Clinical Judgement in the era of Evidence Based Medicine by Flores Sepulveda, Luis Jose
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Clinical Judgement in the era of Evidence Based Medicine
Flores Sepulveda, Luis Jose
Awarding institution:
King's College London
















Submitted to the Department of Philosophy of King’s College London, 
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  




Luis Flores MD. MA. 














Copyright © by Luis J. Flores 2016 
 3 
Abstract 
“Evidence Based Medicine” (EBM) urges that medical recommendations be based on the best 
research evidence, rather than on clinical judgement. While I strongly endorse attention to 
relevant research evidence, I argue that the related downplaying of clinical judgement is a 
step backwards. This is because actual models of EBM encourage physicians to focus 
exclusively on research probabilities and so to neglect relevant information about patients. I 
call this feature of EBM the “Problem of Extra Information” (PEI), and contend that it leads 
to predictions and prescriptions based on the wrong probabilities. 
The PEI has been largely neglected by EBM, which has construed the challenge of clinical 
care as a matter of developing better research evidence, and of reminding physicians to attend 
to patients’ preferences and values. And although meritorious attempts have been made to 
connect research with individuals through sophisticated methodological improvements, these 
only address the PEI partially, and do not eliminate the need for clinical discretion. 
In this dissertation I contend that, in response to the PEI, clinical medicine requires a more 
Discretionary Approach (DA). This approach recognizes that the objective probabilities that 
matter for clinical recommendations are those in the reference class defined by everything the 
physician knows about the patient, and argues that the central role for judgment in clinical 
practice is to estimate these probabilities.  
So understood, the DA has two main advantages over the EBM approach: prudential 
adequacy and evidential flexibility. My defence of the DA consists of addressing criticisms of 
the role ascribed to judgment and clinical experience within this approach.  
The final two chapters of this doctoral dissertation complement my arguments with two meta-
analytical empirical studies: one which compares “therapeutic guidelines based on evidence” 
with “usual care” with respect to patients’ outcomes, and another which examines the relative 
predictive performance of statistical models and physicians’ judgment in the context of 
diagnosis and prognosis. These studies refute previous evidence cited against judgment and 














“Having turned a cold shoulder to the hoary (overused) notion of the intuitive “art of 
medicine,” it might be the case that clinical judgment can now far more productively be seen 
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Clinical medicine is medicine for individuals. It is neither an academic exercise devoted to 
the refinement of general medical knowledge nor a research activity focused on increasing 
our understanding of diseases as abstract entities. In the context of clinical practice medical 
evidence acquires significance insofar it is relevant and properly applied to particular patients.  
This doctoral dissertation is about clinical medicine so understood. In particular, I am 
interested in how physicians should make diagnoses, prognoses, and therapeutic 
recommendations for individuals. I approach this topic from a theoretical and empirical 
perspective. I am interested in how physicians should apply evidence from various sources 
during clinical decision-making and the role of judgment during this process. I endeavour to 
make claims about the right probabilities for clinical recommendations, and the place of 
clinical judgment in the care of particular patients. 
Scholarship concerning the logic underlying medical prescriptions, diagnostic expertise, and 
clinical judgment extends from the time of ancient medicine to relatively recent work on the 
application of decision theory to medical practice. As will be discussed in this dissertation, 
the official perspective on the question of how clinical medicine should be practised is 
currently dominated by the postulates of Evidence Based Medicine (EBM).  One of the core 
ideas proposed by this movement, and one that has been fully embraced by the medical 
establishment, is that physicians should incorporate the best research results into practice, 
either directly or indirectly via evidence-based guidelines. Moreover, along with stressing the 
importance of research results, the EBM movement has questioned the roles traditionally 
attributed to clinical judgment and evidential sources such as clinical experience. Nowadays, 
therefore, the prevailing view is that optimal clinical recommendations are, almost without 
exception, recommendations warranted by the best research available. 
The EBM movement undoubtedly has its merits. After all, who would deny that attention to 
valid research findings is important and potentially beneficial? Or who would like to be 
treated by physicians prescribing treatments supported by out-dated assumptions, unchecked 
reasoning, or even merely wishful thinking? And yet, the maxims of EBM can be taken to the 
extreme. And a number of supporters of EBM have taken them precisely there.  
In his book The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine, Jeremy Howick is not satisfied with 
endorsing the now uncontroversial view that clinical judgment alone is normally a poor basis 
for assessing general population-level claims about therapeutic efficacy. According to 
Howick, clinical judgment is too fallible a tool to be entrusted with any kind of evidential 
function during clinical care. Thus, he suggests that is not only in the context of the 
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generation of general medical knowledge that physicians should abandon clinical discretion. 
Physicians should also put their judgment to one side when comes to predictions and 
prescriptions for individuals.  
Somebody might think that Howick’s stance is idiosyncratic, and that few scholars would 
embrace such high levels of scepticism over the capabilities of clinical judgment. But this is 
hardly the case. The idea that biased clinical judgement is in part responsible for the so-called 
“unwarranted variation in healthcare” is accepted by prominent supporters of EBM and it is 
part of the rationale supporting a model of standardised clinical care where physicians are 
obliged to comply with evidence-based guidelines (EBGs). The line of thought is as follows: 
If two patients have the same condition and share similar preferences, how could it be right 
for them to receive different treatments? In line with this, David Eddy –a prominent figure in 
the camp of EBM– argues that, if one of these two patients receives a treatment supported by 
Randomised Controlled Trials and the other does not, someone must be guilty of an error of 
judgment and someone is receiving suboptimal care. Thus, in the eyes of those who are keen 
to promote standards of practice based on EBGs, the issue of non-compliance with validly 
obtained research results does not seem to deserve extended debate: preferences and values 
may be taken into consideration, but departures from EBGs for evidential reasons are 
unacceptable. 
This commitment to a strong link between EBGs, standards of practice, and quality measures 
is hardly surprising, since it fits naturally with the hierarchical arrangement of evidential 
sources launched by the EBM movement. If recommendations from EBGs are supposed to be 
distillations of the best research evidence, then, departure from such recommendations is 
likely to be supported by low quality evidential sources (personal clinical experience or 
clinical judgment itself). Given this, it is unsurprising that physicians are urged not to exercise 
their judgment and depart from recommendations from EBGs—indeed if they choose to do so 
they risk accusations of suboptimal care or worst malpractice lawsuits. 
Furthermore, it is not difficult to see why EBM policy makers are against clinical judgment 
and why they would like to keep it as restricted as possible. In the view of most of them, 
increasing the room for clinical discretion would be like opening a Pandora’s box–permitting 
recommendations based on anecdote and worsening clinical care. So, from the perspective of 
the strongest believers in EBM, improvements in care will come from one direction: from 
research to practice. Patients need more and better research, more EBM practioners, and more 
physicians complying with EBGs. The less room for clinical discretion the better, because the 
right clinical care is, quite simply, care consistent with evidence-based interventions. In the 
most extreme, EBM implies the elimination of inferences modelled by clinical judgment and 
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informed by experience, in favour of management protocols exclusively based on high-
quality research data. The presence of estimates from valid research override clinical 
judgment because what physicians have seen and learned about patients is likely to be biased, 
and their reasoning, even when it uses the best research as starting point, is likely to find too 
many exceptions to the applicability of clinical trials to individuals that are not justifiable 
according to EBM standards. 
Of course, not all proponents of EBM think that medicine should dispense with clinical 
judgment altogether, or not at least for the present time. More balanced views within the 
EBM camp can be found, as there are those who do not think that the obliteration of the 
current gap between estimates for populations and estimates for individuals by ordinance is 
the best option available. In fact, the standard definition of EBM, which was formulated by 
David Sackett, one of the founders of this movement, seems to describe a version of EBM 
practice that is radically different to the extreme model of standardised care where the best 
research dictates what constitutes optimal practice.  According to Sackett’s definition, EBM 
practioners do have room for the exercise of clinical judgment; what is more, they should 
integrate the best research evidence with their clinical expertise, and do so in a conscientious 
way.  
Sackett’s description of EBM will be discussed in some detail in Chapter Two. At this stage 
let me simply observe that, once one pays close attention to actual models of EBM practice, it 
becomes apparent that, despite the mention of clinical expertise in definitions like Sackett’s, 
EBM practitioners are encouraged and even obliged to practice in accordance to the best 
research available. The misalignment between how EBM is represented and how EBM is 
taught and practiced suggests that those who defend EBM against criticism by appealing to its 
standard definition do not want to recognize that it has become “Rubbish EBM” or, as JPA 
Ioannidis says, it “has been hijacked”. 
As I shall argue, the central problem with actual models of EBM practice is that they neglect 
what I call the Problem of Extra Information (PEI). This problem arises because the physician 
standardly knows more about the patient than that the patient belongs to some population for 
which research data are available, yet the EBM approach tacitly forces the physician to 
assume that this extra information can be neglected.  
This problem emerges because, from my perspective, EBM has not formulated the challenge 
of clinical inference correctly. As we have seen in this Introduction, the practice of EBM 
centred on the identification and application of valid research. Thus, the main task of the 
EBM practitioner is either to search for and apply valid research or comply with 
recommendations based on valid research present in EBGs. This implies that clinical 
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judgment, if permitted to enter the scene, does so after valid research (or derivatively valid 
recommendations) have been clearly pinned down. This may seem trivial, but it is not. By 
focusing the physician’s attention on the probabilities for which there is valid research 
available, the EBM approach turns the physician’s attention away from the reference class 
defined by the physician’s knowledge of the patient, and towards reference classes there are 
valid research data for. Thus, the EBM approach effectively dismisses the PEI because by the 
time clinical judgment enters the scene it is too late: the physician has already been directed 
to recommendations based on membership of a general diagnostic reference class for which 
reliable statistics are available, and so has been tacitly obliged to assume that the extra 
features present in her patient do not make any probabilistic different to the outcome of 
interest. One way to summarize this is to say that the EBM approach promotes 
recommendations based on the wrong probabilities, and this very fact means that, even if the 
standard definition of EBM mentions clinical judgment, this approach has not yet fully 
understood that one of the main roles of the physician is to address the PEI.   
If what the physician is trying to do during the clinical encounter is to maximise benefit and 
minimise harm in her patient, then, the probabilities she ought to be interested in are the 
probabilities for patients exactly like the physician knows her patient to be. In terms of 
reference classes, my contention is that the right approach to clinical care should encourage 
the physician to look for the probabilities for the reference class conformed by everything she 
knows about the patient. These are, from a prudential perspective, the right probabilities to 
base clinical recommendations on and therefore, the probabilities the physician needs to make 
a judgment about. Since recommendations based on probabilities obtained via valid research 
can be but need not be relative to everything the physician knows about the patient, then, the 
probabilities supported by the EBM approach, even in its cutting edge version, need not be 
the right probabilities and it is reasonable to think that often are the wrong probabilities.  
Defending this view is the task of this doctoral dissertation. I shall argue that the EBM 
approach as it is practiced and implemented is wrong in encouraging physicians to focus 
exclusively on research probabilities. In response to the limitations of the EBM approach, and 
in particular to its failure properly to address the PEI, I shall propose a more Discretionary 
Approach (DA). According to this approach, it is rational for the physician to base her clinical 
recommendations on the probabilities relative to the reference class defined by everything she 
knows about the patient. These are the right probabilities for clinical recommendations, and 
the role of clinical judgment is to address the PEI by estimating such probabilities. 
My argument proceeds in five steps. The first step (Chapter 1) reconstructs the rationale of 
EBM recommendations in terms of a partially formal argument, which I think captures the 
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essential elements of this approach and permits me to illustrate how it works in practice. 
Using a clinical case, I shall illustrate the PEI and show how EBM recommendations lead to 
its neglect.  The chapter explains the rationale behind focusing on what I call the “right 
probabilities”, and shows how one of the advantages of the DA over the EBM approach is 
increased evidential flexibility. 
The second step (Chapter 2) is devoted to defending my reconstruction of the EBM approach 
against a charge of straw man. I accept that there is a sense in which this charge appears to be 
justified by the standard definitions of EBM. However, by carefully examining two different 
models of EBM practice I provide evidence that suggests that the actual practice of EBM is 
more similar to my reconstruction than to EBM’s official definition. 
The third step (Chapter 3) considers the prospects of alternative ways of dealing with the PEI, 
which avoid my Discretionary Approach and its appeal to clinical judgment. I examine 
several research refinements –including Pragmatic RCTs, subgroup-analyses, and “n of 1 
RCTs”– and I admit these are helpful in various ways. (Some of these are related to the PEI, 
while others help with standard difficulties related to statistical estimation and causal 
inference.) Then, I appraise “personalised” and “precision” medicine, which I accept can 
narrow the gap between research and individuals. Nonetheless, despite their benefits, I 
conclude that the research improvements in question ameliorate but do not solve the PEI, and 
therefore cannot be used to support the elimination of clinical discretion.  
The fourth step (Chapter 4) further elaborates on the DA and examines potential worries 
about its application. First, the DA is distinguished from similar positions such as Medical 
Particularism and Person Centred-Medicine. Then, I defend it from various charges ranging 
from lack of normative novelty to impracticality. Finally, this chapter discusses the rationale 
behind the concern that the implementation of the DA might worsen clinical care, and argues 
that since supporters of EBM have overstated the negative consequences of clinical 
experience and physicians’ limited cognitive abilities, and partially neglected the limitations 
of research evidence, well-designed and updated comparisons between the DA and the EBM 
approach are needed. 
Finally, the fifth step (Chapters 5 and 6) presents the results of two systematic reviews, which 
shed light on the importance of implementing the DA. Chapter 5 provides the most 
comprehensive and updated summary on the relative performance of successfully 
implemented EBGs and “care as usual”. The findings presented support the plausibility of the 
DA approach in the context of therapy. Chapter 6 then consist of a systematic review 
comparing the predictive accuracy of statistical models with that of physicians’ judgment in 
the context of diagnosis and prognosis. This study also challenges previous findings in the 
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subject used by supporters of EBM to discredit the role of clinical judgment, and thus 
complements the findings presented in the previous chapter, vindicating the DA this time in 
the context of diagnosis and prognosis.  
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Chapter 1: EBM: a critical appraisal and a positive proposal 
 
1.1. Abstract 
The main aims of this chapter are to clarify the kind of recommendations endorsed by the 
Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) approach to clinical care, and to bring attention to one of its 
most important limitations. Although I strongly concur with the idea that attention to research 
evidence is crucial to sound clinical decision-making, I shall argue that the EBM approach is 
wrong in encouraging compliance with predictions and prescriptions that neglect part of what 
the physician knows about her patient. I shall call this feature of the EBM approach the 
Problem of Extra Information (PEI), and my main contention shall be that, to the extent that 
EBM disregards the implications of this problem for particular patients, it supports a type of 
clinical care based on the wrong probabilities.  
In response to this problem, I shall argue that, if the physician’s goal is to maximize expected 
utility for her patient, then her clinical recommendations need to emerge from a more 
discretionary approach. This approach hinges on the idea that the probabilities the physician 
ought to be interested in are the objective probabilities in the reference class determined by 
everything the physician knows about the patient, and that whenever the PEI arises, clinical 












1.2. The scope of clinical medicine 
Clinical medicine is medicine for individuals. At its core there is the clinical encounter, which 
could be, roughly, described like this: There is a patient, maybe currently affected by some 
ailment, who visits a physician looking for information about her present situation and 
guidance as to what to do with it. When seeing the patient the physician gathers information 
about her and her current situation, and then makes various recommendations.2  
If clinical practice is described as a set of predictions and prescriptions issued by physicians 
during the clinical encounter, then, the question arises: What kind of inferences should the 
rational physician make in this context? How should physicians arrive at rational clinical 
recommendations? 
Nowadays, it is widely accepted that clinical medicine should be practised along the lines of 
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) 3  This movement has presented physicians with an 
intuitively compelling normative standard: clinical recommendations should ideally be based 
on the best research results. Why so? Because, as one of its founders puts it, research 
evidence of the highest quality is “so much more likely to inform us and so much less likely to 
mislead us” (Sackett et al. 1996. p.71). Thus, if supporters of EBM are right in that the best 
possible decision-making is decision-making warranted by high quality research, then it 
seems to follow that the rational physician ought to arrive at clinical recommendations 
following the rules of EBM.4   
In this chapter I want to cast doubt on some aspects of EBM so understood. True, paying 
attention to research evidence –and in particular to relevant and carefully conducted research 
studies– is crucially important to improve the quality of medical care. But for all its 
importance, I shall argue that care based on the best research is not necessarily the best care 
for the individual. And, in fact, I shall argue that to think of the adequacy of clinical medicine 
in almost exclusive reference to the best research evidence is misplaced. Clinical medicine 
requires a more discretionary approach, an approach that recognises explicitly that the right 
probabilities for clinical inferences are the objective probabilities in the reference class 
defined by everything the physician knows about the patient; an approach that acknowledges 
                                                        
2  Throughout this thesis my use of the term “the patient” should be understood broadly, as encompassing 
characteristics inherent to the patient and any aspect or feature of the clinical encounter. 
3 This claim is based on the fact that most medical schools (e.g. (Harvard Medical School, no date), (Cambridge 
Medical School, no date), professional associations –e.g. (American college of Physicians, no date), (Royal 
College of Physicians, no date) and the majority of health institutions, private and public (e.g. (NICE, no date) in 
United Kingdom and (NIH, 2016) in United States endorse the principles of EBM.  For general sources on the 
impact of EBM see (Meats et al., 2009) and (Ioannidis, 2016).  
4 As the philosopher Michael Loughlin (2009) has complained, there are supporters of EBM who seem to have 
taken the reasonableness of this approach for granted and even have reacted with outrage or sarcasm to anyone 
who question the movement (e.g. Goldacre 2006; Isaacs and Fitzgerald, 1999). 
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without hesitation that valid research need not provide the physician with estimates of these 
probabilities, and an approach that promotes the exercise of careful judgment to determine the 
best recommendations for each individual. 
The plan for this chapter is as follows. In section 1.3 I shall offer a brief discussion on basic 
aspects of expected utility theory, probability, and causation, so to clarify from the outset my 
position in the field of rational clinical decision-making.  Section 1.4 is focused on the EBM 
approach. This section starts with a general reconstruction of this movement in order to make 
explicit the rationale behind evidence-based recommendations, and continues with a clinical 
case, which will help me to illustrate my main objection against the EBM approach: its lack 
of attention to the Problem of Extra Information. Then, this section ends by considering two 
initial replies from supporters of EBM (§ 1.4.3 and § 1.4.4), which will be useful in 
explaining why I think the EBM approach directs physicians’ attention to the wrong 
probabilities. Finally, section 1.5 offers a more detailed account of the discretionary approach 
and two reasons for accepting that the probabilities in the reference class defined by 
everything the physician knows about the patient are the right probabilities for clinical 
inference: first, prudential adequacy and, second, evidential flexibility. 
1.3. Rational clinical recommendations 
1.3.1. Expected utility theory  
Think again of the question I posed in the previous section: What kind of recommendations 
should the rational physician make in the context of clinical medicine? My strategy to analyse 
the answer put forward by EBM involves looking at the clinical encounter from the 
perspective of expected utility theory (EUT).5  
Consider a therapeutic prescription. When deciding what to prescribe the physician thinks of 
several possible outcomes (cure, quality of life, etc.), each of which has been assigned certain 
utilities. Then there are various therapeutic interventions available, and each of them has a 
certain probability to cause the outcomes of interest (which in turn depends on certain states 
of the world). Now, from the point of view of EUT, what the rational physician is going to do 
is to choose the treatment that maximises expected utility.6 
                                                        
5 By expected utility theory I mean the traditional doctrine initiated by British utilitarian philosophers Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill and further developed by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.  This theory 
has several formulations but, in essence, that the ideal rational decision-maker ought to pursue actions that 
maximize expected utility (Kyburg and Thalos, 2003).  
6 Given a set of therapeutic prescriptions open to the physician, T1, …Tk; a set of outcomes of interest O1, …, Om, 
each with utilities U(O1), …, U(Om); and a set of conditional probabilities for Oi given therapeutic prescription Tj, 
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Obviously this is an idealization. But it will not matter for my purposes. EUT will be my 
starting point. It will provide us with a general normative framework, which I will use, first, 
to examine the EBM approach, and second, to lay down the foundations of the discretionary 
approach, the alternative approach I shall defend. As it will become apparent during the next 
sections, the main reason why EUT is important for my purposes is that it plays a central role 
in the prudential argument with which I will defend the role of judgment during clinical 
inference. 
Nonetheless, being a practicing physician myself, I take very seriously arguments that 
complain that EUT is at best an idealisation of actual decision-making and so of limited 
relevance to actual clinical practice (Gilovich et al. 2003). In response to such concerns, the 
last two chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 5 and 6) present the results of a reanalysis of 
systematic reviews and a meta-analytical summary of evidence that shed light on the potential 
consequences of giving physicians more room for the exercise of their clinical judgment, and 
thereby provide valuable insights about physicians’ capacity to get near to the normative ideal 
envisaged by EUT. 
 Moreover, it is also important to clarify from the outset that my main concern shall be with 
probabilities not utilities. The importance of utility functions in clinical medicine is difficult 
to overestimate, but there are two reasons why I shall not focus on them in this dissertation. 
First, although accurate estimates of both utilities and probabilities are required to maximize 
expected utility, the challenges presented by each of these functions are largely independent: 
even if utilities were perfectly known, difficulties with probabilities may result in 
inappropriate recommendations and vice-versa. The second reason why I shall concentrate on 
probabilities rather than utilities is that utility assessments have already received some 
attention in the medical literature. This is particularly so in the context of therapy, where the 
model of shared-decision making has brought attention to the importance of considering 
patients’ preferences and values (e.g. Siminoff, 2013; McCartney et al. 2016). By contrast, 
the probabilistic rationale of physicians’ clinical inferences, and specifically, the question of 
what kind of probabilities predictions and prescriptions should be based on, has been largely 
ignored by medical scholars. 7 
                                                                                                                                                              
P(O1|T1),…, P(Om|Tk); then, the therapeutic prescription that maximizes expected utility is the Tj for which is 
Ʃi=1…m U(Oi) P(Ri|Tj) is maximum (Jeffrey, 1983). 
 
7 My focusing on probabilities will be reflected in the analysis of cases where utilities are fixed so that the goal of 
maximizing expected utility be attained by recommending the action with the highest probability to cause the 
outcome of interest. Note, however, that this is only to facilitate exposition, for I do not intend to convey the idea 
that the rational physician should always recommend the action with the greatest probability to cause the outcome 
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1.3.2. Clinical recommendations: predictions and prescriptions 
The components underlying clinical recommendations require elaboration. The practice of 
clinical medicine can be seen as an inferential process leading to series of predictions and 
prescriptions pertaining to individual patients (Card and Good, 1971). In this thesis the term 
clinical recommendations will encompass both predictions and prescriptions for particular 
patients, and since the focus of my analysis is restricted to clinical medicine, my use of these 
terms should not be extended to populations unless otherwise specified. 
Note also that throughout the course of the three fundamental medical tasks: diagnosis, 
prognosis and therapy, physicians’ predictions and prescriptions intertwine in complex ways 
(Murphy, 1997). For this reason, it will be helpful to specify how these terms will be 
understood. My usage of the term prediction will be restricted to diagnostic and prognostic 
tasks, and therefore circumscribed to inferences and subsequent recommendations which are 
aimed at detecting concurrent but yet unknown outcomes or forecasting future outcomes 
without causing them. 8  The term prescription, on the other hand, shall be reserved for 
recommendations involving active interventions aimed at causing the outcome of interest in 
the context of therapy.9 
1.3.3. Causal and non-causal correlations 
Since therapeutic recommendations typically involve interventions aimed at modifying the 
pathological process causing the patient’ state, I will take it that rational prescriptions should 
be normally based on relevant causal correlations. By demanding attention to causal 
correlations rather than simple correlations, I am making explicit my commitment to causal 
decision theory in the context of medical therapy. In doing so, I am assuming that when 
physicians prescribe medications they should not be merely interested in increasing the 
probability of the outcome of interest but rather in causing the outcome of interest in a 
probabilistic sense.10 On the other hand, since diagnostic and prognostic recommendations 
                                                                                                                                                              
of interest. Such recommendation only holds under the assumption that utilities make no difference, which is not 
true in many real clinical circumstances. 
8 For example, in diagnostic contexts, a prediction can be about the presence of a certain underlying disease based 
on a set of symptoms (in this case, a diagnostic prediction is identical to a diagnostic hypothesis). And, in 
prognostic contexts, a prediction can be about the future occurrence of an event of interest (e.g. acute myocardial 
infarction) without therapy. 
9 Of course, in common usage, the term “prescription” has sometimes been used in the context of diagnosis (e.g. 
when physicians “prescribe” a diagnostic test) or also to describe actions not aimed at causing the outcome of 
interest in the context of therapy (e.g. when physicians “prescribe” that the patient simply wait until the symptoms 
fade out without taking any particular therapy). Nonetheless, it will simplify my exposition to distinguish between 
(i) diagnostic and prognostic predictions, and (ii) therapeutic prescriptions. 
10 Note that I am aware that in many situations the treatment that increases the probability of the outcome will also 
be the treatment that causes the outcome in a probabilistic sense, but since this need not be the case it is worth 
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are concerned with prediction rather that causation, I shall take it that rational predictions 
need not be (though they can be) based on causal correlations.  
The practical importance of the distinction between causal and non-causal inferences in the 
context of different clinical tasks can be illustrated with an example. Consider the relationship 
between an opportunist infection such as oesophageal candidiasis (OC) and the diagnosis of 
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Many cases of HIV infection are first detected 
because the patient seeks medical attention due to symptoms related to OC. Since opportunist 
infections arise almost exclusively in the presence of immune deficiency, OC is considered a 
strong predictor of HIV infection (Patton et al. 1999). So, although OC does not cause HIV 
infection, a diagnostic prediction of HIV and subsequent diagnostic actions (carrying out 
specific HIV tests) in virtue of the presence OC are perfectly reasonable. By contrast, 
although the identification of OC is typically followed by the diagnosis of HIV infection, the 
fact that the former does not cause the latter makes it unreasonable to infer that a patient with 
HIV infection will recover if her OC is successfully treated with antifungal agents. So, 
whereas relevant non-causal correlations often suffice for reliable diagnostic and prognostic 
predictions, simple correlations might lead physicians astray when comes to therapeutic 
prescriptions. 11   
Note, in passing, that, even if the merits of causal decision-theory over evidential decision 
theory involve heated discussion among philosophers (Peterson, 2009; Papineau, 2006), it 
does not seem to be a contentious issue in the context of medical practice. For one thing, 
medical researchers and clinicians alike are now familiar with the notion of confounding and 
accept that this kind of factors has to be controlled for as much as possible in the context of 
therapy.12 For another, most medical practioners accept as uncontroversial the distinction 
between (a) risk and prognostic factors, which are interpreted as simple correlations for 
                                                                                                                                                              
stating upfront that my normative account of therapeutic decision-making demands attention to causal probabilities 
whenever possible. 
11 Note the distinction between (a) the causal effect of the act of predicting and (b) a prediction based on a factor 
that causes the outcome of interest. When I say that diagnostic and prognostic tasks are not normally aimed at 
causing the outcome of inference I had in mind (a). But when I say that diagnostic and prognostic predictions can 
but need not be based on causal correlations I have in mind (b). Of course, with respect to (a), there are interesting 
cases where the act of forecasting unintentionally causes the outcome of interest via some psychological or 
psychosomatic mechanism. These kinds of mechanisms are not uncommon in certain patients (e.g. prediction of 
relapse in drug addicts, or prediction of symptoms’ recurrence in patients with psychosomatic disorders). However, 
these are special cases, which do change the fact that most diagnostic and prognostic tasks involve actions that are 
causally independent of the outcome of interest (e.g. the act of requesting a chest radiography does not cause a 
patient’s pneumonia, this action only changes the probability of detecting it). Moreover, regarding (b) let me stress 
that while there are situations where physicians predict outcomes using causal factors – for example, the prediction 
of cervical cancer by identifying the presence of Human Papilloma virus– most diagnostic and prognostic 
predictions are based on simple correlations.  
12 Evidence of an increased interest in methods to deal with confounders not only includes current attention to 
randomized controlled trials, but also the development of various techniques to deal with confounders in the 
context of non-randomized studies (Vineis, 1997; Listl et al., 2016; Hernán and Robins, 2006; Nichols, 2007). 
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purely predictive purposes, and (b) causal factors and mechanisms, which are included as 
part of the rationale behind therapeutic interventions (Knottnerus, 1995; Riley et al. 2013; 
Andersen, 2012). So, it is agreed across the board that therapeutic prescriptions need to be 
based on causal correlations, while robust diagnostic procedures or reliable prognostic 
forecasts need not be backed up by causal inferences.13 
1.3.4. Subjective and objective probabilities 
Finally, before proceeding with my reconstruction of the EBM approach, it will be useful to 
be explicit about the kind of probabilities that will occupy our attention. According to 
traditional decision theory (e.g. Jeffrey, 1983) a subjectively rational physician ought to 
maximise expected utility from the point of view of her personal probabilities or subjective 
degrees of belief. But even if the physician is successful at doing this, it is not difficult to 
imagine situations where subjectively rational prescriptions would not be objectively 
advisable. Suppose a physician needs to decide between two available treatments for the 
patient, who is currently affected by a gout attack. However, this physician is misinformed 
and in consequence estimates that treatment A (say, colchicine and ibuprofen) will cause 
recovery with probability 0.3 and the alternative treatment B (say, rest without medication) 
will cause the same outcome with probability 0.7. If we assume that the patient’s preferences 
are neutral between the treatments, then this physician will rationally recommend her patient 
treatment B.  And yet, should we think that this recommendation is advisable when the 
patient’s objective probability of recovery is, say, 0.8 with treatment A and 0.4 with treatment 
B? Obviously, whenever personal probabilities do not match the relevant objective 
probabilities there is little point in being subjectively rational (Papineau, 2006). So, I shall 
take it as uncontentious that patients need physicians to choose prescriptions that will 
maximize their probability of recovery in an objective sense. Or, to put it even more explicitly, 
that the rational physician ought to attend to the right objective probabilities.  
In this respect, I suspect that the intuition that physicians’ practice should be relevantly 
connected to objective probabilities is one of the main thrusts behind the Evidence Based 
                                                        
13 Having said that, two remarks are in order. Firstly, the fact that simple correlations can lead physicians astray in 
the context of therapy does not imply that the only information useful during therapeutic decision-making is 
information whose causal relevance to the outcome of interest has been established via valid research designs (e.g. 
Randomized Controlled trials). There are many genuine causal correlations supported by experience, whose effect 
size is so large that it would be both epistemologically unnecessary and unethical to carry out RCTs to rule out 
potential unknown confounding (in the classic example, the use of parachutes to avoid death related to 
gravitational challenge (Smith and Pell, 2003). Furthermore, without taking things to the extreme, it is reasonable 
to suppose that physicians can sometimes use their own experience to detect potentially relevant factors, which if 
have enough biological plausibility could be attributed a causal role and taken into account during clinical 
decision-making. Secondly, my commitment to causal decision theory does not imply that the output of standard 
research methods developed for purposes of causal inference (again, RCTs) is sufficient to ensure the adequacy of 
therapeutic prescriptions for individuals. As I shall explain during the next sections, in the context of therapy 
attention to general causal correlations from research should be complemented with appropriate consideration of 
potential interaction effects present in the patient in question. 
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Movement (EBM). And I must stress that this is an intuition with which I am happy to agree. 
However, I do not think the EBM movement is directing physicians’ attention to the right 
objective probabilities. This is a matter of practical importance, for although I accept that 
paying attention to the valid research evidence is important for decision-making, I do not 
think that the right objective probabilities for clinical recommendations are always the 
probabilities for which valid research estimates are available.  
In the next section I will offer a general reconstruction of the EBM approach, which along 
with a clinical case will illustrate how EBM encourages recommendations based on what, I 
shall argue, are the wrong objective probabilities.  
1.4. Evidence-based clinical recommendations 
1.4.1. The EBM argument  
Let us consider an admittedly ideal situation. Suppose there is a population defined by the 
presence of a certain diagnosis D. Assume the physician has access to updated research 
evidence about the efficacy of certain medications in this population. This evidence is of the 
highest quality according to EBM rules.14 It consists of a set of randomized controlled trials, 
which were conducted to compare the efficacy of medication A to that of medication B – the 
two treatments currently available for patients with diagnosis D. Suppose that the findings 
indicate that, on average, medication A has a higher probability to cause the outcome of 
interest (e.g. recovery R) than medication B.  And, suppose further that the physician has 
good reason to regard these findings as both internally and externally valid: samples were 
representative of the underlying population D, randomization was not violated, outcomes 
were well-chosen, measurements were unbiased, treatment protocols and follow-up periods 
were realistic, and so on.  
Imagine now that the physician has a particular patient p, and is sure the patient has ailment D. 
That is, let us pretend that the relevant diagnostic tests are perfect in terms of sensitivity and 
specificity 15, and so there is certainty as to the fact that patient p has the ailment in question. 
Finally, to complete this idealized scenario, assume that the physician has confidently 
established that the outcome of interest for patient p is “recovery” and that the patient is 
indifferent to other utilities related to the therapies available (e.g. economical costs, adverse 
effects, etc.).   
                                                        
14 By EBM rules I mean hierarchies (or levels) of evidence published by institutions such as the Oxford Centre for 
EBM (Phillips et al., 1998; updated by Howick, 2011) or described in standard EBM textbooks (e.g. Guyatt et al., 
2008; Strauss et al., 2011). Rules of evidence are described in more detail in Chapter 2 (§ 2.4.1.3). For a thoughtful 
and detailed examination of the hierarchical rules of evidence the reader is referred to Blunt (2015). 
15 Readers not familiar with these terms are advised to consult Akobeng (2007). 
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This hypothetical situation provides us with an excellent opportunity to introduce and 
examine the rationale of the EBM approach to clinical inference. For, in a situation just like 
the one described (or close to it), this approach tells us that the physician ought to recommend 
medication A.  
In order to see what exactly is going on here it would be helpful to be explicit about the 
logical steps underlying this recommendation. Of course, such endeavour is not without 
problems: just as different arguments can lead to the same conclusion, the EBM rationale may 
be represented in different ways.16 Nonetheless, a useful way to think about this is in terms of 
the following argument: 
i) p ∈ D  
ii) PD (R|A) > PD (R|B)  
∴) A is the right therapeutic prescription for p  
where “p” denotes a particular patient, “D” a given target population, “R” stands for recovery, 
and A and B denote mutually exclusive medications.17  
Several remarks can be made about this argument, but let me start with what I think is the 
simplest but most interesting among them: although persuasive and perhaps popular among 
many practitioners of EBM, this argument is invalid. By this, I simply mean that even if the 
physician were perfectly certain of the truth of the premises, the conclusion would not follow.  
This may be familiar ground to many philosophers, but since it is not for most physicians 
allow me to unpack this argument in more detail.  The problem with this argument does not 
lie on the presence of false or implausible premises, but rather it has to do with the 
relationship between the premises and the conclusion. A closer look at the content of the 
premises will clarify this. 
                                                        
16 Note that I am aware that not every author who considers himself a supporter of EBM will be committed to the 
same kind of prescriptions. Nonetheless, although I acknowledge divergence of though within EBM, I think that 
the reconstruction of the logical basis of the recommendations normally attributed to the EBM movement it is 
possible. This is so because, as I will argue in chapter 2, both EBM teachings and implementations strategies share 
a commitment to EBM rules of evidence, which underlies physicians’ intuitive understanding of what counts as an 
evidence-based recommendation. 
17 Note that, as I explained previously in this chapter (§ 2.1), in order to focus on the logic of probabilistic 
inference this argument assumes that the patient’s outcome of interest R is fixed and that the patient is indifferent 
to further utilities. It is only given these assumptions that the EBM argument can offer a conclusion about the right 
recommendation rather than merely about probabilities. So, the reader may well take the conclusion as equivalent 
to: “If p is exclusively interested in R then A is the right therapeutic prescription”. Note also that in the context of 
evidence of ideal RCTs, the difference in the conditional probabilities showed in the second premise should be 
given a general causal interpretation such as “in population D, on average, medication A has a higher probability 
to cause recovery than medication B” (See, Papineau, 1994, 1985, 1989; also Cartwright, 2007). 
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The first premise represents what we might call a ‘diagnostic hypothesis´. It simply asserts 
that the patient belongs to a set of subjects defined by the presence of a given medical 
condition, in this case ailment D. This is a perfectly plausible premise, which standardly 
arises during the exercise of clinical medicine. Of course, in real contexts physicians do not 
rely on foolproof diagnoses, but this merely indicates that a premise of this kind may be more 
or less certain depending on the patient in question, among other considerations, but there is 
nothing in it that makes it necessarily false. Thus, this diagnostic hypothesis seems to be a 
reasonable premise for supporters of EBM to rely on.  
Let us now turn our attention to the second premise. As with the previous premise, this 
second premise does not seem questionable by itself. Here what it is being asserted is simply 
that a specific intervention has a higher probability to cause the outcome of interest than a 
relevant alternative on average in a certain population. Of course, in practice physicians rarely 
face an ideal situation where the evidence available is so strong that any concerns about the 
appropriateness of statistical inference (estimation), causal inference (confounding), and 
external validity (extrapolation) do not arise, but even if in real situations the aforementioned 
issues can be problematic, there is no principled reason to think that general efficacy claims 
are not practically possible.18 
So, if the premises seem plausible, why is it that I claim that the conclusion does not follow? 
Is it not exactly in situations of this kind: where the patient’s diagnosis is correct, the 
evidence seems both strong and relevant to the patient, and preferences and values have been 
properly accounted for, when it is reasonable to conclude that the application of the best 
research evidence determines the right prescription? Why is it that I claim that this EBM 
recommendation does not follow? An example inspired in a real situation suggested by Brian 
Hurwitz (Hurwitz, 2013) will be useful to illustrate the problem I have in mind. 
1.4.2. The case of Mr. Smith and the problem of extra information 
To continue with our useful idealization let us consider first a simplified clinical scenario A:  
Dr Jones is a physician who considers himself as an EBM practitioner.  She wants to establish 
the best treatment for her patient, Mr Smith, who is currently affected by ‘acute 
conjunctivitis’. Assume that the clinical picture is clear so the diagnosis is well justified. Now, 
Dr Jones, being the dutiful physician she is, knows very well that she should search for 
updated evidence of the highest quality to establish whether “a short course of antibiotics” or 
                                                        
18 Let me clarify immediately that the main reason why at this stage I am setting aside problems underlying 
general efficacy claims is not because I think these are unimportant (Fuller and Flores, 2015, 2016; and Flores 
2015), but rather because I want to bring attention to a further problem which remains even if statistical estimation, 
confounding, and extrapolation to target populations were not a problem. We will return to these issues in chapter 
3 (§ 3.4), when discussing current methods to refine EBM recommendations. 
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“observation without antibiotics” is better for Mr Smith.  Given that Dr Jones does not have 
much time to perform a systematic review and then critically appraise a long list of 
potentially relevant studies, she might opt to comply with the recommendations of evidence-
based guidelines19. In this respect, current guidelines indicate that “acute conjunctivitis” is a 
self-limiting condition, in which topical antibiotics are not effective (Jefferis et al. 2011, 
Sheikh and Hurwitz, 2006; Steeples and Mercieca, 2012).  
Now, given a solid guideline recommendation, backed up by ‘gold standard’ methods, and 
assuming that the preferences of Mr Smith are not an obstacle, an EBM practitioner like Dr 
Jones would not hesitate to conclude that Mr Smith should not receive antibiotics, and that 
this properly evidence-based advice does not deserve further revision. And yet, regrettably, 
since Dr Jones’ individualized prescription is backed up by an inadequate rationale, it may be 
wrong in many circumstances, which will become apparent if we consider a slightly more 
realistic clinical scenario B. 
Assume now that during the clinical interview Dr Jones records some extra information about 
Mr Smith. For example, she learns that Mr Smith’s daughter has been recently affected by a 
serious case of acute conjunctivitis in which a particular bacterium was isolated. Or, 
alternatively, suppose that when asking for personal antecedents Dr Jones traces back a 
history of repeated sexually transmitted diseases (RSTD), or perhaps she learns that Mr Smith 
has recently returned from a trip to a suburban, poor area in Africa.  
I take it that Dr Jones should not ignore this information. This is not because the information 
will necessarily change Mr Smith’s diagnosis, for after considering this information there is 
still a sense in which the diagnosis remains acute conjunctivitis. Rather, it is because this 
information may make a difference to the clinically relevant objective probability of recovery 
for Mr Smith (Steeples and Mercieca, 2012; Postema et al.1996; Garland et al. 1995).  
But then, how could Dr Jones take into account this information and simultaneously follow 
EBM rules? Does not Dr Jones knows that the best research evidence available indicates that 
antibiotics do not work for patients with acute conjunctivitis, and that Mr Smith has acute 
conjunctivitis, and so the right thing to do is to withhold antibiotics? If the EBM approach is 
correct, and the right prescriptions are prescriptions supported by the best evidence available, 
then it seems that Dr Jones should not waste her time paying attention to additional 
information. After all, the premises required by the EBM argument have already been met. Dr 
Jones knows that Mr Smith has acute conjunctivitis, and according to EBM guidelines, the 
                                                        
19 The two alternatives mentioned here refer to the four steps model of EBM practice (“4S model”, see chapter 2 
(§ 2.4.1) and the EBM guidelines model of practice (“EBGs model”, see chapter 2 (§ 2.4.2). 
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right thing to do in this case is not to give antibiotics. Thus, it seems that the EBM approach 
does not leave much room for Dr Jones to revise the probabilities that should guide her 
treatment of Mr Smith in the light of what she has learned about him, although it seems clear 
that, in truth, ignoring such information may result in the wrong prescription.  
With this more realistic clinical scenario in mind, it becomes apparent that neither absolute 
certainty that Mr Smith belongs to the diagnostic category ‘acute conjunctivitis’, nor the 
availability of reliable research conducted on patients with this diagnosis are enough to ensure 
that the EBM prescription is the right one for Mr Smith.   
Let me emphasise, in passing, that the problem with this EBM recommendation has nothing 
to do with a potential conflict of utilities (or “preferences and values” in the EBM jargon). 
The question of what utilities Mr Smith attaches to the available prescriptions is of crucial 
importance, but certainly different from the question of how likely is that each of the 
prescriptions available will cause the outcome of interest for Mr Smith. 
So, to summarize: what is the trouble with the EBM approach? Put simply, the problem is that 
this approach does not account for the fact that the physician might know more about the 
patient than that the patient belongs to a population for which there are valid research data, 
and that irrespective of the presence of further information available to the physician at the 
time of decision-making, the EBM approach standardly encourages (and sometimes obliges) 
the physician to act on the probabilities for which valid research estimates have been obtained. 
This is problematic because, in real clinical encounters, physicians are likely to identify 
features that might make a difference to the probabilities that should guide treatment but for 
which valid clinical trial results are unlikely to be found. In the case of Mr Smith, EBM 
recommends Dr Jones to base her inferences on the best research data, but such data only 
exists for patients with acute conjunctivitis tout court, not for a patient like Dr Jones knows 
Mr Smith to be, that is, for patients with acute conjunctivitis and the characteristics Dr Jones 
learned about him during the clinical encounter (e.g. RSTD, recent trip, and so on).  
This problem will be denoted the Problem of Extra Information (PEI). It is worth 
emphasizing that it arises whenever the physician has knowledge that locates the patient in a 
more fine-grained reference class, by which I mean an extensionally narrower but 
informationally richer reference class.  
So described, the PEI has been largely disregarded by supporters of EBM. As my 
reconstruction of the EBM argument illustrates, the emphasis of this approach has been on 
recommendations based on validly obtained general efficacy claims (second premise), plus 
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reminding the physician that the individualisation of research findings requires attention to 
the patient’s preferences and values.  
In the rest of this chapter I shall argue that the PEI calls for a revision of the EBM approach. 
For insofar as physicians are advised to base their decisions on research estimates that ignore 
available information, EBM encourages them to try to identify the wrong objective 
probabilities to guide treatment. In response to this problem, I shall formulate an alternative 
approach. This approach holds that as the right probabilities for clinical inference are the 
objective probabilities in the reference class based on everything the physician knows about 
her patient. Hence, it emphasises that probability estimates from valid research may but need 
not be estimates of the right probabilities, and that EBM should not encourage physicians to 
assume that any extra-information available about the patient is probabilistically irrelevant. 
This approach will be denoted the discretionary approach (DA). Although I certainly think 
that rational physicians ought to attend to valid research evidence, this should not prevent 
them aiming to estimate the objective probabilities that should actually guide their treatment 
of each of their patients.  
Before proceeding, however, it will be worth to address two immediate replies to the 
challenge raised by the case of Mr Smith. 
1.4.3. Is this a straw-man? 
Supporters of EBM may rely on several strategies to address the challenge raised by the case 
of Mr Smith. An obvious alternative would be to deny that the argument sketched in section 
3.1 truly represents the EBM approach. The EBM movement, this rebuttal goes, does in fact 
leave space for clinical judgment, and therefore it gives physicians sufficient manoeuvrability 
to take into account additional information so to avoid misapplications of research results. 
Physicians who apply the best research evidence in the way Dr Jones did are not exemplars of 
EBM practitioners, since a truly EBM practitioner would have considered all available data to 
change her prescription. 
EBM’s advocates have the right to raise this objection because, up to now, I have not offered 
specific evidence to back up my reconstruction of EBM. An adequate reply to this objection 
requires a detailed account of how exactly EBM obliges physicians to apply valid research 
evidence to particular patients, and what the exact place of judgment within the EBM’s 
system is. However, given that the answers to these questions require contextual information 
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and an extended argument, I shall address concerns about a potential misrepresentation of the 
EBM movement in the next chapter.20 
For the moment, I can anticipate that although my reconstruction of EBM removes some 
nuances so to avoid unnecessary complications, it still captures the kind of practice that 
follows from standard models of EBM practice. While it is true that the most common 
definition of EBM (Sackett et al. 1996) seems to permit the exercise of clinical judgment, I 
shall maintain that the very presence of prescriptions supported by high-quality research data 
generates a normative pressure that in most cases ends collapsing almost completely the space 
for judgment and thereby makes EBM practice vulnerable to the problem of extra information 
(PEI). 
More importantly, even if there is a sense in which the methods used to implement EBM 
recommendations permit the exercise of clinical judgment, I would still argue that, in practice, 
the space assigned to clinical judgment in this context does not really help the EBM approach 
to avoid the PEI. For, insofar as supporters of EBM are truly committed to hierarchies of 
evidence, which is one of the core organizing principles of this movement, they will have to 
admit that inferences informed by low-ranked evidence are not welcomed, and, because of 
this, the role of judgment will be normally restricted to that of preventing blatant 
misapplications of valid research evidence under exceptional circumstances. And while I 
would be prepared to admit that this sort of gatekeeper function for clinical judgement is 
better than ignoring clinical judgment altogether, I would still argue that the EBM approach is 
misguided, for the application of judgment should not be restricted to a limited set of 
evidential sources but rather it should be kept flexible so that the physician to be able to 
estimate, as best as possible, the right probabilities for each patient.  
1.4.4. The problem of outliers 
A different EBM response to the case of Mr Smith would be to deny its significance. 
Supporters of EBM might say that a particular case showing that the EBM approach leads to 
the wrong recommendation has no argumentative force against its general reasonableness. 
This idea can be expressed as follows. Given certain probability distribution of recovery for 
patients with acute conjunctivitis, nobody should be surprised by the existence of subjects for 
whom the probability of recovery with and without antibiotics is very different from the 
                                                        
20 This is mainly because I need space to explain that there is a disconnection between the way in which EBM is 
presented to physicians in the official “integrative” definition provided by Sackett and colleagues (1996) and the 
methods by which EBM is actually taught and implemented: the “4S model” and the “EBM guidelines model” (§ 
2.41 and 2.4.2). 
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average. However, this is no reason to conclude that the EBM treatment is not the right 
intervention for Mr Smith. For, even if the EBM prescription to withhold antibiotics will be 
wrong for some patients with acute conjunctivitis, it remains true that this prescription will be 
the right one for most of them.   
Correct, it is a fairly common situation that research data indicates that the majority of 
patients with certain diagnosis will recover with treatment, but the physician does not know 
whether the particular patient in front of him belongs to this majority or belongs to the 
minority who will not recover (let us call this last group “outliers”). And while it is true that 
any particular member of the target population might turn out being in the group of outliers, I 
agree with supporters of EBM that this does not necessarily turn an inference based on 
average research data unreasonable.  
Why is it that I do not see outliers as a problem for the reasonability of clinical inferences? As 
I pointed out previously (§ 1.3.1), from the perspective of expected utility theory, a 
reasonable prescription is not a prescription that “ensures” that the outcome of interest will 
occur, but rather a prescription that maximizes the probability of causing the outcome of 
interest. In consequence, I take it that if the patient in question turns out having an outcome 
that differs from average, one could simply acknowledge that both the patient and the 
physician were victims of “bad luck”. However, by no means do I think that one should 
conclude, on this ground, that the physician’s prescription was unreasonable. After all, the 
uncertainty inherent to the physician’s prescription –that is, the inescapable possibility that 
the patient might end in the group of outliers– has been already addressed by the principle of 
rationality that tells the physician that she ought to maximize expected utility. So, from this 
perspective, the possibility of unlucky outcomes is no argument against the reasonability of 
the recommendation to prescribe the treatment that, on average, has a highest probability to 
cause the outcome of interest. 
Now, does this imply that supporters of EBM are right when they say that the case of Mr 
Smith tells us nothing about the adequacy of the EBM approach? By no means, and let me 
emphasise why: the case of Mr Smith was not meant to illustrate that outliers are a problem 
for the EBM approach, but rather, as I said before, to bring attention to a distinct problem: the 
Problem of Extra Information (PEI).  
The problem of outliers and the PEI may seem similar in the surface, but they constitute very 
different kinds of worries. The problem of outliers is, as I explained, a worry about the 
unavoidable possibility that probability-based prescriptions might not in the end bring about 
the desired outcomes. The PEI, on the other hand, is a concern about the amount of 
information the physician is taking into account at the time of decision-making. Thus, the 
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case of Mr Smith should not be read as providing evidence that the EBM approach is 
inadequate because the EBM recommendation to withhold antibiotics turned out to be wrong 
for Mr Smith, but rather as illustrating that the EBM approach is wrong because it supports a 
prescription that ignores part of the information available, and thereby tacitly assumes that the 
extra features Dr Jones knows about Mr Smith do not cause any difference to his probability 
of recovery. As my reconstruction of the EBM rationale illustrates (§ 1.4.1), the judgment 
responsible for taking into account this information is not part of EBM’s inferential algorithm, 
and it is for that reason that this approach is vulnerable to the PEI. 
So, to repeat, whether the case of Mr Smith ends up being an outlier is beside the point. The 
moral of the case of Mr Smith is not that in the particular situation illustrated things went (or 
could have gone) wrong, but rather that the EBM prescription is directing attention to 
probabilities in the wrong reference class. Concretely, the EBM prescription is incorrect 
because, from the point of view of Dr Jones, Mr Smith is not just a patient with acute 
conjunctivitis; Mr Smith is a patient with acute conjunctivitis and, say, a history of RSTD. 
Hence, my objection is that by endorsing prescriptions supported by valid research, which 
tacitly assume that the extra information available to the physician is probabilistically 
irrelevant, the EBM approach is guilty of directing physicians’ attention to the wrong 
objective probabilities.21 
1.5. The Discretionary Approach 
So far, the central point I have made is that in its emphasis on ensuring prescriptions based on 
valid research estimates, the EBM approach forces physicians’ attention towards the objective 
probabilities for which reliable statistics have been obtained. Let me, from now on, identify 
these probabilities using the term EBM probabilities. However, although I accept that 
attention to valid research is important, in my view encouraging recommendation based 
solely on EBM probabilities is misguided because such recommendations implicitly assume 
                                                        
21 Notice that if the real clinical situation were such that the physician only knew that Mr Smith has Acute 
Conjunctivitis, then I would be prepared to endorse the EBM recommendation, provided that the EBM argument 
(§ 1.4.1) were modified as follows: 
i) p ∈ D  
ii) PD (R|A) > PD (R|B)   
iii) This is everything the physician knows about p 
∴) A is the right therapeutic prescription for p   
 
This new argument still is not deductively valid, but I take it as inductively reasonable for it makes explicit the fact 
that the problem of extra information has not arisen. Nonetheless, as the more realistic version of the case of Mr 
Smith showed, it seems illusory to suppose that there will be many actual clinical situations where this additional 
premise could be satisfied. Normally, physicians know more about their patients than the mere fact they belong to 
a general diagnostic reference class like “acute conjunctivitis”. Such kind of limited knowledge is commonly used 
as a pedagogical simplification but it is uncommon in real clinical contexts. 
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that any additional information about the patient is probabilistically irrelevant to the outcome 
of interest. 
In this section I shall articulate in more detail an alternative to the EBM approach: the 
Discretionary Approach (DA) to clinical practice. This approach consists of two main 
elements. The first one is that the right probabilities for clinical recommendations are the 
probabilities in the reference class defined by everything the physician knows about the 
patient (DA probabilities); and the second element is that the physician ought to make a 
judgment about what these probabilities for each particular patient are.  
Since concerns about the practical consequences of the Discretionary Approach will be 
addressed in subsequent chapters (Chapter 4, 5 and 6), at this point I shall concentrate on two 
reasons for accepting DA probabilities as the right probabilities of interest during clinical 
decision-making: namely, prudential adequacy and evidential flexibility. 
1.5.1. Prudential adequacy 
What are the objective probabilities of interest if the physician wants to maximize expected 
utility for her patient? My answer to this question is that the objective probabilities of interest 
are the probabilities in the reference class defined by everything the physician knows about 
the patient (DA probabilities). However, if this answer is accepted, it follows that the EBM 
approach is in trouble, for this approach encourages them to try to identify the wrong 
objective probabilities. 
Let me put this idea in abstract terms so to make it explicit. Suppose some EBM probability, 
that is, a probability for which a valid research estimate is available, tells the physician that in 
some reference class R the probability of recovery for patients with ailment D given treatment 
T is k. Assume now that the physician knows that a particular patient with D is not just R but 
also X and Y. And assume further that, according to the physician's considered judgement 
based on his medical knowledge, the probability of recovery in the reference class defined by 
R, X and Y is not k but another number j. Then it is easily perceived that it would be 
irrational for the physician to assess the potential benefit of treatment T for this particular 
patient by using the probability k rather than j. 
The case of Mr Smith clearly illustrates that there are situations where the EBM approach 
encourages physicians to act irrationally, in the sense that it supports recommendations based 
on probabilities that ignore part of what they about the patient. For if Dr Jones follows the 
EBM advice she is obliged to put her judgment to one side, and tacitly assume that factors 
such as a history of Repeated Sexually Transmitted Diseases (RSTD) are probabilistically 
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irrelevant to Mr Smith’s probability of recovery. But, of course, it is plain that, from a 
prudential perspective, if Dr Jones wants to maximize expected utility for Mr Smith, the 
potential virtue of a treatment with antibiotics for Mr Smith ought not to be judged on the 
basis of the probability of recovery in the reference class defined by the presence of acute 
conjunctivitis but by the presence of acute conjunctivitis and a history of RSTD. It is this later 
probability the probability of interest for Dr Jones, and it is precisely because the EBM 
approach does not provide him with an estimate of this probability that she has to exercise her 
judgment to estimate, as best as possible, its value. 22  
1.5.2. Evidential flexibility 
In this final section I would like to show how the DA allows—indeed encourages– physicians 
to make sensible use of a wide range of evidential sources. As I have said, and I shall 
demonstrate in the next chapter, the EBM approach ties the adequacy of physicians’ 
recommendations to certain evidential sources via EBM rules of evidence. By contrast, the 
DA does not force physicians’ attention towards any particular type of evidential source. The 
right recommendation, from the perspective of the DA, is right not because it is supported by 
certain kind of evidence (e.g. well-conducted RCTs), but because it is the recommendation 
based on estimates of the right probabilities, that is, the probabilities for the reference class 
defined by everything the physician knows about the patient. Of course, the DA endorses the 
idea that the physician would ideally like to obtain as good as possible an estimate of the right 
probabilities, but unlike the EBM approach the DA recognises explicitly that a perfectly valid 
evidential source may lose most or even all its appeal if it does not deliver estimates of the 
right probabilities.  And, in the other end, the DA has no problem in recognizing that there are 
many situations where the right recommendations for particular patients are recommendations 
supported by what EBM rules consider low-quality evidential sources.  
                                                        
22 Given the way I defined DA probabilities an immediate question arises: How much additional information 
should the physician gather about the patient before issuing a clinical recommendation? Should the physician 
invariably try to know more facts about the patient, with a consequent deferment in predictions and prescriptions? 
The proof provided independently by Frank P. Ramsey (1990) and Irvin J. Good (1967) is relevant to answering 
this question. These authors’ result show that, whenever the cost of acquiring extra information about the patient is 
negligible (near zero), the expected utility of delaying the clinical recommendation until additional information is 
acquired is never less that that of issuing the clinical recommendation immediately. Of course, in real-life clinical 
situations gathering additional information about the patient does typically involve costs (including a variety of 
harms, time, money and so on), and so the rational physician will apply her judgment to weigh these costs against 
the extra expected utility of waiting on the further information before making the clinical recommendation. Notice, 
however, that since it is prudentially rational for the physician to guide all these calculations by DA probabilities, 
they are merely special cases of the superiority of the DA over the EBM approach. In “Probability as a Guide to 
Life” Helen Beebee and David Papineau (1997) develop a compelling argument to take acting on relative 
probabilities –equivalent to DA probabilities– as a primitive fact about prudential rationality, which underlies the 
Ramsey-Good result that agents ought to arrange to act on probabilities relative to more information, whenever 




In virtue of its evidential flexibility the DA approach leaves enough room for the exercise of 
clinical judgment. And, because of this, it can accommodate with ease common criticisms 
against the EBM approach, such as: (i) EBM’s understatement of the problem of external 
validity of RCTs (Cartwright, 2007, 2011; Worrall, 2007), (ii) EBM’s general lack of 
attention to knowledge about mechanisms (Clarke et al. 2014; Dragunilescu, 2016), as well as, 
(iii) EBM’s effective dismissal of clinical experience (Greenhalgh and Worrall 1997; 
Greenhalgh, 2002; Greenhalgh et al. 2004, Elwyn et al. 2016; Tonelli, 2001; Upshur, 2005).  
Since I shall consider some of the problems related to these criticisms against EBM in chapter 
3 (§ 3.3.3) I shall now limit myself to explain very briefly how the DA is better prepared than 
the EBM approach to deal with the aforementioned objections. 
1.5.2.1. External validity 
One way to think about the problem of external validity is as a situation where it is unclear 
what actual target population research results are representative of, and for this reason neither 
physicians nor policy-makers know to what extent the findings, which may well be 
impeccable in terms of statistical estimation and control for confounding, are applicable to the 
intended target populations (e.g. diabetic patients in primary care). 
Despite the fact that supporters of EBM have sometimes recognized that the samples used in 
clinical trials (and clinical trials’ set ups in general) do not permit the extrapolation of 
findings to target populations (Guyatt el al. 2011), EBM’s standard attitude towards the 
applicability of research designs ranked at the top of hierarchies of evidence (e.g. well 
conducted RCTs) is one in which the burden of proof is on the side of those who want to 
prove that research is not applicable.23 This attitude, which has received several names, for 
example, “simple extrapolation” (Fuller, 2016) and “extrapolation unless” (Stegenga, 2015), 
emphasises that research evidence should be considered applicable by default and that only 
strong reasons could revert the extrapolation of research findings to target population in real 
clinical settings. These types of approach to applicability are particularly surprising because, 
while conventional RCTs randomize treatment allocations, in these trials samples are not 
normally randomly drawn from target populations.24 
As I said earlier, the problem of external validity is different from the PEI. While the former 
is related to the task of establishing what is the target population clinical trials are 
                                                        
23 See (§ 2.4.1.4) on “applying evidence” in the context of the 4S model of EBM practice. 
24 Notice that it is not uncommon that physicians infer an actual target population by relying on the arbitrary 
stipulations of researchers (in the case of primary research) or guideline-makers (in the case of EBM guidelines). 
In this regard, a review by Jonathan Fuller found that guideline-makers typically present guidelines as applicable 
to broad target populations despite the fact that primary studies are often conducted with highly selected samples 
(Fuller, 2013). 
 35 
representative of, the latter has to do with using everything the physician knows to determine 
the right reference class for probabilities for each patient. However, one of the by-products of 
paying attention everything the physician knows about the patient (DA probabilities) rather 
than paying attention to the probabilities for which valid estimates have been obtained (EBM 
probabilities), is that it is less likely that physicians neglect the problem of external validity. 
This is because the DA, unlike the EBM approach, does not push physicians to restrict their 
attention to valid research evidence, and therefore eliminates the pressure to obtain some 
valid probability estimate to back up the right clinical recommendations and practice 
medicine in accordance with EBM rules. 
Of course, supporters of EBM might complain that the DA neither ensures that the problem of 
external validity will not be neglected, nor makes its solution any less difficult. But, even so, 
it is undeniable that the DA may help physicians not to forget that sound clinical 
recommendations demand judgment in the light of all available information, and such 
judgment not only needs to be exercised to address the PEI, but also the problem of external 
validity. As Jonathan Fuller (2016) suggests when arguing against EBM’s “simple 
extrapolation” approach to external validity, reasons in support of and against extrapolation 
should be taken into account, and it seems plausible to think encouraging attention to 
everything the physician knows about the patient may help him to find both types of reasons. 
1.5.2.2. Mechanisms  
The claim that basic scientific research on biological mechanisms and derivatively the so-
called “physiopathological rationale” are not as reliable sources of medical knowledge as it 
was once thought is one of the hallmarks of the EBM movement (e.g. EBM working Group, 
1992; Howick, 2011; Howick et al. 2013; Bluhm and Borgerson, 2011). In fact, one of the 
crucial elements of the campaign by which EBM came to occupy its current position as the 
standard approach to clinical care was its capacity to provide empirical data suggesting that, 
had physicians attended to randomized controlled clinical trials (RCTs), rather than to basic 
research about mechanisms, thousands of lives could have been saved.25 Thus, current EBM 
rules emphasise that evidence of mechanisms has limited epistemological value in the context 
of therapy by downgrading its place in hierarchies of evidence, or excluding it completely 
(Bluhm, 2005).  
Nonetheless, as several authors have pointed out (e.g. Feinstein and Horwitz 1997), 
supporters of EBM moved too quickly from the sensible claims that evidence about 
mechanisms can sometimes be misleading and that an exclusive reliance on 
                                                        
25 This evidence was persuasively presented in the form of “horror stories”. Specific cases can be found in Howick 
(2011, p.122-153) and Abel and Koch (1999). 
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physiopathological rationale can be problematic, to the idea that any knowledge about 
mechanisms and associated inferences lead to questionable recommendations, which are 
almost invariably inferior to those based on evidence from valid clinical trials. Furthermore, 
in their enthusiasm for the virtues of RCTs, supporters of EBM embraced the controversial 
idea that causal claims supported from such trials provide physicians with efficacy claims that 
need not be backed up by (or at least be consistent with) plausible mechanisms.26   
Critics of the EBM movement argue, rightly in my view, that there are situations where 
research about mechanisms can provide physicians with evidence that not only complements 
but may even countervail the applicability of findings from RCTs to individuals (Clarke et al. 
2013, Clarke et al. 2014; Russo, 2012). More precisely, attention to relevant mechanisms can 
help physicians in a number of situations including assessments of external validity as well as 
when it comes to determining whether findings applicable to populations are applicable to 
particular individuals (Clarke et al. 2013). So, unlike the EBM approach, the DA has ample 
room to incorporate evidence from mechanisms, for, from this point of view, this kind of 
evidence is not considered to be of inherently poor quality.  
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the DA is also sensitive to the reasonable point that 
physiopathological reasoning can sometimes be misleading. This is the reason why this 
approach does not link the adequacy of physicians’ inferences to specific evidential sources.  
According to the DA, physicians are responsible to answer the question of when and to what 
extent evidence of mechanisms should be considered on a case-by-case basis, for this 
question is essentially, a matter of clinical judgment. While for some patients the estimation 
of the right probabilities will be strongly influenced by relevant mechanistic evidence, such 
evidence need not have such effects in every patient. This is a matter of judgment, which, to 
repeat, is concerned with the estimation of the probabilities in the reference class defined by 
everything the physician knows about the patient. 
At this point, supporters of EBM might complain that by appealing to physician’s judgment 
the DA approach is merely avoiding an explicit confrontation with the problem of misleading 
mechanistic evidence. But the fact remains that where EBM implicitly forces physicians to 
ignore mechanistic evidence, the DA tells them that they must pay attention to it whenever 
the estimation of the right probabilities demands it.  
1.5.2.3. Clinical experience 
                                                        
26 Russo and Williamson have made a compelling case for attending to relevant mechanisms for purposes of causal 
inference in medicine (Russo and Williamson, 2007). See Weber (2009) and Claveau (2012) for interesting critical 
comments, and Illari (2011) for a lucid clarification of the Russo-Williamson thesis. 
 37 
Another respect in which the DA fares better than the EBM approach has to do with the 
possibility to attend to the relevant clinical experience. Even though the way in which 
medical training has and continues to be structured suggests that medical knowledge 
developed through practical experience remains central to physicians’ performance 
(Ludmerer, 2004; Huddle and Heudebert, 2008; Epstein et al. 2013), it is undeniable that the 
EBM movement has helped to cast doubt upon both physicians’ capacity to acquire 
knowledge from regular clinical experience (Howick, 2011), and also upon the validity and 
reliability of such knowledge in the first place (Greenhalgh et al. 2014).  
We will consider the way in which EBM is taught and implemented in chapter 2 (§ 2.4) but 
presently let me point out that, after the arrival of EBM the epistemological function of 
clinical experience fell into disrepute (Tonelli, 1998, 1999; Tanenbaum, 1993, 2012). From 
the perspective of supporters of EBM, the idea that physicians ought to attend to research 
evidence is as much justified by the virtues of research evidence as it is by the pitfalls of 
standard clinical experience as a source of general medical knowledge (Eddy 1990a-c, 2005; 
and Howick, 2011). Thus, hierarchies of evidence that exclude clinical experience –or include 
it implicitly and ranked at the bottom, embedded in the notion of expert judgment, are no 
more than a crystallization of EBM’s standard attitude towards this kind of information.  
True, I concur with supporters of EBM that assessments of efficacy based on uncontrolled 
clinical experience can be misleading, and also that physicians, as other humans, have several 
cognitive features that might lead them to mistaken inferences (Dawson and Arkes 1987; 
Elstein and Schartz 2002; Bornstein and Emler, 2001; Casarett, 2016). Furthermore, personal 
clinical experience, which is often characterised by a small number of patients, which might 
be inaccurately recorded and poorly recalled, can be particularly misleading for purposes of 
generating medical knowledge in the form of efficacy claims for general reference classes, or 
knowledge about general risk or prognostic factors.  
However, having said that, I take it that only the most extreme among EBM’s advocates 
would deny that personal experience can be useful to improve physicians’ inferences in the 
context of clinical medicine (that is, when inferences are directed towards and predictions and 
prescriptions are restricted to particular individuals). In this context clinical experience can 
help physicians in different ways (Tonelli, 2006, 2011). It might help physicians to make 
sense of idiosyncratic features present in the kind of patients that visit their clinics. More 
precisely, experience might help physicians to determine whether certain features are or are 
not probabilistically relevant to the outcome of interest, or it might be the source of specific 
estimates, estimates for fine-grained classes of patients, for whom research data is unlikely to 
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be found (e.g. patients of specific age groups, who develop their conditions under local social 
circumstances, or who have uncommon comorbidities). 
It is noteworthy, then, that just as the EBM approach had little room to allow for the 
evidential use of mechanistic reasoning, it also has little room for the incorporation of 
knowledge from clinical experience (Greenhalgh and Worrall, 1997). For, once more, if 
physicians want to avoid a major conflict with hierarchies of evidence, they will have to resist 
the temptation to use knowledge from experience to refine or replace probability estimates 
that come from more reliable evidential sources, such as RCTs. So, while within the EBM 
framework the use of clinical experience is normally interpreted as an action that decreases 
the quality of the resulting inferences or as a desperate resource in the absence of valid 
research evidence, the DA, by contrast, demands the exercise of clinical judgment in the light 
of information from clinical experience the patient’s characteristics or situation so require it. 
According to the DA, therefore, there will be patients for whom clinical experience will be 
the type of evidential source underlying optimal inferences and patients for whom 
information from clinical experience will not be useful. 
Finally, as with the limitations of mechanistic reasoning, given that the scope of the DA is 
restricted to particular patients, this approach is sufficiently qualified to acknowledge that 
clinical experience does not offer solid grounds to substantiate therapeutic or predictive 
claims for broad populations. So, the benefits of attending to clinical experience can be 
maximized in the benefit of well-selected individuals without encouraging physicians into 
unwarranted generalizations.  
1.6. Conclusions  
In this chapter, I reconstructed the rationale behind the EBM approach to clinical medicine, 
and argued that it promotes recommendations that are vulnerable to the PEI. This problem 
consists of encouraging recommendations based on the probabilities for which valid research 
estimates have been obtained, which implicitly forces the physician to assume that any extra 
information about the patient is irrelevant to the outcome of interest.  
I argued that this makes the EBM approach inadequate. If the goal of the physician is to 
maximize expected utility for her patient, then the information she possesses about him at the 
time of decision-making (or the additional facts she could learn about the patient at a 
negligible cost before making a recommendation) should not be tacitly disregarded.   
In response to this problem, I proposed that clinical medicine requires a more discretionary 
approach (DA). This approach acknowledges the importance of valid research findings, but it 
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is also sensitive to all information available to the physician, regardless of its source. This is 
because the DA is premised on the idea that the right probabilities for clinical 
recommendations are those in the reference class defined by everything the physician knows 
about the patient, and not just by the part of this information for which valid research 
estimates are available. Finally, the DA stresses that physicians have an active role in 
ensuring the soundness of clinical recommendations, for whenever the PEI arises the role of 
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Chapter 2: Rigid versus judicious Evidence-based practice 
  
2.1. Abstract  
In the previous chapter I reconstructed Evidence-based medicine (EBM) as an approach to 
clinical care that is almost exclusively concerned with aligning recommendations with 
findings from valid research evidence. I argued that this is problematic because it directs 
physicians’ attention to probabilities that ignore part of the data available, and thereby 
generate what I called the Problem of Extra Information (PEI). 
But my reconstruction of EBM is controversial. Advocates of this movement might contend 
that I misrepresented EBM practice, for the reconstruction I offered presents EBM as if it 
were rigidly tied to research findings, when in truth, the practice of EBM has been standardly 
defined and described by its founders as an integrative and judicious endeavour, which is 
sensitive to all available information. 
This chapter argues that this latter understanding of EBM is misleading. True, I shall accept 
that this approach is officially presented to the public using EBM’s standard definition. 
Nevertheless, I shall argue that this definition is an idealised portrayal, which lacks 
descriptive accuracy due to a clear disconnection with the ways in which EBM is actually 
taught and implemented. By the end of this chapter, I expect to convince the reader that if 
enough attention is paid to the normative pressure imposed by the rules of EBM, as well as by 
the system of care that has been built around EBM teaching tools and guidelines, it becomes 










2.2. Rigid Evidence Based Medicine  
In the first chapter of this thesis I reconstructed the EBM approach in terms of a two-premise 
argument (§ 1.5.1). The first premise is a diagnostic premise, which identifies a particular 
patient as a member of a standard target population. The second premise is a general efficacy 
premise, where valid research provides physicians with an estimate of the probabilities of 
some outcome of interest for members of a standard target population. Once these two 
premises are met –and the patient’s utilities are not an obstacle– I claimed that the EBM 
approach advices physicians to prescribe the treatment supported by the general efficacy 
premise (§ 1.5.2). 
My reconstruction of EBM practice emphasised that in the presence of evidence of the 
highest quality (e.g. well-conducted clinical trials), the physician is advised to ignore 
additional information available about her patient. I called this the Problem of Extra 
Information (PEI). When this problem arises, EBM recommendations based on the best 
available research become recommendations based on the wrong probabilities for the 
individual in question. In addition, my account of EBM practice stressed that EBM rules 
deemphasise reliance on evidential sources such as clinical experience or basic mechanisms 
(§ 1.5.2). That is why, in the context of therapy, I represented the EBM approach as 
committed to the idea that the EBM practitioner should comply with EBM guidelines based 
on evidence of the highest quality even when extra information seems to countervail standard 
recommendations (§ 1.5.2). And, similarly, in the context of diagnosis, I claimed that the 
EBM practioner is advised to act on estimates from statistical prediction rules, regardless of 
the presence the PEI, and therefore does not allow him to refine predictions and improve 
subsequent recommendations (§ 1.6.1). In both situations, I claimed that EBM 
recommendations are guided by the general EBM principle that clinical practice ought to 
conform to valid research findings whenever the patient belongs to the target population for 
which such findings are available (and, of course, personal preferences are no impediment). 
But this portrayal of EBM practice is debatable. Advocates of the EBM movement might 
protest that I did not represent EBM recommendations accurately, and therefore that I am 
guilty of setting up a straw man to attack. Furthermore, supporters of EBM might say that the 
inadequacy of my description of EBM is very easy to demonstrate, for it happens to stand in 
sharp contrast with the standard account of EBM (Sackett et al, 1996), according to which 
there is much more to EBM practice than the rigid application of valid research evidence to 
individuals.  
Now, since Sackett represents EBM practice as a judicious and flexible endeavour, it is hard 
to see how EBM recommendations could be as deprived of judgment as my reconstruction 
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suggests. So, if supporters of EBM are right, and it is true that EBM’s standard definition 
describes how EBM works in practice, then, it appears that they are correct in saying that my 
“rigid” account of EBM (REBM) is no more than a straw man.27  
Nonetheless, I shall attempt to convince the reader that this line of reasoning is misguided. 
For, I will argue that, in spite of its apparent influential character, Sackett’s standard 
definition has little or nothing to do with the actual practice of EBM. Supporters of EBM who 
defend its judicious character and flexibility using Sackett’s definition as if were descriptively 
accurate, I will contend, are victims of naivety or denial. For if they pay enough attention to 
the way in which EBM is actually taught and implemented, they will have to acknowledge 
that core normative principles of EBM such as the hierarchical rules of evidence, and the 
presence of significant extrinsic incentives, end almost entirely removing the space for 
judgment as well as obliterating the epistemological import of information not backed up by 
valid clinical trials. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In § 2.3 I shall look closely at EBM’s standard definition 
so as to identify what kind of practice is implied by it. Then, in § 2.4, I shall turn my attention 
to two methods by which EBM is currently being taught and implemented: the 4S model (§ 
2.4.1) and the EBM guidelines model (§ 2.4.2). I shall argue that each of these methods is 
designed to indoctrinate EBM practitioners in the rules of EBM, and via different 
mechanisms, to promote recommendations vulnerable to the PEI and to discourage an 
effective use of clinical judgment to arrive at the “right probabilities” for clinical inference (§ 
1.5.1). Thus, I shall conclude that the actual practice of EBM is much more consistent with 
my reconstruction of EBM that with Sackett’s account. 
2.3. EBM’s standard definition 
In the article “Evidence Based Medicine: what it is and what it isn’t” (1996) 28 leading 
proponents of EBM define this approach as “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of 
current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients” and indicate 
that “The practice of evidence based medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise 
with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research” (p.71-2). 
                                                        
27 It is important to stress from the outset that Sackett’s definition (1996) is an attempt to describe what EBM is 
(and it is not), not an attempt to describe how EBM ought to be given such and such aims. 
28 Notice that there are several definitions of Evidence-Based Medicine. Michael Loughlin, (2008 and 2009) 
surveys some of them. However, I shall focus on Sackett’s definition (1996) for three reasons. The first one is that 
critics and supporters of EBM have treated Sackett’s definition as the official definition of EBM (e.g. Bluhm and 
Borgerson, 2011; Greenhalgh et al, 2014; Djulbegovic et al., 2009). The second reason is that, as I said earlier 
(footnote 28) Sackett’s definition is supposed to be a descriptive definition, which allegedly tell us about EBM 
practice as it actually is as opposed to as it ought to be. The third reason is that, with more than 4.300 citations, 
Sackett’s definition (1996) is by far the most popular representation of EBM in the literature (Web of Knowledge, 
accessed December, 2015). 
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Now, since this definition is supposed to be descriptively accurate, two questions arise: First, 
what do EBM recommendations according to Sackett’s depiction of EBM look like? Second, 
are such recommendations consistent with those that follow from my rigid reconstruction of 
EBM? 
In answering the first of these question one faces an immediate difficulty: the official 
description of EBM seems to be rather vague, and so it makes it difficult to know how EBM 
recommendations look like.29 
On the one hand Sackett’s references to a “conscientious” and “judicious” practice might 
make the reader suppose that the EBM approach is something similar to the DA. For start, if 
the word “conscientious” is interpreted as suggesting a degree of “carefulness” and 
“thoroughness” in the use evidence then it might suggest EBM practitioners have enough 
room for the exercise of judgment. Similarly, while the meaning of the word “judicious” is 
not clear-cut, “judicious use of evidence” in the context of Sackett’s description of EBM and 
the claim that EBM is not “cookbook medicine” seem to convey the idea of a well-considered 
inferential process, which again might led someone to think that EBM practice encourages 
physicians to exercise their clinical discretion. After all, if EBM practitioners acted 
“judiciously” when using evidence, it seems unlikely that they would make recommendations 
that assume that any information about particular patients is probabilistically irrelevant to the 
outcomes of interest.30 
However, other phrases in the official description of EBM indicate that Sackett seems to 
favour something closer to my rigid EMB. In particular his references to “explicit evidence” 
31 and his emphasis on the importance of “clinical research” make it hard to understand him 
as supporting DA. Moreover, while there are passages where Sackett seems to describe EBM 
practice as a flexible and integrative endeavour or when calling for the use of clinical 
                                                        
29  Ironically, the vagueness of EBM’s definition has not been considered in any way problematic by some 
supporters of EBM, whom seem to take the virtues of the approach to obvious to deserve careful thinking about it 
(e.g. Goldacre, 2006) 
30 Notice, however that there are authors in the EBM camp, who have explicitly claimed that patients would be 
better off if physicians put their clinical judgment to one side and thereby suggest that a “judicious use of evidence” 
would be to do exactly that (e.g. Howick, 2011; Eddy, 1990a).  
31 If EBM practitioners aim at an “explicit use of evidence” as Sackett describes, then there is a sense in which 
they are likely to conform to my rigid reconstruction of EBM. The reason for this is the following. EBM 
practitioners who do not want to ignore the PEI will presumably have a hard time trying to account for their use 
extra information in cases where their judgment tells them that such information changes the probability of the 
outcome of interest. This is because the relevance of extra information and their influence in recommendations 
would normally be supported by evidential sources such as tacit knowledge or perhaps their own clinical 
experience. Even more clearly, to the extent that clinical judgment itself is interpreted not only as a process but as 
an evidential source of second order (as it often happens with the testimony of experts in legal contexts), one 
would think EBM practitioners that are willing address the PEI would find difficult to use “explicitly” evidential 
sources that are inherently “implicit”). 
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expertise 32, this is effectively cancelled out by the insistence that both clinical experience and 
judgment are subservient to the rules of evidence (Howick, 2011; Stegenga, 2014).33 
Thus, on the one hand Sackett’s characterisation suggests that EBM practice is flexible. But 
on the other hand, there are places where he suggests the contrary. In the end, as Michael 
Loughlin has pointed out (Loughlin, 2008, 2009) EBM’s description is so imprecise that, it 
would be fruitless to try to pin down exactly what message is conveyed by Sackett’s 
characterisation of EBM. The more important issue is to try to understand those who cite this 
definition and teach EBM to clinicians. In the rest of the chapter I shall argue that the actual 
models of EBM practice do not really encourage the EBM practitioner to use evidence 
judiciously, and do not really allow her to integrate different sources of evidence such as 
clinical experience, as Sackett’s definition seems to imply.  
2.4. EBM practice as it is taught and implemented 
In this section we will consider two methods by which the EBM movement has been put into 
effect. I will argue that, if attention is paid to these methods, it becomes clear that EBM 
practioners are encouraged to make recommendations almost exclusively based on the best 
research evidence. Thus, the way in which EBM is taught and implemented leads to a kind of 
practice, which is vulnerable to the PEI, leaves little room for clinical judgment and, in the 
end, is much more consistent with my reconstruction of EBM than with Sackett’s official 
definition.   
The first method we will consider is a teaching method: the “4S” model (Sackett 1986, 1989, 
1993; Straus et al. 2005). On the surface, this teaching approach does not appear to entirely 
rule out the exercise of clinical judgment; however, careful examination reveals that exercise 
of judgment is discouraged and in practice confined in extent.  
This method achieves this effect by focusing physicians’ attention on valid clinical trials from 
the outset and promoting the idea that the default attitude towards these trials should be that 
results are generally applicable to any member of the intended target population. Clinical 
judgment, if exercised at all, plays the limited role of preventing blatant misapplications of 
research evidence at the end of an inferential chain that seems to be almost determined to 
conclude applicability. Furthermore, while attention to extra information about the patient is 
                                                        
32 When describing the practice of EBM Sackett claims that it implies “integrating individual clinical expertise 
with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research” (Sackett et al 1996, p.71). 
33 As Gordon Guyatt and colleagues, in the name of the EBM working group explain (2000) explain: “The 
hierarchy implies a clear course of action for physicians addressing patients problems–they should look for the 
highest available evidence from the hierarchy.” (p.1293). Notice also that in chapter 4 (§ 4.4.3) we will consider 
what Howick (2011) describes as the position of EBM on clinical judgment in some detail, and that according to 
Howick clinical judgment ought not to be attributed any evidential role, not even in the context of inferences for 
individuals. 
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not explicitly forbidden, adherence to the rules of EBM, which work as organising principles 
of the 4S model, deemphasises it by problematizing the use of evidential sources such as 
clinical experience or knowledge about mechanisms. 
The second method through which EBM practice has been implemented is composed by 
EBM guidelines (EBG model) (Eddy, 1990b-f; Grol and Grimshaw, 2003; Grimshaw and 
Russell, 1993; Grimshaw et al. 2006; Qaseem el al. 2010; Woolf et al. 1999; Flodgren et al. 
2016). Unlike the 4S model this second method does not rely on physicians’ ability to search 
for and subsequently apply the best research evidence. The basic building block of this model 
is composed of readily applicable recommendations supported by evidence selected by 
guideline-makers. In theory, the EBG model need not result in recommendations that neglect 
the PEI, for, even if recommendations are exclusively based on research evidence, physicians 
might be able to incorporate individual patients’ idiosyncrasies if they have enough room to 
exercise their judgment. However, reasons related to the way this system of practice is 
structured make it unlikely. First, clinical discretion and attention to other sources of evidence 
is discouraged by the normative power of strong recommendations, which are presented as 
actionable rules vouched by valid research evidence. Second, adherence to EBG is positively 
rewarded by quality-improvement schemes (e.g. pay-for performance initiatives), which pay 
physicians practices when is consistent with EBM recommendations. And third, the fact that 
several EBGs are equated to “best practices” in policy and legal contexts makes physicians 
think twice before deciding to apply their judgment to pay attention to information whose 
relevance might only be justified by low-ranked evidential sources according to EBM 
standards. 
2.4.1. The four step model of EBM practice 
The four-steps model (or “4S” for short) is one of the standard educational approaches to 
teach and promote EBM practice. This model was first introduced by Sackett and colleagues  
(Sackett et al, 1985) and it has been reproduced, with minor modifications, in several EBM 
textbooks and teaching articles (e.g Rosenberg and Donald, 1995; Akobeng, 2005; Dans et al. 
2008; Prasad, 2013). In essence, the “4S” provides the physician with a recipe to base clinical 
decisions on valid research evidence. The process consists of the following steps: “ask, 
acquire, assess, and apply” (Prasad, 2013 p.2). In the first step the physician has to formulate 
a clinical question; the second step involves searching for evidence to answer this question; in 
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step three the physician assesses the validity of the evidence retrieved; and finally, in step 
four, the evidence obtained should be applied to the patient.34 
Then, one would ask, what kind of EBM practice should be promoted by the 4S model for it 
to be consistent with the recommendations that follow from Sackett’s definition?  
In the next sub-sections (§ 2.4.1.1 and § 2.4.1.2), I will show that, contrary to what one would 
expect for a teaching model congruent with EBM’s official definition, the 4S model has been 
operationalized so as to promote recommendations almost exclusively based on research 
evidence and thus to ignore part of what the physician knows about the patient. The first three 
steps of this model encourage selective attention to certain types of research evidence and 
step four (§ 2.4.1.4), while apparently leaving some room for physicians to consider 
additional information about individuals, ends up encouraging the physician to assume that 
such information is not worthy of attention.  
2.4.1.1. Step 1: Asking for evidence 
In the 4 steps model (4S) the task of asking for evidence for purposes of clinical decision-
making is standardly presented as requiring the formulation of “a focused clinical question” 
(Guyatt et al. 2000. p.1294; Dans et al. 2008). Clinical questions need to be focused since 
proponents of this model expect them to be “answerable” by research evidence (Richardson et 
al. 1995). Thus, the very first step of the 4S model immediately reveals that although this 
teaching approach has been presented to physicians as general strategy to learn EBM practice, 
in truth it is a model that fosters exclusive attention to research findings from the outset. To 
see this, it is instructive to pay close attention to the PICO method, that is, the technique 
physicians have to apply in order to construct proper “answerable questions”.  
The acronym PICO stands for “Patients”, “Intervention”, “Comparisons”, and “Outcomes”. 
This method is sometimes presented as a method to “facilitate finding the best evidence”  
(McKibbon et al. 2002 p.16). But, in truth, it is a method designed to help physicians to find 
evidence from selected clinical trials, as opposed to sources such as basic research, let alone 
relevant data from clinical experience (Richardson et al. 1995).  
The PICO process encourages the physician to focus on clinical trials via a series of 
abstractions inherent to its application. These abstractions are, up to a point, understandable, 
for they are necessary to connect questions about particular patients with research findings 
                                                        
34 More recently a fifth step has been added, which involves evaluating the results generated by the application of 
evidence (Haynes, 2006). However, since this last step is not relevant for the points I shall make in this chapter, we 
will continue our discussion based on the 4S model. 
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about general populations from the literature. But these abstractions come with a significant 
cost, namely the danger that the physician ignores potentially relevant information about the 
patient that was available from the outset.  
To see this, consider the element “P”, which normally refers to a type of “patient” or a 
“problem” in the PICO process. In regard to this element the treating physicians is advised to 
ask questions such as  “How would I describe a group of patients similar to mine?”  (The 
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2016). Of course, in answering questions of this kind, it is 
normal to expect some level of simplification. As I said, in order to establish a connexion 
between a single individual and research data, some simplifications have to be made. 
Obviously, one hopes that most of those simplifications will not be too detrimental to the 
inferential process. However, what is remarkable about the PICO process in the 4S model is 
that it encourages the physician to focus on a single purpose, namely, to extract away the 
information that makes the patient different from the research subject.  This implies that the 
EBM practitioner who applies the PICO process is expected to simplify the description of the 
patient so it make possible a match with the kind of generic descriptions commonly used to 
identify research populations. In their book “painless EBM” Antonio Dans and colleagues 
(2008) provide a nice illustration of this. These authors prescribe that the patient’s description 
should not go beyond certain “disease” or “diagnosis”, for example,  “acute chest pain” or 
“HIV” (p. 8). The logic underlying this advice is simple enough: the EBM practitioner should 
focus on what matters. Why raise a question for which there is no good answer?  Is it not 
better to ask questions that have been investigated by valid methods?  
However, as we saw in the first chapter, this kind of selective attention is not harmless, for by 
recommending EBM practitioners to classify their patients into the broad reference class for 
which it is likely that valid research will be found, the 4S model, via the PICO process, starts 
paving the way for a systematic disregard of potentially valuable information about the 
patient for which there is no good research data. 35  
Of course, it is true that framing clinical questions in a way that facilitates matches of 
relevance with research evidence does not necessarily lead to recommendations that neglect 
the PEI. After all, the inferential process is just beginning and it might be that the extra 
information available about the patient might be considered later on, before arriving at the 
final recommendations. Nonetheless, if the 4S model truly aimed to practice EBM in 
accordance with Sackett’s definition, then one would expect that this teaching approach 
                                                        
35 It is not necessary to dwell on this point, but notice that there is a way in which each of the elements of the 
PICO process (patients, interventions, comparisons, and outcomes) promotes abstractions aimed at matching 
individuals with the reference classes for which there is valid research data available.  
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would facilitate attention to all available information from the outset. After all, if Sackett’s 
definition were descriptively accurate, then EBM practitioners would integrate research 
evidence with information from their own experience. Given this, it seems odd that the 4S 
model promotes abstractions exclusively directed at facilitating the acquisition of research 
evidence during the next steps.  
So, as we have seen, the first step of the 4S model, via the PICO process, encourages 
physicians to frame the patient’s case so to make the identification of clinical trials much 
easier and, by contrast, omits any abstractions that could make the search for non-research 
evidence, or the application of clinical judgment, any less difficult. Thus, up to now, it 
appears that the recommendations supported by this model are more consistent with my 
reconstruction than with EBM’s official definition. Let us now, however, turn to the second 
step of the 4S model, for perhaps now, things might get a little better for supporters of EBM. 
2.4.1.2. Step 2: Acquiring evidence 
The second step of the 4S model advises EBM practioners on how to obtain evidence for 
clinical decision-making. For this step be aligned with the official definition of EBM, one 
would expect that it would help physicians to acquire whatever kind of evidence is necessary 
to make sense of what they know about their patients. However, this second step makes even 
clearer that the emphasis of the 4S model has been placed in providing EBM practitioners 
with tools that restrict their attention to clinical trials, and simultaneously overlook the PEI. 
Continuing with a narrow focus on research evidence, this step omits advice on how to 
acquire evidence from sources other than clinical trials. In fact, in their eagerness to facilitate 
the acquisition of findings from certain types of research, some editions of the 4S model 
match questions related to traditional medical tasks (e.g. diagnostic, prognostic, and 
therapeutic questions) with particular research designs, thus suggesting that paying attention 
to other types of evidence would be a waste of time. For questions of therapy, for example, 
EBM practitioners have been advised to focus on evidence from RCTs (Sackett et al. 1985), 
and in the case of diagnostic or prognostic tasks, physicians have been recommended to look 
for articles on risk models and predictive rules (Adams and Levenson, 2012). And while the 
link between traditional clinical tasks and particular research designs has been relativized in 
further editions of the 4S model (e.g. Sackett and Wennberg, 1997), it is remarkable that the 
methods aimed at facilitating acquisition of evidence included in the 4S model do not include 
any practical advice as to how to acquire information from what is considered low-ranked 
evidential sources, such as basic research about mechanisms (Straus et al. 2009; Clarke et al. 
2013; Fuller and Flores, 2015). 
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Examples illustrating that the search for evidence in the 4S model is actually a search for 
particular clinical trials abound: consider the PubMed Clinical Queries Feature, a search tool 
supported by EBM (Bartkowiak, 2005), which automatically eliminates non-randomized 
studies for questions of therapy. As the website of the Arizona Health Science Library 
explains: “The default when the clinical studies search is set to "therapy" will limit the search 
to Randomized Controlled Trials” (The University of Arizona, no date). Or, for another 
example, take notice of the advice provided by Randolph and colleagues (1999) in one of a 
series of articles on EBM practice edited by the Journal of the American Medical Association 
(JAMA). When describing the stage when evidence should be acquired their advice is: 
“…you connect to the Internet and decide to search the medical literature…. You limit your 
search to randomized controlled trials… You choose a Randomized Trial of Corollary 
Orders…” (p.67).  
As these quotes illustrate, in the context of therapy the search strategies promoted to acquire 
evidence in the 4S model give preeminent attention to research designs ranked higher in 
hierarchies of evidence (e.g. RCTs), so a fortiori, this step of the 4S model seems to neglect 
non-research sources.  
Of course, this does not mean that EBM practioners following this model will automatically 
ignore additional information about their patients or will put their judgment aside. But still it 
is clear that to encourage physicians to narrow down their attention to research evidence does 
not count as facilitating attention to whatever information is present in the patient. Obviously 
physicians might well look for non-research evidence to determine whether the extra features 
present in their patients are probabilistically relevant to the outcome of interest, but if this 
happens, it would not be a consequence of the 4S model to train EBM practitioners. So, at the 
very least, this second step of the 4S model does not make it easier for physicians to address 
the PEI, and therefore perpetuates the strategic simplifications made in the previous step, 
which aimed exclusively at finding a match between the best research evidence available and 
particular individuals.  
So, it appears that the recommendations based on the second step of the 4S model remain 
much more consistent with my reconstruction of EBM as a practice deprived of judgment 
than with Sackett’s portrait of EBM. For, as we have seen, the 4S model seems to be much 
more concerned with facilitating attention to certain types of valid research than with 
correcting a potential lack of attention to part of what the physician knows about the patient. 
Thus, rather than promoting a judicious and sensitive search for whatever kind of evidence 
useful to estimate the outcome in the light of what the physician knows about the patient, this 
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second step of the 4S model endorses searches for selected research designs based on a 
carefully curated summary of what is “known” about the patient. 
2.4.1.3. Step 3: Appraising evidence 
The divergence between the kind of recommendations endorsed by the 4S model and those 
that we would expect from EBM practitioners according to Sackett’s definition becomes even 
more apparent at this stage. For, if this model really teaches physicians to practice along the 
lines of the definition of EBM, one would expect them to acquire tools to appraise the quality 
of both research and non-research evidential sources. However, instead of providing 
physicians with a wide range of tools to assess the quality of various kinds of evidential 
sources, so that they can exercise their judgment regardless of the type of information they 
happen to have available, this third step of the 4S model ensures that only research evidence 
ranked at (or towards) the top of hierarchies of evidence be considered as input for 
recommendations.  
This third step is operationalized as what is known as “the critical appraisal exercise” 
(Guyatt, 1991; Green, 1999). In essence, this exercise consists of an assessment of the quality 
of the evidence available, which is oriented to filter out evidential sources that fail to meet 
certain quality standards (Henegan and Badenoch, 2002). 
In order to understand how the critical appraisal exercise promotes the exclusion of certain 
types of evidential sources we need to pay attention to what prominent authors in the EBM 
camp call the first fundamental principle of EBM: the EBM rules or hierarchies of evidence 
(Montori 2008, p.1815; quoted from Bluhm and Borgerson, 2011).36 
Note that hierarchies of evidence have shaped EBM practice through different routes 37 . 
However, their influence in recommendation is particularly apparent in the third step of the 
4S model. In this context, EBM rules of evidence are important because evidence rankings 
are often presented vaguely as rankings that arrange evidential sources with respect to their 
validity (e.g. La Caze, 2009), quality (e.g. Brozec et al. 2009), and even their clinical 
usefulness (e.g. Andrews et al. 2013). 
In the context of the 4S model, rules of evidence are presented to EBM practitioners as tools 
to help them select sources with a greater number of epistemological strengths and fewer 
                                                        
36 In his textbook on EBM, Jeremy Howick (2011) claims that the philosophy of EBM “is best expressed in EBM 
hierarchies” (p.4). 
37 For example, hierarchies of evidence also take part in the construction of recommendations in the EBM 
guidelines model of practice (§ 2.4.2). 
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epistemological weaknesses. However, in practice, the quality markers used to rank evidential 
sources varies from one hierarchy to the next (Blunt, 2015). 
So, for example, in hierarchies of evidence designed to guide therapeutic recommendations, 
well-conducted RCTs are typically placed at the top (or near the top after meta-analyses of 
RCTs) mainly, but not exclusively, because of their ability to identify causal relationships 
(Cartwright, 2011; Papineau, 1994). In the context of diagnosis and prognosis, on the other 
hand, well-conducted prospective studies (for instance, cohort studies) occupy the top 
position due, among other things, to their capacity to obtain precise and unbiased correlations 
(Burns et al. 2011). It must be noticed, however, that most hierarchies supported by advocates 
of EBM (e.g. NICE, 2004; U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 2008; Canadian Task Force, 
1979; Sackett, 1986,1993) seem to identify susceptibility to bias as one of the most important 
epistemological weaknesses of an evidential source (Blunt, 2015). And this is one of the 
central reasons why randomized clinical research is typically regarded as epistemically 
superior to observational studies, basic research on mechanisms and information from clinical 
experience.38 
But let me return now to the main point of this section. How are the rules of EBM used during 
the critical appraisal exercise? As Jacob Stegenga points out, the standard prescription 
implied in hierarchies of evidence is that physicians ought to take instances of evidential 
sources (evidence tokens) ranked higher in hierarchies to be more reliable than instances of 
evidential sources placed lower (Stegenga, 2014). And because the place of any given source 
of evidence is often seen as closely connected to judgments about the clinical usefulness of 
such evidence (e.g. Belsey, 2009), one of the practical upshots of hierarchies is that the EBM 
practitioner should spend most of her scarce time paying attention to evidential sources that 
are ranked high, precisely because these are less likely to mislead and more likely to inform 
(Sackett et al. 1996).39 
Let me offer an illustration of how EBM practitioners are advised to exercise the critical 
appraisal in practice. The Evidence-based tool-kit tells physicians that: “the most important 
type of research for answering therapy questions is the randomised controlled trial (RCT).” 
And then continues to say that if the answer to the question “were the groups randomized?” 
                                                        
38  Notice that although some supporters of EBM have suggested that some aspects of hierarchical rules of 
evidence, for instance the superiority of RCTs over observational studies and basic research on mechanisms are 
well-supported by empirical evidence (§ 1.5.2.2), others –for example, Howick (2011)– have, at some moments, 
recognised that “the EBM hierarchy itself appears to be supported by “weak” (according to EBM) evidence, 
namely the opinion of EBM experts!” (p.6). 
39  As Gordon Guyatt and colleagues (2000) explain: “The hierarchy implies a clear course of action for 




is “not satisfactory”, then physicians “should consider ditching the paper and looking 
elsewhere” (Henegan and Badenoch, 2002, p.1). Thus, for questions of therapy, the third step 
of the 4S model explicitly encourages practitioners to jettison study-types not ranked high in 
hierarchies of evidence. 
Furthermore, the stage at which evidence is appraised in the 4S model also encourages 
recommendations vulnerable to the PEI through a subtler mechanism. For, as I said at the 
beginning of this subsection, if the 4S model truly endorses recommendations consistent with 
Sackett’s definition, then one would expect at least some advice (even very general) as to how 
to assess the quality of non-research evidential sources. After all, if, according to EBM’s 
official definition, EBM practitioners integrate the best research with clinical experience, then 
an approach to teach that kind of EBM practice should help physicians to distinguish when 
clinical experience and their judgment can be useful and when they can be misleading. So, 
while the 4S model, via the critical appraisal exercise, teaches EBM practitioners about 
various methodological aspects of clinical trials, this model has remained largely silent as to 
how to assess the reliability of the so-called low-quality evidential sources. Surely, not all 
instances of judgment informed by clinical experience (or perhaps reasoning based on 
mechanisms supported by basic research) are equally unreliable or faulty. Won’t the specific 
kind of reasoning applied, as well as the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of the 
primary evidence involved, make the resulting judgments be more or less reasonable? And 
yet, despite this, it is remarkable that the third step of the 4S model, which is supposed to help 
physicians to appraise evidence, only provides physicians with a methodological checklist for 
selected research designs and ignores the relevant task of assessing the quality and reliability 
of information from clinical experience. 
Of course, this might be an innocent oversight. But regardless of the reasons behind it, the 
fact that the 4S model does not teach EBM practitioners how to assess the quality of non-
research sources seems difficult to reconcile with the idea these practitioners are being trained 
to put into effect the kind of EBM described in Sackett’s definition. As far as I can see, this 
kind of training prepares physicians to find and select the best research evidence so that it can 
then be used to back up recommendations for individuals. And if this is correct, it seems like, 
after its third step, the 4S model keeps helping physicians to focus on selected research 
evidence. And, in doing so, it continues to foster recommendations that leave little room for 
judgment and are vulnerable to the PEI. 
2.4.1.4. Step 4: Applying evidence 
At this stage, advocates of EBM might admit that the previous three steps of the 4S model 
promote recommendations exclusively based on the information for which valid research data 
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is likely to be found. However, it might still be too hasty to conclude that the 4S model 
teaches physicians to practice medicine in a way that is consistent with my reconstruction of 
the EBM approach and, by contrast, difficult to reconcile with Sackett’s version. Such 
conclusion would be precipitate because supporters of EBM might still contend that it is 
during the fourth step of the 4S model, the step where valid evidence is applied to individuals, 
that EBM practitioners exercise their judgment and address the PEI.  
I accept that there is some plausibility to this defence. If it is true that in the fourth step of the 
4S model physicians are entrusted with the task of determining the “applicability” of the 
evidence gathered in the previous steps, and if “applicability” is defined at least in some EBM 
textbooks –for example the one written by Antonio Dans and colleagues (2008)– as “the 
extent to which conclusions of a study can be expected to hold true for a particular patient” 
(p.11), one might think that this model does not seem to be oblivious of the PEI. And if so, by 
encouraging judgments of applicability, the 4S model might be teaching EBM practitioners to 
use their clinical judgment and derivatively encourage them to consider information beyond 
valid research findings. 
However, if supporters of EBM were right on this, the fourth step of the 4S model would 
have to offer a significant compensation for the neglect of additional information inherited 
from the previous steps. One way to do this would be to foster explicit awareness about the 
importance of the PEI so to encourage EBM practitioners to apply their judgment in the light 
of everything they know about their patient, regardless of whether the relevance of the 
information available could only be supported by low-ranked evidential sources. 
But I think that this would be to ask too much of the 4S model. Below I shall argue that, in 
practice, the influence of EBM rules of evidence prevails. Even if there are some timid calls 
for judgment when it comes to applying research findings, it is unlikely that EBM 
practitioners will overcome the pressure to generate recommendations that, in accordance 
with EBM rules, must be based on evidence of the highest quality available.  
Thus, despite first appearances, I shall argue that the 4S model ends discouraging EBM 
practitioners from paying attention to information about the patient whose relevance can only 
be defended by appealing to clinical judgment itself (e.g. in the form of experts’ opinion) or 
by citing basic research or previous personal clinical experience with similar patients. If 
explicitly defending the incorporation of such information in clinical recommendations is 
difficult enough in the absence of supporting research evidence, it is almost impossible when 
EBM practitioners know that there is valid research evidence for a target population to which 
the individual patient belongs to supporting another recommendation. So, if clinical discretion 
were to be exercised by the end of the 4S model, it would only be exercised in a very 
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restricted sense – perhaps only under extreme circumstances, so to prevent blatant 
misapplications of research data to individuals. 
2.4.1.4.1. “Non-exclusion” as applicability 
Let us now consider concrete guidance with regard to assessments of applicability in the 
context of the 4S model.  A first problem for those who claim that in this last step the 4S 
model can correct the neglect of available information fostered in previous steps is that some 
supporters of EBM provide physicians with advice that is, quite simply, misguided. I say this 
because the advice offered, rather than helping EBM practitioners to widen their gaze so to 
look for any kind of evidence they might need to make sense of the information present in the 
patient and estimate the right probabilities, avoids addressing the PEI by asking the wrong 
questions.   
Examples of this kind of “misguidance” can be found in the writings of EBM authors who 
seem to think that the question of the applicability to individuals is interchangeable with the 
question of whether the patient could have been included in the study sample. An error, which 
as the reader might recall from the first chapter, confuses the problem of determining what 
target population research evidence is representative of (that is, the problem of 
generalizability or external validity) with the PEI, which consist of knowing something extra 
about the particular individual the physician is interested in. Consider, as illustrations, the 
following quotes: 
 “Could my patient have been randomised in this trial? If so the results are applicable; if not, 
they may not be.”  
  (Valori, 2002, quoted from Summerskill, 2005 p.13)  
Or, even more explicitly,  
“…how does the cardiologist know whether to apply a specific treatment--whose efficacy and 
risk profile have been defined in a good quality RCT… to his/her individual patient? The 
simplest solution would be found in the answer to the question: "Could my patient have been 
enrolled in the study by satisfying its inclusion and exclusion criteria?" If the answer is "yes", 
then it would be sound to apply the study results to the patient…” (Carneiro, 2003, p.259) 40 
                                                        
40 Similar quotes are “Could my patient have been included in this study? (Does my patient meet the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria used in this study?)” (Nordenstrom, 2007, p. 69) Or: “The applicability of clinical trial results to 
the individual patient depends on a rigorous set of rules that can be summarized in the question "Could my patient 
have been enrolled in this trial?" (Carneiro, 2003, p.259). See also Sackett, 2000 for analogous counsels. 
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As the previous passages suggest, EBM practitioners who follow this advice during the last 
step of the 4S model are taught that the question of the applicability of research to individuals 
is satisfactoryly solved when patients could have been included in the study sample.  
On a charitable reading, one could see that this approach to assess applicability is well 
intended. I say this because at least it raises the possibility that the results of certain clinical 
trials, however valid, might not be applicable to some individuals. But having said that, it is 
apparent that this kind of advice does not grasp the crux of the PEI, and therefore does not 
address it properly. To see this, one only needs to point out that paying attention to inclusion 
and exclusion criteria may, sometimes, be equivalent to paying attention to everything the 
physician knows about the patient; but given the way in which patients’ data are normally 
collected by physicians in real clinical settings (Drill et al. 2015, Dugdale et al. 1999; Walker 
et al. 1990; Kaplan et al. 1997), it is reasonable to assume they will know more about their 
patients than whether they meet or do not meet a few inclusion and exclusion criteria41. Thus, 
this kind of advice is unlikely to redirect physicians’ attention towards the patient’s 
idiosyncrasies that were extracted away during the previous steps of the 4S model, and 
therefore, is likely to perpetuate recommendations that forcibly eliminate the PEI and 
encourage the application of valid research findings on the basis of membership of standard 
target populations.  
As I pointed out in the previous chapter, if the PEI is taken seriously, then it follows that the 
main challenge for the physician is to use everything she knows about the patient to estimate 
what the relevant probabilities are, and it is quite clear that this challenge may still arise after 
the physician has no doubts about the fact that, given certain inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
her patient could have been included in the study sample. 
Finally, it worth stressing that this kind of approach to implement the fourth step of the 4S 
model does little or nothing to align the recommendations of EBM practioners who follow 
this criteria to those ascribed to EBM practice by Sackett’s definition. For to encourage 
physicians to determine whether inclusion or exclusion criteria would leave the patient out of 
the trial is undoubtedly different from encouraging physicians to integrate the best research 
evidence with “their judgment informed by experience”. So, if this is all there is to the 
assessment of applicability in the 4S model, it would be difficult to claim that it will turn 
resulting recommendations congruent with EBM’s official definition and inconsistent with 
my representation of EBM 
2.4.1.4.2. Applicability by default 
                                                        
41 To complicate things even more, it is well known that inclusion and exclusion criteria are poorly reported by 
many researchers (See Blümle et al., 2011). 
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However, the inclusion/exclusion criteria approach is not the only alternative, for another way 
to operationalize judgments of applicability in the context of the 4S model has been proposed 
by Matt Petticrew and Sir Ian Chalmers (2011) 42. 
In essence, Petticrew and Chalmers’ approach to applicability in the context of the 4S model 
is that valid clinical trials (in particular RCTs) should be assumed applicable to every member 
of the intended target population except in the presence of strong reasons to think otherwise. 
In response to Nancy Cartwright’s remarks on the necessity of a reasoned approach to 
examine the generalizability of the results from RCTS (Cartwright, 2011), these authors 
proposed that physicians should approach to the question of applicability by asking 
themselves: “Are there any good reasons to believe that the research is not relevant to us, 
that ‘it won’t work for us’?” (p.1696). So far so good, no surprise there, however, Petticrew 
and Chalmers (2011) continued to put forward the following concrete advice: “a good 
working assumption is that the main result probably applies to everyone, unless good 
evidence exists to the contrary” (p.1696).  
If we focus on the first part of Petticrew and Chalmers’ advice, it may appear that EBM 
practitioners are being taught to incorporate previously neglected information about the 
patient.  To the extent that “reasons” are requested before applying research finding, one 
cannot say that the 4S model is telling physicians to extrapolate findings automatically on the 
basis of membership to the target population as my reconstruction suggests. Furthermore, to 
the extent that these authors’ request for reasons involves attention to what physicians know 
about their patient, then it seems that Petticrew and Chalmers’ counsel is better suited to 
address the PEI. After all, for the request for potential reasons not to apply research findings 
to individuals to have any practical influence in final recommendations, these authors should 
leave some room for the exercise of clinical judgment. 
Nonetheless, attention to the second part of Petticrew and Chalmers’ recommendation (2011), 
what they called “a good working assumption” (p.1696), reveals that these authors impose 
important constraints on the application of clinical judgment, and do not promote attention to 
the PEI. For according to this assumption, the claim that valid research findings are applicable 
can only be challenged under special circumstances, namely: in the presence of “good 
evidence” (p.1696).  
The demand for “good evidence”, although in principle sensible, becomes problematic 
because EBM practitioners the notion of good evidence is tightly connected to EBM rules, 
                                                        
42 Sir Ian Chalmers is a very influential figure in the area of EBM. He has not only written hundreds of articles 
supporting reliance on RCTs, but also was the founder of the Cochrane collaboration, which aims at providing 
physicians with updated summaries of the best evidence available. 
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and therefore these rules affect judgments as to what constitute good reasons not to 
extrapolate evidence. So, from this perspective, EBM practitioners are perfectly entitled to 
establish the applicability of research without attending to everything they know about the 
patient, and, what is more, are in effect encouraged to determine applicability by restricting 
their attention to information whose relevance is defensible according to EBM rules.  
By now, the reader will have noted that Petticrew and Chalmers’ advice has taken EBM 
practitioners round a small circle. Because what Petticrew and Chalmers’ are actually saying 
to EBM practitioners is that the reasons not to apply RCT evidence should be backed up by 
information about the patient whose relevance to the matter has been itself previously backed 
up by suitably controlled research! Or, to put it the other way around, that EBM practitioners 
should not waste their time paying attention to information about the patient that is not 
backed up by research evidence, for such information cannot possibly challenge the 
“reasonable working assumption” that research results are by default applicable to individuals. 
In effect, therefore, the recommendations that follow from Petticrew and Chalmers’ advice 
are perfectly consistent with my reconstruction of EBM recommendations as exclusively 
based on valid research evidence, and which assume that any extra information about the 
patient not backed up by suitable research is probabilistically irrelevant to the outcome of 
interest. 
So, to summarise, the last step of the 4S model seems of little value against the PEI. And the 
main reason for this is that it seems implausible that a significant proportion of what the 
physician knows about her patient could be defended as relevant by citing previously 
conducted controlled trials. In the context of therapy, for example, that would imply that each 
potential interaction effect should gain such status on the basis of well-conducted RCTs, 
which is in practice unfeasible 43.  
Furthermore, with respect to the idea that the last step of the 4S model would permit 
integration with low-ranked evidential sources so as to generate recommendations consistent 
with Sackett’s definition of EBM, it seems highly implausible that this happens in a context 
where EBM rules dictate the attitude of EBM practitioners to different evidential sources. 
Suppose, for the sake of emphasis, that a physician has a patient in front of her and she recalls 
from her experience that she has seen many patients of this kind during her years of practice. 
Suppose further that, according to the physicians’ experience, patients like the patient in 
question are not likely to respond to the treatment recommended by a well-conducted RCT, 
whose intended target population, according to the authors of this trial, are patients with the 
                                                        
43  Notice that since most of our knowledge about interaction effects does not comes from main estimates reported 
in clinical trials many supporters of EBM would consider such knowledge too unreliable to be taken seriously 
(Sleigh, 2010; Senn and Harrell, 1997; Burke et al., 2015). 
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condition this patient has. Now, the question is: should the physician retrace her own steps, 
abandon the abstractions that made possible attention to high-quality evidence and now 
appeal to the presence of extra information in her patient so to challenge the applicability of 
such evidence to her patient? According Sackett’s definition, such kind of relevant experience 
should not be ignored, and what is more, it should be combined with the findings that come 
from research. But, would the EBM practitioner (in particular a dutiful one) be willing to do 
that? Surely, as some advocates of EBM have said, if the physician is going to disregard RCT 
evidence and rely on her judgment she has to be sure of what she is doing (Howick, 2011). 
But the interesting thing here is that it is difficult to imagine that any physician who adheres 
to EBM rules of evidence could possibly be willing to jettison RCT findings that superficially 
seem perfectly applicable so to be able to face the PEI and use her judgment to estimate the 
right probabilities on the basis of all information available. 
In conclusion, the EBM practioners who follows the 4S model faces an evident predicament. 
While it seems, in theory, possible to combine evidence from various sources when assessing 
applicability, it is difficult to see how this can be done without violating EBM rules of 
evidence.  Thus, if the applicability of valid research to the individual can only be questioned 
by information about the individual that is also supported by “valid evidence”, we are forced 
to conclude that the 4S model of EBM practice fosters recommendations almost exclusively 
concerned with the best research, which leave little room for clinical judgment and which 
remain vulnerable to the problem of extra-information. As Sandra Tanenbaum (2012) puts it: 
“For EBM, clinical science is so far superior to any other form of medical knowledge that 
there are few good reasons not to act on it, even in the individual case.” (p.272). 
2.4.2. Evidence-based guidelines model 
The second method through which EBM practice has been implemented is centred in the 
construction and application of evidence-based guidelines (EBGs). Unlike the 4S model, the 
practice of EBM via EBGs does not rely on physicians’ capacity to search for and 
subsequently apply high-quality research evidence to their patients. In the EBG model, 
physicians are presented with clinical recommendations backed-up by the best research 
evidence available, which has been searched, selected, and analysed by guideline-makers 
(Lim et al. 2008; Woolf et al. 1999). 
Given that EBGs are tools primarily constructed for purposes of public health, one might 
wonder: what should the practice that follows from EBGs look like for it to be compatible 
with Sackett and colleagues’ integrative definition?  Obviously, the fact that guideline-makers 
develop recommendations for standard reference classes of patients makes it unreasonable to 
demand attention to knowledge about particular patients during the process of construction of 
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EBGs.  However, this does not imply that a system of care based on EBGs is necessarily 
incompatible with Sackett and colleagues’ definition. Even if recommendations from EBGs 
are exclusively based on research evidence, their application to individuals can, in principle, 
coexist with the exercise of clinical judgment and thereby permit attention to the 
idiosyncrasies of particular patients. Thus, one might think that physicians could interpret 
EBGs as general suggestions based on simple rules, which could be useful for some patients, 
but which also could be put to one side when they have access to additional information that 
permits more sophisticated decision algorithms.  
As it happens, the very definition of EBGs seems to support the idea that their application is 
consistent with Sackett and colleagues’ definition, for EBGs are officially presented to 
physicians as recommendations not mandates. The Institute of Medicine in the United States 
(Field and Lohr, 1990), for example, emphasises the non-compulsory character of EBGs by 
defining them as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner decisions about 
appropriate healthcare for specific clinical circumstances” (p.38). Likewise, the American 
college of Physicians (ACP) tells physicians that the goal of ACP guidelines is to “provide 
clinicians with recommendations based on the best available evidence; to inform clinicians of 
when there is no evidence; and finally, to help clinicians deliver the best health care possible.” 
(ACP, no date) And, similarly, in the United Kingdom, several guidelines generated by the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) present part of their content using 
an advisory tone. For instance, the NICE guideline [CG90] for the management of depression 
in adults specifies that physicians are expected to exercise their judgment because 
recommendations are "not mandatory"(NICE, 2016). 
Thus, if EBGs truly are suggestions not commands, then surely their application must be 
flexible enough to leave sufficient room for the exercise of judgment and thereby avoid the 
PEI. And if so, the thesis that I mounted a straw-man against EBM would find support in the 
EBGs model of practice. 
Nonetheless, the way in which EBGs are officially presented –either in general definitions or 
in specific guidelines– does not provide a definite answer to the question of what kind of 
clinical practice follows from the application of EBGs. Caution is necessary here, for 
although standard definitions and the presence of provisos in some EBGs are important, these 
are only part of a larger set of mechanisms through which EBGs shape physicians’ clinical 
behaviour. 
In fact, I think that it would be rather naïve –if not conveniently simplistic– to assume that 
careful definitions and statements with qualified conditions of use determine the way in 
which EBGs are in practice applied. As several authors have noted, the relationship between 
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EBGs and clinical practice is more complex than it appears, and to fully understand how 
EBGs really shape the care of individuals we need to consider how EBGs relate to standards 
of practice and measures of quality and performance (e.g. Bogdan-Lovis et al. 2012, 
Tanenbaum, 2012). This is because physicians’ compliance (or non-compliance) with 
standards and quality measures brings about professional, economical and legal consequences, 
which in turn affect how physicians interpret the compulsoriness of EBGs in the first place 
(Hayward and Kent 2008, Shackelton et al. 2009, Karve et al. 2008). Below I shall direct the 
reader’s attention to a set of implicit and explicit influences, which jointly counteract the 
advisory character of EBGs, and end by promoting a rigid kind of EBM practice with an 
exiguous space for clinical discretion.  
2.4.2.1. The tacit influence of EBM rules of evidence 
One of the reasons that makes it difficult for physicians not to comply with EBGs, even if 
they are presented as recommendations, and even if physicians are requested to exercise 
judgment, was already discussed in the context of the 4S model: the pressure to practice in 
accordance with the rules of EBM. 
When it comes to deciding whether to apply a recommendation for a particular patient it is 
hard to see how a physician who wishes to be identified as an evidence-based practitioner 
would dare to challenge recommendations supported by “the best scientific evidence 
available” (Grol et al. 1998. p.858).   
The influence of EBM’s rules on physicians’ attitude towards EBGs is illustrated vividly in 
the comments of Peter Szatmari (2004), a physician who expresses his frustration in response 
to the problem of basing recommendations on evidence of dubious applicability to individuals 
(Gupta, 2004): “On what basis do I make a clinical decision? … I would prefer to make my 
clinical decision on the basis of the best available evidence. What is the alternative to using 
evidence as a guide? I could do nothing…I could make a decision at random… I could make 
my decision on the basis on how I was trained…[or] I could instead make my decision based 
on what I know about pathophysiology…Do we have an alternative?”(p.97-98).  
Many physicians who, like Szatmari, adhere to the rules of EBM, feel that when EBGs are 
presented as supported by valid research evidence, there seems to be no way in which they 
could challenge recommendations. This idea was expressed when I introduce the case of Mr 
Smith in the previous chapter: If the physician knows that her patient has acute conjunctivitis, 
and she has access to valid EBGs for such patients: why bother in exercising her judgment to 
pay attention to extra information whose probabilistic relevance to the outcome of interest is 
difficult to defend according to EBM rules?  
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The point is simple enough, if attention to additional information might lead to 
recommendations that diverge from EBGs, and which could be criticised on the grounds that 
the relevance of such information can only be backed up by low-quality evidence, then the 
systematic exercise of clinical judgment to determine the applicability of EBGs seems to be 
futile. And, in consequence, it would not be surprising if most practical-minded physicians, 
who work for institutions that embrace EBM rules, would prefer to ignore the PEI and just 
apply EBGs on the assumption that the extra facts they might know about their patients are 
probabilistically irrelevant. 
But even if some physicians were sufficiently aware about the negative consequences of 
ignoring the PEI, and therefore were interested in exercising their judgment during the 
application of EBGs, there are stronger and more explicit influences than a potential conflict 
with EBM rules, which might persuade them that it is more convenient to put their clinical 
judgment to one side. 
2.4.2.2. Standards of care and “best practices” 
Nowadays there is a clear link between EBGs and standards of clinical practice. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, many recommendations included in NICE guidelines are explicitly 
tied to NICE quality standards (NICE, 2016a). These standards consist of “…markers of 
high-quality, cost-effective patient care, covering the treatment and prevention of different 
diseases and conditions. Derived from the best available evidence such as NICE guidance …” 
(NICE, 2016b). 
It is worth stressing, however, that the correspondence between EBGs and quality measures is 
not absolute. In this respect, not all recommendations included in NICE guidance gain the 
status of quality indicators. This is not surprising, because quality standards are normally 
established by a process that not only involves attention to research evidence but also 
additional considerations, such as feasibility and economical costs at a population level 
(NICE, 2016b). Nonetheless, the fact that the link between EBGs and quality standards is not 
applicable to all recommendations, does little to change the basic message conveyed by this 
connexion: while compliance with EBGs suggests that clinical care is of the highest-quality, 
non-compliance is assumed to be indicative of sub-optimal practice. 
The situation is not very different in United States, where the quality of care has been 
operationalised using performance indicators largely influenced by EBGs (Tannebaum, 2012). 
Thus, Rodney Hayward and David Kent (2008) two primary care physicians ironically 
comment: “providing the highest quality of care is no longer the challenging task it used to 
be, involving clinical acumen and understanding of individual circumstances, concerns and 
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needs of your patients. Those days are thankfully gone, replaced with a far more reasonable 
principle – providing highest quality care simply means scoring well on your performance 
measures.” (p 255) 
Notice, however, that the point I am pursuing here is not that establishing a link between 
EBGs and practice standards is necessarily a bad thing. I seriously doubt that any reasonable 
person would reject that a certain level of practice standardization is necessary for a public 
system of health to work efficiently, and that performance measures can be sensible way to 
check compliance with established standards. My point is rather that the connexion between 
EBGs, standards of practice, and quality measures need not be too rigid. If it lacks flexibility, 
it introduces an additional and potentially detrimental incentive to comply with EBGs. For, if 
the link with quality measures eliminates clinical discretion, it is plausible to think that 
physicians (regardless of whether they style themselves as EBM practitioners and are 
concerned with following EBM rules of evidence) would be concern with complying with 
EBGs if they want to avoid being considered professionals who practice suboptimal clinical 
medicine. 
But, of course, the connexion between EBGs and quality measures need not result in a model 
of care that forces physicians to apply EBGs uniformly. One can conceive of a reasonable 
system of quality measures that leaves enough room for exceptions. In such a system 
departures from EBGs would not be immediately taken as instances of suboptimal practice, 
and if so, physicians would feel less compelled to adhere invariably to EBGs. Regrettably, 
although there is increased awareness as to the importance of generating quality standards 
that are sensitive to special cases (e.g. Mercuri and Gafni, 2011), the most common scenario 
seems to be one in which departures from EBGs are very quickly classified as cases of 
deficient medical care.  
As Falzer and Garman (2009) point out, the “lack of conformance to clinical guidelines and 
dosage recommendations have been attributed to factors such as lack of knowledge, 
vulnerability to the persuasive appeals of big pharma, intransigence, poor training, or lack of 
proper monitoring and inherent limitations of human cognitive functioning.” (p.1143). So, it 
seems that the standard attitude towards non-compliance with EBGs is not to assume that 
physicians were able to provide patients with a better recommendations based on more 
information, but rather that physicians actually failed to prescribe the right interventions (e.g. 
Rapp et al. 2008; Schoenwal et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, even if risking being considered a lazy professional who does not deliver high-
quality care to her patients is not sufficient reason to put judgment to one side, there are 
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additional incentives that might lead the physician to favour an automatic conformance to 
EBGs, even in the presence of information suggesting that the patient would be better off if 
she does not comply with EBGs. 
2.4.2.3. Pay for performance initiatives  
One of the most obvious positive incentives to comply with EBGs is economic, for nowadays 
the physician who practices in accordance to guideline recommendations can increase her 
income. McCartney and colleagues (2016) describe the current situation in the United 
Kingdom: 
“[EBGs] have been used to create financial incentive schemes such as the UK’s Quality and 
Outcomes Framework, whereby a substantial proportion of general practice income depends 
on achieving thresholds for drug therapy or surrogate outcomes in accordance with National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidelines” (p.1). 
As McCartney and colleagues (2016) say, the scope and impact of financial incentives is 
considerable. In a report on the experience of pay for performance incentives in the United 
Kingdom, Campbell and colleagues (2009) indicated that “payments make up approximately 
25% of family practitioners’ income, and 99.6% of family practitioners participated in the 
pay-for-performance scheme…” thus confirming that these stimuli may play an important 
role in shaping physicians’ clinical practice (p.369). 
However, although it is reasonable to assume that economic incentives do not affect the 
behaviour of every physician in the same way (Wieringa and Greenhalgh, 2015; Montgomery, 
2006, Elwyn et al. 2016), there is widespread concern that they are turning evidence-based 
“guidelines” into evidence-based “tramlines”. As McCartney and colleagues (2016) say: 
“many clinicians and patients have expressed dissatisfaction with the way evidence based 
medicine has been applied to individuals, especially in primary care. There is concern that 
guidelines intended to reduce variation and improve the quality of care have instead resulted 
in medicine becoming authoritarian and bureaucratic” (p.1). And while most commentators 
(e.g. Greenhalgh et al. 2014; Harrison and Wood, 2000; McCartney et al. 2016) have pointed 
out that the use of pay for performance incentives encourages neglecting patients’ preferences 
and values, it is clear that a system that rewards rigid application of EBGs also discourage 
physicians from paying attention to the additional information they might have about 
individual patients. The mechanism is simple: If the physician knows that the consequences 
of exercising her judgment are not only recommendations that might be difficult to defend, 
but also recommendations that will not bring about any economical benefit, why bother about 
the PEI? After all, if heath-care managers and supervisors do not worry about the 
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consequences of ignoring extra information, why the physician should worry about this 
problem?  
Even so, one might hope that not all physicians are willing to put their own economic benefit 
above their patients’ interest. (In fact, as a clinical psychiatrist, I would like to think of myself 
as one of those physicians.) And in fact, studies that reveal physicians’ dissatisfaction with 
the way in which they are encouraged to apply EBGs suggest that at least some of physicians 
seem to be more interested in improving their patients’ health than in increasing their income 
(Harrison and Wood, 2000). Nonetheless, there is yet a further incentive to comply with 
EBGs, which might be even more persuasive for it appeals to a particular kind of fear, namely, 
fear of malpractice lawsuits.  
2.4.2.4. Defensive medicine and risk of litigation 
Concerns of malpractice liability are particularly prominent in developed countries such as 
United Kingdom and United States, where the term “defensive medicine” was first coined 
(Bishop and Pesko, 2015). This term refers to a situation where physicians’ recommendations 
are primarily aimed at decreasing the risk of litigation (Sekhar and Vyas, 2013). 
Of course, defensive medicine is a problem of its own, which is not necessarily related to 
EBGs. However, to the extent that defensive medicine involves compliance with 
recommendations that are more defensible in case of adverse outcomes, it is plausible to think 
that physicians whose recommendations are driven by fear would prefer to comply with 
EBGs, even in a situation where EBGs do not provide them with the recommendation that 
maximizes the probability of the outcome of interest for the patient. 
Consider the following quote from the Department of Health (1999) taken from a comment 
on the role of EBGs in determinations of medical negligence by Brian Hurwitz (2004): “Any 
doctor not fulfilling the standards and quality of care in the appropriate treatment that are set 
out in these Clinical Guidelines, will have this taken into account if, for any reason, 
consideration of their performance in this clinical area is undertaken.” (p.1024). 
The point illustrated by this quote is made explicit by Steven Woolf and colleagues (1999): 
EBGs constitute “citable evidence for malpractice litigation” (p.530), and since several 
studies suggest that fear of malpractice occupies a prominent role among the factors 
determining practice styles (Schumacher et al. 1995; Carrier et al. 2010; Mercuri and Gafni, 
2011), it would not be surprising if physicians interested in protecting themselves against 
litigation opt to ignore the PEI and just practice in accordance to EBGs.  
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Of course, it is true that EBGs do not necessarily establish legal standards of practice, and 
therefore physicians are not “forced” to follow EBGs. However, EBGs do not require a legal 
status to exert a powerful behavioural influence on physicians’ practice. As Hurwitz (2004) 
points out, EBGs “do provide the courts with a benchmark by which to judge clinical 
conduct”, and this implies that they “set normative standards such that departure from them 
may require some explanation” (p.1028). And while such demand for explanation may not be 
a problem for some physicians, it is reasonable to assume that most physicians would prefer 
to avoid formal inquiries into their practice, even if they know that they can argue that given 
the information available about the patient at the time of decision-making their 
recommendations were the right ones.  
So, to summarize, although the fact that EBGs are normally presented as recommendations 
seems to support the thesis that they leave enough room for the exercise of clinical judgment, 
careful attention to the relationship between EBGs and standards of care reveals that EBGs 
take part in a model of clinical care that is far more rigid than initially appears.  In practice, 
physicians are encouraged to comply with guidelines by at least three mechanisms: first, 
compliance with EBGs helps them to maintain their professional reputation as EBM 
practitioners; second, it helps them to increase their income; and third, it may protect them in 
case of being subject to malpractice lawsuits. Thus, even though a model of practice based on 
EBGs is in principle compatible with Sackett’s definition, in practice it encourages physicians 
to put their judgment to one side and therefore is more consistent with my reconstruction of 
EBM. 
2.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter have I addressed the question of what EBM practice is. My starting point was 
the so-called EBM integrative definition. By paying attention to the aims stated in this 
definition I offered a general characterization of the kind of practice that follows from this 
definition. Then I proposed an alternative description of EBM, as a practice almost 
completely focused on applying selected research to the care of individuals. Given the 
incompatibility between EBM’s integrative characterization and my characterization I 
questioned the capacity of EBM’s integrative characterization to describe how EBM is 
actually practiced. I showed that, the practice of EBM that follows from its methods is in 
tension with the practice of EBM implied by the integrative definition. Finally, I considered 
the possibility that the inconsistencies between different accounts of EBM practice could be 
explained by errors in EBM’s methods. However, after considering various reasons, I 
concluded that it is more likely that EBM integrative definition is, in truth, a restrictive kind 
of EBM practice, in disguise.  
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Chapter 3: Research improvements  
 
3.1. Abstract  
This chapter is focused on recent research improvements. My primary aim is to examine the 
prospects of three methodological refinements with respect to the problem of extra 
information (PEI). I shall argue that well-conducted Pragmatic Randomized Controlled Trials, 
Subgroup Analyses, and n of 1 Randomized Controlled Trials can do much to ameliorate 
standard problems that often jeopardize the adequacy of physicians’ clinical 
recommendations. But even though these technical upgrades can aid physicians in obtaining 
probabilities for more fine-grained reference classes of patients, I shall contend that none of 
them eradicates the PEI and therefore do not eliminate the need for clinical judgment required 
by the Discretionary Approach (DA). 
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3.2. Recapitulation 
In the first chapter I argued that, if the physician wants to maximize expected utility for her 
patient, the right probabilities are the probabilities in the reference class defined by everything 
she knows about the patient. The physician cannot avoid making a judgment about what these 
probabilities are; this is the role of clinical judgment and EBM is not doing the patient a 
favour by encouraging the physician to use probability estimates from valid research results 
and just assume that the extra features present in the patient will not have any probabilistic 
causal effect on the outcome of interest.  
The second chapter offered a defence of my reconstruction of the EBM approach. As I 
explained, while it is true that the standard definition of EBM (Sackett et al. 1996) seems to 
leave room for the application of clinical judgment, I argued that the methods used to teach 
and implement EBM, along with various professional, economical and legal influences, 
reduce the latitude for the exercise of clinical discretion, and end promoting recommendations 
that neglect the PEI. 
This chapter focuses on a line of argument that, if adopted by supporters of EBM, could 
provide them with a practical answer to the challenge of basing clinical decisions on the right 
probabilities for each individual without yielding ground to physicians’ clinical judgment. 
This strategy does not deny my claims that the right probabilities for clinical decision-making 
are the probabilities based on everything the physician knows about the patient (DA 
probabilities) (§ 1.5), and that the EBM approach provides physicians with probabilities that 
ignore part of the available information (EBM probabilities). However, this strategy aims to 
address these issues without appealing to clinical judgment. Instead it claims that suitable 
refinements in research methodology can in due course overcome the relevant evidential gap 
between EBM probabilities and DA probabilities, and therefore that EBM will eventually be 
able to offer patients recommendations based on the right probabilities, but this time not 
filtered or refined by physicians’ judgment. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides the reader with the necessary 
background to understand in more detail what kind of obstacles hamper the generation of 
general efficacy claims (§ 3.3). This is important because I think that most refinements 
proposed by supporters of EBM, though addressing some of the challenges related to general 
efficacy claims and –albeit partially– helping EBM practitioners with the PEI, cannot be used 
to defend the thesis that clinical judgment is dispensable. Then, in the following section (§ 
3.4) I discuss three research refinements: (§ 3.4.1) Pragmatic Randomised Controlled Trials 
(PRCTs), (§ 3.4.2) subgroup analyses (SGAs), and (§ 3.4.3) N of 1 Randomised Controlled 
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Trials (N1s). I shall contend that these improvements help physicians to address crucial 
challenges related to basic statistical inference (estimation), causal inference (confounding), 
external validity (extrapolation), and –to some extent– the PEI. Nonetheless, I shall insist that 
is unlikely that these methodological advances will be able to obliterate the gap between the 
probabilities provided by our best research methods (EBM probabilities) and the right 
probabilities for each individual (DA probabilities). For this reason, while they are steps in 
the right direction, they are not an effective means for dispensing with physicians’ judgment 
altogether 
 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects of personalised and 
precision medicine44. These types of medicine are certainly distinct from standard EBM 
practice (4S model and EBGs model) as discussed in (§ 2.4), but deserve consideration 
because they exploit the idea of using research refinements to offer patients individualized 
prescriptions, and their advocates often style themselves as practitioners working at the 
“cutting edge” of evidence-based practice (e.g. Kumar, 2011; Sharma, 2014). I shall maintain, 
however, that although these movements are right in thinking that current EBM 
recommendations need to be improved, they tend to overstate the level of individualization 
achievable by their methods and give the false impression that the adequacy of 
recommendations does not depend on careful clinical discretion. While I think that there is 
progress in tailoring prescriptions by using genetic makeup or sophisticated physiological 
variables, such kind of tailoring, far from eliminating the need for a considered judgment, 
makes its application even more relevant. 
 
3.3. General efficacy claims 
When introducing the rationale behind EBM recommendations in the context of therapy (§ 
1.4.1), I assumed that conventional RCTs have the capacity to provide physicians with 
evidence for general efficacy claims such as “topical antibiotics are not, on average, an 
effective treatment for patients with acute conjunctivitis”.45 
 
                                                        
44 Neither personalised medicine nor precision medicine should be confused with person-centred medicine. The 
main elements of the latter will be discussed in chapter 4 (§ 4.2.2). 
 
45 Let me stress that by “general efficacy claims” I mean both claims about the average efficacy or average “non-
efficacy” of some intervention (pharmacological, psychological, etc.) for a population defined by membership to 
standard diagnostic reference classes (e.g. patients with major depressive disorder, patients with asthma, patients 
with diabetes type I, and so on). Notice also that that the equivalent to a general efficacy claim in the context of 
diagnosis and prognosis are general “diagnostic/prognostic claims” such as “shortness of breath is, on average, a 
sign of severe asthma” or “patients with acute conjunctivitis recover, on average, within one week”. 
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At that stage I did not dwell on the inferential process leading to general efficacy claims, but 
simply limited myself to pointing out that, given certain assumptions, such kind of claims are 
in practice possible. However, in avoiding a detailed discussion about the rationale behind the 
kind of general efficacy claims supported by EBM, I did not want to convey the idea that the 
inferential process leading to such claims is without problems. 46 My reason for not dwelling 
on such problems was simply that I wanted to direct the reader’s attention to the PEI, which is 
an additional challenge that physicians must face during the clinical encounter, and a 
challenge that may arise even if they have access to relevant RCTs, which provide them with 
sound general efficacy claims; that is, even if physicians were in a position where they had no 
doubt about the truthfulness of efficacy claim applicable to an intended target population their 
particular patients belong to. 
 
As it happens, I am well aware about the difficulties of the scientific process leading to 
general efficacy claims. After all, it is precisely because determining whether, to what extent, 
and under what circumstances treatments are effective (or ineffective) for intended target 
populations is not an easy task that many generations of scientists, statisticians, 
methodologists, and philosophers of science, have worked and are continuing to work to 
improve our inferential methods, which includes the development of more rigorous research 
designs and more sophisticated approaches to data analysis (e.g. Matthews, 1995; Doll, 1992; 
Alyass et al. 2015; Porter, 1997; Marks, 1997, Feinstein, 1967, 1968; Auffray et al. 2016). 
 
For the sake of clarity I shall distinguish between three inferential problems, which are 
connected to, but different from, what I call the PEI. This may be familiar ground for some 
readers, but rehearing these issues will facilitate exposition, and help me to explain why I 
think the set of research refinements put forward by supporters of EBM in the hope of 
bringing about truly individualised recommendations do not provide physicians with a 
definite solution to the PEI. 
 
3.3.1. Basic statistical inference 
The first problem that needs to be kept in mind is the perennial challenge of standard 
statistical inference. Under this term I include different types of estimation problems, which 
arise whenever one can obtain accurate estimates of the probability of a certain outcome of 
interest for a given target population using samples. The main concern here has to do with the 
influence of sampling fluctuations in the resulting estimates, which is, of course, a reasonable 
                                                        
46 In “the risk GP model”, Fuller and Flores (2015) consider the problems of general efficacy claims in the context 
of medical prediction in what we call the step of “generalization”.  
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worry because, whatever probability a given estimate is for, it will not be a good estimate if it 
comes from an unlucky sample (Steyerberg, 2009; Hacking, 2001). 
 
Note that the standard way to address estimation problems is with properly drawn large 
samples, so to decrease the chances that our sample is in one of the tails of the distribution by 
“bad” luck. This is the reason why both physicians and statisticians worry about issues such 
as sample size when estimating parameters and during hypothesis testing (e.g. Peto et al. 
1995). For, other things been equal, it is generally reasonable to take more seriously estimates 
that come from large samples than those that come from small ones.47 Note also –as this will 
be useful for the forthcoming discussion on subgroup analyses and N of 1 RCTs– that if we 
put estimation worries to one side, then we can say that the estimates obtained can be safely 
equated to the probabilities of interest for the population our sample is representative of. 48 
 
3.3.2. Basic causal inference 
The second problem that affects general efficacy claims is the problem of causal inference. 
Without risking much simplification, a useful way to think about this problem, from the point 
of view of probabilistic causation and causal modelling, is as a challenge related to 
confounding factors (Hitchcock, 2010; Papineau, 2012). If everything has gone well with 
respect to basic statistical estimation, the aim of researchers is now to go from simple 
correlations to causal ones (that is, for example, from claims such as “the probability of 
recovery is higher with topical antibiotics than without them in patients with acute 
conjunctivitis” to claims such as “topical antibiotics do not cause, on average, recovery in 
patients with acute conjunctivitis”).49 
It is worth noting, at least in passing, that causal inference is a topic of active debate among 
                                                        
47 Of course, what counts as a “small” or “large” simple will depend on the hypothesis under investigation. In 
medical research, various elements are considered, including general factors such as the prior probability of the 
hypothesis, and more technical ones such as the type of estimator (e.g. mean, proportion, etc.). 
48 As a statistical aside, at certain point in the past medical researchers on the side of EBM seem to have failed to 
distinguish between the problem of estimation, which can be effectively dealt with by increasing the sample size, 
and the problem of external validity, which may remain even in studies conducted with very large samples. Since 
an accurate estimate is not the same as an applicable estimate for the intended target population, meta-analyses 
should not be considered as methodological refinements that necessarily help with the problem of external validity. 
In fact, as several authors have pointed out (e.g Borenstein et al., 2009) meta-analyses can provide physicians with 
estimates that are more accurate but less useful because it remains unclear what actual target population such 
accurate estimates are representative of. Many real meta-analyses are conducted with primary studies, which were 
in turn conducted with samples known to be unrepresentative of the intended target populations or with samples 
whose representative remains unclear because of bad reporting (e.g. Travers et al, 2007; Petersen et al, 2007). In 
consequences, the estimates obtained from such meta-analyses might be more precise, but in no way more 
informative because they inherit the problems of primary studies.  
49 As I pointed out in the first chapter, the question of whether a given correlation is truly causal or due to some 
confounding is not as important in the context of diagnosis and prognosis as it is in the context of therapy, for in 
the former contexts relevant non-causal correlations can guide clinical decision-making without problems. 
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medical researchers, statisticians, epidemiologists, and philosophers (e.g. Russo and 
Williamson, 2007, 2011;Vandenbroucke et al. 2016; Hernán and Robins 2006; Beebee et al. 
2010). In this regard, the EBM movement has been widely criticised for adopting an 
overenthusiastic attitude towards RCTs (e.g. Worrall, 2007, 2011; Cartwright, 2007). From 
my perspective, overenthusiasm towards RCTs is not questionable because it rooted in 
alleged virtues that are not real (e.g. the capacity of randomization to provide a probabilistic 
guard against unknown confounders). Overenthusiasm towards RCTs is pernicious because it 
neglects the weaknesses of RCTs and fails to recognize that causal inferences can also be 
reached by alternative methods that may offer additional advantages over RCTs and do not 
deserve to be categorically classified as “second class” citizens. Regrettably, this has been the 
case with methods such as observational studies and basic research on mechanisms, which 
have strengths that conventional RCTs do not possess (e.g. Worrall, 2007, 2011; Cartwright, 
2007; Clarke et al, 2014) and which have not been sufficiently reflected in EBM’s standard 
rules of evidence (§ 2.4.1.3 and 2.4.1.4). Nonetheless, we need not discuss the many facets of 
this debate here. For my purposes it is only necessary to stress that I accept that we can learn 
about causal relationships, in a technical sense, via different routes including both systematic 
research (e.g. RCTs, observational studies, basic scientific experiments) and non-research 
methods (e.g. clinical experience and causal reasoning based on mechanisms) each of which 
has its own strengths and weaknesses. In this regard, it is worthwhile stressing that while 
conventional RCTs can ensure that the intervention under investigation “causes” the outcome 
of interest in the trial population, they cannot, without a number of additional assumptions, 
ensure that the intervention will, on average, cause the outcome if applied to the target 
population.50 As Nancy Cartwright (2011), puts it, an “ideal RCT” can tell us that a certain 
treatment “works somewhere” but it will not, by itself, tell us whether it will work if applied 
outside the trial population, for instance, if applied to the intended target population in 
standard clinical settings (p.1401). 
Furthermore, with regard to the interpretation of general causal claims in the context of 
medicine focused on individuals, it is worth emphasising that I am happy to accept, along 
with supporters of EBM, that RCTs, if well executed, can be excellent methods to discover 
causal relations that are applicable to particular patients. However, I neither think that RCTs 
are the only method to discover causes for individuals, nor that when general causal relations 
                                                        
50 The technical sense of probabilistic causation I have in mind here assumes that an intervention I is a cause of 
the outcome O if and only if there is some context in which I fixes and above-average single-case objective 
probability for the outcome O. This is equivalent to say that intervention I causes O in the trial population just in 
case there are at least some types of patients for which the Prob (O|I) > Prob (O|¬I) (See, Papineau 1985, 1989, 
1994). Note that this account does not take causal unanimity as a requirement to establish causation, that is, I do 
not assume that in order to conclude that I causes O, Prob (O|T) > Prob (O|¬T) must be true in all contexts. (The 
details of this stronger notion of causation can be found in Eells, 1987 and Cartwright, 1989.) 
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have been established via RCTs, such causes necessarily have clinical applicability to 
individuals. What I mean to say here is that even when a physician is certain that a general 
causal claim holds true for a certain standard target population, and she knows that her patient 
belongs to this target population, she may still think that such general causal claim ought not 
to be transformed into a particular efficacy claim for the patient in question51. As I argued in 
the first chapter (§ 1.4.2), extra information in the form of interaction effects can either 
reverse or amplify causal effects for individuals; and before physicians transport efficacy 
claims from research to individuals they will do well in exercising their judgment to estimate 
the potential effects of such information on the outcome of interest (§ 1.5). 
3.3.3. External validity 
At the end of the first chapter (§ 1.6.2.1) I offered a few remarks on the problem of external 
validity, which I contended is a serious issue for conventional RCTs and has been 
underestimated by some supporters of EBM 52. For purposes of this chapter I shall limit 
myself to stress that even if basic statistical inference and causal inference were not a problem, 
objections to the external validity of research findings can downgrade or even invalidate the 
practical import of general efficacy claims, even if they are otherwise methodologically 
flawless (See Rothwell, 2006; Steckler and McLeroy, 2008; Pearce et al, 2015; Cartwright, 
2013). 
The inferential difficulty underlying the problem of external validity has been identified using 
various terms which, regrettably have not been defined as precisely as one would wish. For 
example, authors concerned with this topic in the context of EBM often use terms such as the 
problem of extrapolation, the problem of transportability, the problem of lack of 
representativeness, or sufficient similarity assumptions, each which emphasise aspects of this 
problem from slightly different perspectives (Khorsan and Crawford, 2014). 
Nonetheless, issues of terminology aside, one can make sense of the essential difficulty 
behind the problem of external validity as follows. Consider a well-conducted RCT: Having 
followed estimation procedures according to standard rules, as well as having randomized 
treatment allocations properly, now one can say that researchers have good reason to believe 
that, say, the correlation between the treatment and the outcome of interest they have found 
implies that there is some context in which the treatment makes a causal difference to the 
outcome of interest (Papineau, 1994). However, even if researchers are quite certain that the 
                                                        
51  As Fuller and Flores (2016) argue in his Risk GP Model, particular efficacy claims require a step of 
“particularisation”, which is based on assumptions that might not be easily met.  
52 For example, Jeremy Howick (2011), citing research conducted by Vist et al., (2008) –which in truth is of 
questionable relevance to the problem of external validity (See Fuller, 2016)– asserts that “even if randomized 
trials appear to involve unrepresentative populations, the results apply to the target population” (p.43). 
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have obtained a precise estimate which can given a causal interpretation of the kind 
“treatment T causes, on average, outcome O”, they might still remain unclear about what the 
actual target population in which T makes this causal difference to O. 
Of course, the obvious question is why researchers are unclear about the actual target 
population their general efficacy claim is representative of. A simple answer, which does not 
sacrifice much precision, is that the samples with which conventional RCTs are conducted are 
almost invariably not random samples of the intended target populations. 53 So, for example, 
even if we have an RCT conducted in a sample of subjects defined by the presence of a 
diagnosis of type II Diabetes, if the sample was not properly drawn from the intended target 
population54, we will not know which among the actual populations which have been defined 
by the diagnosis of type II Diabetes this sample is representative of. 
Note also that, from the clinical point of view, the problem of external validity can be 
understood as a general challenge for the generalization or applicability of research findings, 
for it raises doubts about the extent to which general efficacy claims can truly support 
recommendations for standard target populations in actual clinical settings (Rothwell, 2006, 
2010; Pearce et al. 2015). 55 Thus, since external validity is a serious issue for the prospects of 
the EBM movement, understood as an extensive programme to improve the quality of 
medical care, methodological improvements to obtain research findings with increased levels 
of transportability can be found among the standard solutions to address this challenge 
(Treeweek and Zwarenstein, 2009; Patsopoulos, 2011). 
So, to sum up, I have mentioned three problems that are directly related to the question of 
what general efficacy claims research findings can tell us about, namely, standard statistical 
estimation, causal inference, and external validity. These problems are relevant because the 
                                                        
53 For the problem of external validity be understood as a problem of representativeness, the term sample should 
be read as encompassing both the members of the sample and also several characteristics of the experimental set-
up such as setting, treatment regimens, follow-up periods, etc. We will return to this point later on in this chapter 
when discussing pragmatic RCTs (§ 3.4.1). 
 
54 The frequentist and bayesian schools of statistical inference have different views about the virtues of random 
sampling. Authors typically identified with the Bayesian School tend to accept that random sampling carries 
certain technical advantages, they do not think it necessary for sound inferences (See Howson and Urbach (1989); 
Berry (2006). The position of frequentist statisticians is, at least in some sense, odd, for while they normally 
defend the importance of random sampling, when comes to particular studies where samples had not been 
randomly obtained sometimes they ignore this and interpreted parametric statistical tests as if had been obtained 
from random samples. For the frequentist position on random sampling see Mayo and Spanos (2010). 
 
55 Note that there is a sense in which the problem of external validity is much more than an academic issue 
concerning statisticians and medical methodologists. Several authors have pointed out that with the advent of EBM 
movement pharmaceutical companies have misused RCTs as marketing tools to promote recommendations based 
on efficacy findings that were obtained in samples conveniently arranged with patients of good prognosis, which 
are very different from those conforming intended target populations in real settings (e.g. Ioannidis, 2016; 
Greenhalgh et al., 2014; Christmas, 2014; Rothwell, 2006). 
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truthfulness of general efficacy claims depends on how well the aforementioned difficulties 
have been dealt with 56, and more importantly, because if they are not addressed adequately 
the resulting efficacy claims might lead to incorrect clinical recommendations. But, as the 
reader now knows, even if general efficacy claims are sound, there is an additional problem 
for the physician, a problem that we have not yet started to worry about in this chapter, but a 
problem which has to be faced if the physician wants to maximize expected utility for each 
particular patient: the PEI. To put it simply, even when the three previous problems have been 
satisfactorily dealt with, and the EBM practitioner is happy to accept that the research 
findings she knows about can back up general efficacy claims, the physicians ought not to 
ignore the extra information she has about the patient and ought to exercise her judgment to 
estimate the right probabilities. As I discussed in the first chapter (§ 1.5), my position 
regarding the PEI is that it is unreasonable to ignore it, for physicians who assume that their 
extra information is probabilistically irrelevant will fail to estimate as best as they can the 
probabilities that maximize expected utility for their patients.   
However, in this chapter we will consider an alternative attitude towards the PEI. The thought 
is the following: If previous methodological developments have helped researchers to address 
the challenges of statistical and causal inference, why one would not think that the same or 
new methodological improvements can free physicians from the PEI? The logic it is as simple 
as it is compelling: if throughout the years the collective efforts of methodologists and 
statisticians have led to (a) improvements in statistical estimation, (b) a better capacity to deal 
with the problem of confounding causes and (c) arguably more transportable research 
findings, then it does not seem unreasonable for supporters of the EBM movement to believe 
that research improvements could do the same with (d) the PEI. More precisely, could not the 
introduction of new research designs such as pragmatic controlled trials, more sophisticated 
sub-group analyses, and better and more numerous N = 1 RCTs bridge the evidential gap 
between research and individuals? Perhaps this kind of improvement can, as the supporters of 
precision medicine have sometimes promised: “predict the treatment effect for individual 
patients based on all relevant characteristics together” (Dorresteijn et al. 2011 p.2). And if 
these authors are right, then EBM could fulfil its aim of basing recommendations on objective 
probabilities estimated via the best research evidence without yielding ground to clinical 
judgment. 
                                                        
56 Recall that in the context of therapy efficacy claims require sound statistical and causal inference as well as a 
good level of external validity, but since the claims necessary to support recommendations in the context of 
diagnosis and prognosis do not require sound causal inference, researchers typically focus on good estimation (e.g. 
Hemingway et al., 2013; Riley et al., 2013) and –more recently–on ensuring better external validity (e.g. Bleeker 
et al., 2003; Collins et al., 2014). 
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Below I shall consider the aforementioned research improvements, which I admit should be 
regarded as steps in the right direction. However, I shall argue that, in the end, none of them 
makes the exercise of careful clinical judgment superfluous. Although PRCTs, SGAs and N = 
1 RCTs will typically deliver probabilities closer to the ones physicians are looking for, it is 
unlikely that these methodological advances will be able to collapse the difference between 
the probabilities provided by the best research findings and the probabilities needed for 
individual decision-making.  
3.4. Research improvements 
3.4.1. Pragmatic randomized controlled trials 
The randomized controlled trial (RCT) is a notable research design. RCTs are often ascribed 
the capacity to provide physicians with research findings that are “internally valid”, a term 
used to convey –in this particular case– a combination of robust statistical estimation and 
control for confounding factors, including unknown ones.57 But RCTs, even those perfectly 
conducted, have important weaknesses. Some of these limitations are not necessarily inherent 
to this research design, but, since they are present in most instances, they acquire high 
practical significance. Of the three problems mentioned in the previous section, conventional 
RCTs are particularly vulnerable to the problem of external validity. As I said before, this 
problem is different from the problem of extra information (PEI), and a problem that has 
captured philosophical interest on its own (Cartwright, 2009, 2010; Rothwell, 2010; Howick, 
2011; Howick et al. 2013).  
One reason to be interested in this problem is that the level of external validity of the 
evidence endorsed by EBM is important to assess the overall cogency and practical prospects 
of this movement. For if EBM is understood as a general programme to modify medical care 
on the basis of our best research evidence, then the success of this approach certainly depends 
on the assumption that what EBM regards as the best research evidence (RCTs or meta-
analyses of RCTs for questions of therapy) is typically –and perhaps also sufficiently– 
externally valid to be applicable to standard clinical populations. Nonetheless, this is not the 
reason why I am interested in the problem of external validity here. I am mentioning this 
problem here because research improvements aimed at addressing the problem of external 
validity could easily be misinterpreted as solutions to the problem of individualisation. And it 
                                                        
57 This, of course, need not be the case, RCTs can be conducted in very small samples and as a result provide 
weak evidence for correlations. Furthermore, if randomization is not properly carried out, RCTs do not offer any 
warrant to interpret probabilistic differences as causal differences. Nonetheless, it is commonly assumed that 
researchers in charge of conducing conventional RCTs try to ensure that both statistical estimation and causal 
inference be as robust as possible. 
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would be unfortunate if valuable strategies to deal with the lack of external validity of RCTs 
end up being discredited because they do not solve the PEI or, which is perhaps even worse, 
end up being undeservedly regarded as solutions to the PEI, which they are not. 
The Pragmatic Randomized Controlled Trial (PRCT) is among the research improvements, 
whose advantages might be wrongly interpreted as a solution to the PEI. The PRCTs are a 
sensible refinement over conventional RCTs, which as I said are normally affected by the 
problem of external validity. As several authors have pointed out (See e.g. Godwin et al. 
2003; Fortin et al. 2006; Uijen et al. 2007; Travers et al. 2007; and Rothwell 2005a, 2006), 
the practical import of RCTs can be very limited because these trials usually investigate the 
efficacy of treatments under experimental circumstances very difficult to replicate in real 
settings. This implies that the findings from conventional RCTs can be misleading because 
they were obtained with samples that are not representative of the target populations. And if 
so, although researchers can claim that there is some context where the treatment under 
investigation is effective for some patients, researchers left physicians without knowing what 
the actual target population the findings are supposed to be representative of. 
It was against this backdrop that PRCTs emerged as a feasible alternative to increase the level 
of external validity of the findings of conventional RCTs (e.g. Johnson et al. 2014). 58 For, in 
essence, what was needed was to carry out RCTs with samples more akin to standard clinical 
populations, and to modify RCT protocols so that treatment administration regimes and 
follow-up periods resemble those that were practically possible in actual settings (Hotopf, 
2002; Macpherson, 2004). 
The PRCT has proven to be a useful research improvement. Characteristics such as less 
stringent inclusion and exclusion criteria, feasible treatment protocols, and the use of 
clinically relevant measures (e.g. measuring outcomes of interest for real patients within an 
adequate time framework) normally result in estimates of higher external validity. So, the 
main advantage of PRCTs is that the actual target population the findings are representative 
of is easier to identify, and as a result, the findings can be more confidently extrapolated to 
the corresponding target population in real settings (Marks et al. 2009). 
Now, if we consider an efficacy claim, say “antidepressants are effective to treat major 
depressive disorder” and we are told that this claim is backed up by a PRCT rather than a 
conventional RCT, it becomes apparent that, other things being equal, a general efficacy 
                                                        
58 I use the term “feasible” because most statisticians would accept that random sampling would be a useful 
method to ensure the representativeness of the sample in a statistical sense--but the practical difficulties of carrying 
out such kind of sampling procedures are often daunting.  
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claim supported by a PRCT has better prospects in terms of applicability than that supported 
by a conventional RCT, for such claim is more likely to hold true in the intended target 
population when backed up by the former than by the latter.  
However, the benefits of the PRCT with respect to the problem of external validity should not 
be confused with a potential advantage with respect to the PEI. The PEI, unlike the problem 
of external validity, is a problem that emerges when the physician has additional information 
about a particular individual member of the target population. (Recall that in the therapeutic 
clinical case presented in the first chapter Mr Smith was a particular member of the general 
reference class “patients with acute conjunctivitis”.) Thus, even if the physician had access to 
a perfectly conducted PRCT; that is, even external validity were out of question, the presence 
of extra facts about the particular member of the target population the physician is interested 
in remains a crucial challenge that, as I argued, cannot be ignored if the physician wants to 
arrive at the right recommendation. So, the point is that, from the perspective of the EBM 
approach, which encourages EBM practitioners to issue recommendations based on the best 
research available, the fact that such research is now instantiated by a PRCT rather than a 
conventional RCT does not change the fact that this approach still directs the physician’s 
attention to the wrong probabilities and neglects the PEI.  
So, although an ideal PRCT could successfully bridge the so-called gap between research and 
practice understood as a gap between research samples and actual target population 
(Chalkidou et al. 2012; Longford and Nelder, 1999), this research refinement does not bridge 
this gap if it is understood as a discrepancy between the probabilities for which there is valid 
research available and the right probabilities for clinical recommendations. For this reason, 
the PRCT cannot be considered a solution to the PEI. 
Thus, if I am right in that the correct probabilities for clinical practice are the probabilities 
based on everything the physician knows about the patient, the ideal PRCT will give a 
physician strong reasons to accept that there is certain therapy that, on average, is effective 
for members of a target population to which her patient belongs. But if the physician knows 
more about her patient, then the PRCT will not necessarily provide him with the probabilities 
she needs to decide whether to recommend or withhold such therapy in patient’s best interest. 
Of course, as with conventional RCTs, PRCTs may sometimes deliver the right probabilities 
for clinical decisions, but this is something that depends on how much knowledge the 
physician has about her patient and is in no way related to the methodological changes that 
transform a conventional RCT into a PRCT. Careful exercise of clinical judgment in the light 
of everything the physician’s knows about her patient remains, therefore, an unavoidable task 
for the rational physician, even in the presence of sound estimates from PRCTs. 
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3.4.2. Subgroup analyses  
In the medical literature Subgroup analyses (SGAs) are commonly presented as strategies to 
explore the heterogeneity of outcomes within study samples (Sculpher, 2010; Keene and 
Garret 2014), and less often, as methods to avoid errors because of the low relevance of 
aggregate estimates to some members of the target population (Sun et al, 2014; Oxman and 
Guyatt, 1992; Rothwell, 2005b)..59 
Unlike PRCTs, which help physicians with the problem of external validity but do not 
address the PEI, SGAs are research refinements that permit recommendations based on 
probabilities for more fine-grained reference classes, and in virtue of this advantage, they may 
help EBM practitioners with the problem of extra information (PEI).  
Nonetheless, although I think that SGAs are particularly valuable tools, which increase the 
relevance of research findings to individuals, I shall argue that they should not be interpreted 
as providing a definite solution to the PEI. Even in cases where the best research evidence 
available comes from SGAs, it would be wrong to think that SGAs eliminate the PEI. EBM 
practitioners should not take the probabilities from SGAs as equivalent to the right 
probabilities for individuals. As with the probabilities obtained from conventional RCTs, the 
probabilities obtained via SGAs may but need not be the right probabilities for particular 
patients. So, while I acknowledge that SGAs constitute a step in the right direction, advocates 
of EBM should not use them to argue that this approach can deal with the PEI without 
resorting to clinical judgment.  
Before proceeding, a caveat is in order. SGAs are methods that have generated a great deal of 
controversy among statisticians, epidemiologists, and medical researchers (See e.g.: Brookes 
et al. 2001, 2004; Wang et al. 2007; Pocock et al. 2002; Jones et al., 2011; Naggara et al., 
2011). It is not surprising, then, that one can find supporters and detractors of SGAs within 
the EBM camp (Sun et al. 2012, 2014; Gabler et al., 2009; Senn and Harrell, 1997; Altman, 
1998). However, while it is worth noting that not every advocate of EBM would accept 
evidence from SGAs as the best evidence available, I can by-pass the technical details of this 
debate because they are largely orthogonal to the point I shall make in this section. The 
                                                        
59 This section is entitled “subgroup analyses” but it should be read as encompassing several analytical tools 
normally classified under the heading of “stratified medicine”. (See Feinstein, 1998; Brookes et al., 2001, 2004; 
Shaw and Johnson, 2012). Accordingly, my use of the term subgroup analyses includes both (a) analyses that 
account for one additional variable at a time and also (b) more sophisticated techniques, which rely on various 
modelling strategies to account for the heterogeneity of treatments effects (Kent and Hayward, 2007ab, Kent et al., 
2010; Wang et al., 2007; Peto, 2011; Hayward et al., 2006; Dorresteijn et al., 2011). It is worth noting, however, 
that the main difference between conventional SGA and more elaborated techniques such as test of interaction, 
which are favoured by supporters of EBM (Kent et al., 2010; Brookes et al., 2001, 2004) has to do with issues of 
estimation, which are important, but ultimately orthogonal to my point. The precise approach to explore interaction 
effects is not important to my point as long as the result is to obtain a probability for more refined reference classes. 
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reason for this is that the controversy about SGAs has to do with basic estimation issues that 
arise in the context of statistical inference (§ 3.2.1). Since estimation problems affect any 
approach to inference, regardless of the presence of the PEI, I shall put them to one side so to 
assess the ideal prospects of this research improvement. Of course, I am perfectly aware that 
the extent to which estimation problems hamper inferences based on SGAs is of practical 
importance for clinical medicine. But, again, since my argument contends that SGAs would 
not offer a definite solution to PEI even if estimation problems did not exist, we can facilitate 
exposition by considering the prospects of SGAs with respect to this problem under the 
admittedly unrealistic assumption that SGAs provide physicians with probabilities for actual 
target populations. 
3.4.2.1. Fine-grained probabilities via SGAs 
It is high time for me to address the question of to what extent SGAs address the PEI. Let us 
then, recall once more the case of Mr Smith from the first chapter, the patient diagnosed with 
acute conjunctivitis (AC), who was recommended not to use topical antibiotics since current 
EBM guidelines indicate that they are not effective (Steeples and Mercieca, 2012) (§ 1.4.2). 
Suppose, as we did before, that the treating physician, Dr Jones, learned that Mr Smith has 
AC and a history of Repeated Sexually Transmitted Diseases (RSTD). As I explained when I 
introduced this case –and expanded later when discussing the 4S model to teach EBM 
(§ 2.4.1.4)–, since the relevance of the presence of RSTD to the outcome of interest is 
difficult to defend according to EBM rules, it is reasonable to think that an EBM practitioner 
like Dr Jones would prefer to neglect the PEI, and assume that Mr Smith’s history of RSTD 
does not make any difference to the outcome of interest.  
By now, the reader will know very well that, even if we assume that estimation causal 
inference are not a problem, the evidence available can back up a general efficacy claim, 
which is not necessarily the right recommendation for Mr Smith. After all, if Dr Jones knows 
that Mr Smith has AC and RSTD, she cannot conclude that what on average is true for 
subjects with AC will also be true for patients with AC and RSTD. These are probabilities for 
different reference classes, and their difference is important because RSTD might interact 
with topical antibiotics so to turn them more effective, less effective or might not interact at 
all. 
This simplified case illustrates that a SGA for subjects with AC and RSTD would be a very 
good thing to have for both Dr Jones and Mr Smith. For, at least in this simplified clinical 
scenario, such SGA would provide the physician with the right probabilities for clinical 
inference, or more precisely, the probabilities for a patient just like she knows Mr Smith to be. 
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Thus, since SGAs focus on specific subsets of patients, it is natural to think of this research 
improvement as a valuable tool, which provides physicians with more refined outcomes than 
main analysis from conventional RCTs. In doing so, SGAs effectively decrease the gap 
between general efficacy claims backed up by RCTs, which typically tell physicians what 
works, on average, for general classes of patients, and individual efficacy claims, which tell 
the physician what works, on average, for members of the reference class conformed by 
everything the physician knows about a particular patient (§ 4.1). 
3.4.2.2. SGAs and the PEI 
At this stage some readers might feel enthusiastic about the prospects of SGAs with respect to 
the PEI. Is it not plausible to think that SGAs, in due course, will collapse the difference 
between the probabilities for which valid research data is available (EBM probabilities) and 
the probabilities based on everything relevant the physician knows about the patient (DA 
probabilities), and when that time comes, clinical medicine might be able to dispose of 
clinical judgment and its accompanying perils?  
However, even if by now it has become apparent that SGAs may offer more refined 
probabilities than conventional RCTs, it is not immediately obvious that SGAs will provide 
EBM practitioners with a definite solution to PEI. The main concern here is with the practical 
capabilities of both SGAs and individual physicians to gather relevant information. For us to 
take this possibility seriously one need to think about whether –and if so, how often–SGAs 
would be truly able to deliver probabilities that are individualised enough to match the right 
probabilities?  
Since the answer to these questions depends on the capacity of SGAs to account for further 
information as well as on the amount of information physicians normally obtain from their 
patients during the clinical encounter, it will be useful to try to picture a clinical case in the 
most realistic way possible. 
Think once more about Mr Smith’s case and try to form a mental image of a real clinical 
situation. Without idealizing Dr Jones’s abilities to conduct clinical interviews, it is plausible 
to assume that within the short time frame allowed for clinical encounters, she will be able to 
collect information about Mr Smith which might include (i) Mr Smith’s personal history of 
efficacy of antibiotics under similar circumstances, (ii) previous adverse reactions or 
complications without therapy, (iii) vital signs, and (iv) other observations from the eye 
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examination such as redness grade and type of discharge 60. As I argued in the first chapter, 
the right probabilities for Mr Smith are relative to this informational set, not relative to the 
part of this set for which valid clinical trials are available. And although it is correct that the 
probability for a patient with AC and RSTD is a probability that is closer to the probability of 
interest, given the amount of information normally available to physicians it is not a 
probability that is close enough to the right probability for the patient61.  
Of course, the enduring presence of a gap between these probabilities does not imply that 
SGAs are not useful. As I said, normally SGAs permit more fine-grained recommendations 
and will decrease the number of idiosyncrasies that need to be taken into account to estimate 
the right probabilities. But the point is that even in the presence of probabilities from SGAs it 
is likely that the physician will have to exercise her judgment to determine whether factors 
such as “redness grade”, “type of discharge”, “particular vital signs” or “previous response to 
similar treatments” modify the probability of the outcome of interest. 
Finally, note that it remains possible that after considered judgment in the light of what the 
physician knows about the patient, the treating physician concludes that the extra features 
present in the patient make no probabilistic difference to the outcome of interest. But let me 
emphasise that since the PEI is a procedural worry rather than a consequential worry, what 
matters is not that the exercise of clinical judgment results in revised probability estimates for 
the patient, but rather that the physician does not put her judgment to one side and assume 
that the extra features present in the patient are negligible just because there is no valid 
research data supporting their relevance to the outcome of interest. 
So, even if SGAs provide the EBM practitioner with more refined probabilities, which might 
account for a greater amount of the information gathered by the physician during the clinical 
encounter, the limitations that characterise estimates from conventional RCTs remain present, 
in SGAs. This implies that the gap generated by the presence of further information about the 
patient cannot be ignored and suggests that SGAs offer a valuable but partial solution to the 
PEI. For this reason, EBM practitioners should bear in mind that research findings from 
SGAs should not be automatically extrapolated to individuals, and such findings do not free 
the rational physician from her responsibility to estimate, as best as possible, the right 
                                                        
60 Standard medical textbooks, such as the Oxford Handbook of Clinical Specialties (Collier et al., 2013), classify 
part of the information I have mentioned as standard elements of the clinical assessment. Furthermore, being a 
practicing physician myself I know very well that even the busiest (or “laziest”) of my colleagues would ask their 
patients a minimal set of questions, which include personal information, history of present illness, previous use of 
medications and complications, and findings from physical examination. 
61 It must be noticed that at least some authors in the EBM camp have recognised that SGAs at typically based on 
“univariable analyses [which] do not fully incorporate all available patient characteristics…” (Dorresteijn et al., 
2011, p.2) See also, Rothwell, 1995 and Kent and Hayward, 2007ab. 
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probabilities for her patient.  
3.4.3. N of 1 RCTs 
In this section we shall focus on Randomized Controlled Trials conducted in individual 
patients (N1s). My aim is to analyse the merits of N1s with respect to the problem of extra 
information (PEI). I shall argue that the N1 is a useful research design, which may lead to 
improved prescriptions for certain individuals, but does not provide a definite solution to the 
PEI. Even when the best research evidence is instantiated by findings from N1s, clinical 
judgment will normally be necessary to estimate the right probabilities for particular patients 
and therefore remains crucial to ensure the adequacy of clinical recommendations. 
As their name indicates N1s share properties with two classes of research designs: RCTs and 
single case studies. The history of both RCTs and single case studies precedes the emergence 
of the EBM movement (See Hacking, 1988; Hill, 1952; Barlow and Hersen, 1984; Bothwell 
and Podolsky, 2016; Gabler et al., 2011; Fisher, 1990). But it would not be far from the truth 
to say that N1s, in their standard form, are a product of this movement (Guyatt et al. 1986). 
Supporters of EBM have described N1s as the ultimate research design to investigate 
therapeutic efficacy in particular individuals (Guyatt et al. 1988, 1990). In contrast with 
conventional RCTs, whose focus is the generation of general efficacy claims for standard 
populations, N1s are typically (but not exclusively62) expected to produce particular efficacy 
claims; that is, claims about the efficacy of interventions in individual patients (Kravitz et al., 
2008). 
N1s are held in high regard among advocates of EBM. For example, Kravitz and colleagues 
(2008) stress the virtues of N1s by telling us that: “…randomized, blinded single-patient (n-
of-1) trials are uniquely capable of establishing the best treatment in an individual patient.” 
(p.533). And it is perhaps because supporters of EBM believe that N1s fulfil this role almost 
to perfection that in some hierarchies of evidence N1s have been ranked at the top, even 
above “systematic reviews of randomized trials” (Guyatt et al., 2000 p. 1292). 
Since the reader might not be familiar with N1s, before explaining why I think this research 
design does not solve the PEI, a brief description of their methodology will be instructive. 
N1s are typically applied to investigate the efficacy of medications in the context of chronic 
diseases (Duan et al. 2013). The management of chronic diseases has two characteristics that 
are important to understand the role assigned to N1s. The first one is that poly-pharmacy, the 
use of several medications simultaneously, is the rule rather than the exception (Mannuci et 
                                                        
62 For example, see Senior et al., 2013. 
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al., 2014); and the second one is that the standard therapeutic aim in this context is not full 
recovery but rather symptom reduction, or increments in quality of life (Parek et al., 2011). 
Thus, N1s are normally used to decide whether adding or eliminating a certain medication 
from a given therapeutic scheme is beneficial or harmful for a particular patient (Kravitz et al., 
2014). 
In N1s the patient receives both the treatment under investigation and the control intervention 
–which could be another active treatment or no active treatment. This is possible because N1s 
are crossover designs, in which interventions are administered sequentially, often in pairs 
separated by “wash out” periods (e.g. A-B, B-A, B-B, and so on) (Vohra et al, 2015). 
N1s are considered among randomized research designs because the sequence of treatment 
allocation is established using a random device and concealed from both the physician and the 
patient. Normally, N1s require a research assistant (usually a pharmacist) who is responsible 
for preparing similar interventions so neither the patient nor the physician can evaluate the 
symptoms without being able to guess the treatment sequence. When the trial ends, which is 
typically after 3 pairs of treatment episodes but varies from one set-up to another, an estimate 
of the effect of each intervention with respect to the outcome of interest is calculated. Finally, 
a statistical test is often used to compare the estimates obtained between each other. The 
resulting findings are taken to be evidence about the efficacy (or non-efficacy) of the main 
treatment with respect to the control intervention (Guyatt et al., 1990; Kravitz et al., 2014). 
After this brief description the reader might have several concerns about N1s, which probably 
range from the ethical to the methodological. For example, are N1s ethically justified in 
clinical contexts? And, under what circumstance is an attempt to establish the causal effect of 
a specific part of a composite treatment worth risking a decrease in the patient’s health? 63 Or 
perhaps, with respect to the challenge of estimation (§ 3.3.1): how reliable are the estimates 
that can be obtained with N1s? Are not N1s typically based on too few observations? Or 
maybe, with regard to causal inference (§ 3.3.2), is randomization, as carried out in N1s, good 
enough guard against confounding?  
All these questions are of practical clinical importance. But to address them would take us too 
far from the scope of this chapter. More importantly, since my main claim is that N1s can be 
                                                        
63 Ethical discussions about N1s usually come to a point where it is necessary to ask explicitly what is the 
intention of the experiment. While an N1 might be ethically justified in the expectation that it might permit 
eliminating a medication for the patient which does not have an active role in the reduction of symptoms but which 
carries various side effects, the same N1 might not be ethically justified if the aim is to clarify whether the 
medication has an active causal effect for purely academic or scientific purposes, which are disconnected from the 
patient’s benefit. See Kravitz et al., 2014 for a discussion focused on N1s, and Lilford and Jackson, 1995 for a 
general comment on the ethics of RCTs. 
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useful but do not solve the problem of extra information (PEI), N1s’ estimation problems and 
their limitations with respect to causal inference are largely orthogonal and we need not dwell 
on them. Even in the ideal scenario where N1s provide the physician with true causal 
correlations, I shall still contend that this kind of research improvement does not make the 
exercise of clinical judgment redundant. 
The best way to illustrate my point is with an example, for which I would like to consider a 
case adapted from the article where N1s were first proposed (Guyatt et al. 1986). John is a 13 
years old patient who has suffered from chronic asthma for 6 years. When uncontrolled, John 
has several symptoms including chest tightness and shortness of breath during normal 
activities, as well as attacks where the symptoms get worse, even when she is at rest. Over 
several months, her physician adjusted the treatment regimen until John reported being 
significantly less symptomatic while taking a bronchodilator (Albuterol) and an 
anticholinergic agent (Ipratropium). Since the addition of Ipratropium was correlated with the 
stabilization of John’s symptoms, her physician suspected that this medication might be 
causally related to his improvement. However, neither John nor her physician were convinced 
about this, for they were aware that Ipratropium could be correlated with another unknown 
factor, which could be causing the improvement in his symptoms. 
Determining whether Ipratropium was causally responsible for his improvement was 
important for John for several reasons, including economic costs and, also because this 
medication carries side effects such as bladder pain, constipation and blurred vision (Ziebach 
et al., 2001). Thus, the physician and John agreed to carry out an N1 to find out whether 
Ipratropium was causally effective and thereby be able to tailor John’s therapeutic scheme to 
better meet his needs. 
Assume that the trial was conducted without technical problems, that is, John took the 
medication and the physician monitored his clinical status throughout the trial as expected. As 
table 1 (see below) shows, the results of John’s N1 trial suggest that there is a correlation 
between Ipratropium and a decrease in Johns’ symptoms, and since this was a well-conducted 
randomized trial, this results are suggestive that Ipratropium, on average, causes symptomatic 
improvement for John. Now, if we put potential concerns with statistical estimation and 
potential problems with causal inference aside, we can take it that this N1 trial indicates that 
Ipratropium is, on average, effective for John. And so, according to what EBM regards as 
gold standard evidence for particular efficacy claims, the right recommendation for John 
ought to be to continue Ipratropium. But now, the central question of this dissertation arises 
once more: did this N1 truly solve the PEI for John’s physician? Or, in other words, is this 
EBM individualized prescription for John based on the right probabilities?  
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Table 1: John’s N of 1 RCT † 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Mean score 
Pair 1  Control 4.43 4.00 4.14 4.29 4.22 
 Ipratropium 4.43 4.86 4.71 4.71 4.68 
Pair 2 Control 3.86 4.00 4.29 4.14 4.07 
 Ipratropium 4.57 4.89 5.29 5.29 5.01 
Pair 3 Control 3.71 4.14 4.43 4.43 4.18 
 Ipratropium 4.29 5.00 5.43 5.43 5.04 
Benefit is measured with a shortness of breath scale (Higher scores represent less 
symptoms). A paired t-test applied to the mean score pairs (4.68 and 4.22, 501 and 
4.07, and 5.04 and 4.18), using two degrees of freedom, results in a t value of 5.07, 
which has a corresponding p value of 0.037. † Adapted from Guyatt et al. 1986 and 
1988. 
Some readers (and, I suspect, many physicians) might be a bit puzzled at this point. Is it not 
obvious enough that there is no further individualization possible for John than the one 
already accomplished by the above-described N1 trial? If the N1 was conducted in John 
himself, how is it possible that the physician could know something extra about John that is 
not properly accounted for in the N1?  
The crucial point to stress here is that PEI is not a problem about finding the most 
individualised probabilities valid research can offer, but rather the problem of obtaining the 
probabilities fixed by everything the physician knows about her patient.  
With this distinction in mind, it can be appreciated that the N1 successfully solves the 
problem of providing the best possible estimate research can provide for an average version 
of John at the time of decision-making. But since the PEI has to do with using all information 
available, regardless of its source, it is quite clear that during or after the N1 the physician 
might still learn something extra about John, something that may change the probability that 
Ipratropium causes a reduction of symptoms. For example, the physician might learn that 
John now has a viral infection, whose pharmacological treatment interacts with Ipratropium 
so to decrease its effect. Or perhaps that John has made a recent dietary change, which soon 
will affect the absorption of Ipratropium and therefore its effect on the symptoms.  
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So, although supporters of EBM are right that it is reasonable to assume that N1 decreases the 
number of probabilistically relevant additional factors that the physician might know about 
her patient, the fact that N1s are conducted in the very patient at issue does not imply that 
once an N1 has been conducted the relevant set of information available for decision-making 
is automatically exhausted. Since relevant changes in the status of patients might occur 
anytime (and in fact, are likely to be happening on an ongoing basis), N1s need not provide 
EBM practitioners with the right probabilities. Hence, even if the probabilities provided by 
N1s are highly individualised and undoubtedly useful for during the clinical encounter, 
physicians should not assume that any further information about the patient is necessarily 
probabilistically irrelevant to the outcome of interest. This is a matter of judgment and close 
follow up, and that is precisely why I think that the estimation of the right probabilities, even 
when the best evidence available comes from N1s, still requires clinical Judgement. 
3.5. Clinical judgment in the era of personalised and precision medicine 
In this last section I shall focus on personalised medicine (Ginsburg and Willard, 2009; 
Valdes and Yin, 2016) and precision medicine (Cardon and Harris, 2016). These terms have 
been used to denote approaches to the practice of medicine that are different to Evidence 
Based Medicine in significant respects 64, but which deserve our attention in this chapter 
because they share an explicit interest in using the latest scientific technologies and research 
methods to provide physicians with individualised recommendations (Hamburg and Collins, 
2010).  My aim will be to describe to the reader how these approaches have been presented to 
physicians and the general public, in order to explain in what sense I think they are 
commendable projects to improve care, but at the same time not solutions that eliminate the 
PEI and so make the exercise of clinical discretion redundant. 
                                                        
64 There are at least two notable differences between the EBM project and the personalised and precision medicine 
approach to clinical care. The first one is that given its focus on conventional clinical trials conducted for standard 
clinical populations (e.g. Sackett and Rosenberg, 1995; Haynes, 2002, 2006), and its connexion with health policy 
and the standardization of care via evidence-based guidelines and practice standards, the EBM approach, unlike 
precision and personalised medicine, is perceived by many authors as a project to improve healthcare that is more 
concerned with outcomes at a population level than with improving the outcomes of particular individuals (e.g. 
Saarni and Gylling, 2004; de Leon, 2012). For contrasts between the EBM approach to care and that favoured by 
precision and personalised medicine for specific clinical conditions, see Goldhaber, 2009; Basu 2010; Tarantini 
and Lanzellotti, 2010. The second important difference between EBM and personalised and precision medicine has 
to do with the rules of EBM (Sackett, 2000; Bluhm, 2005). While EBM has traditionally emphasised the 
importance of recommendations based on clinical trials, it has deemphasised the clinical relevance of basic science 
(Guyatt, 1991; EBM working group, 1992) including laboratory studies that focus on the study of biological 
properties at a cellular or molecular level with the aim of generating novel diagnostic tests and biomarkers of 
disease for prognostic purposes (see Baker, 2016). Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that personalised and 
precision medicine share with EBM the aspiration of provide physicians with objective probabilities supported by 
rigorous “evidence-based” procedures (Ginsburg and Willard, 2009), and in this respect, each of these approaches 
distance itself from traditional clinical practice, or other approaches such as person-centred medicine, which 
emphasise that the right care for individuals has to consider everything the physician knows about the patient 
regardless of whether such information is backed up by scientifically validated data. 
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So, what are personalised and precision medicines? Nowadays personalised medicine and 
precision medicine are terms often used interchangeably (e.g. Joyner and Paneth, 2015; 
Jameson and Longo, 2015); this is because their supporters describe both of them as practices 
that use cutting-edge medical knowledge with the aim of individualising recommendations. 
For example, Michael Joyner and Nigel Paneth (2015) stress this aim by telling us that 
"personalized or precision medicine maintains that medical care and public health will be 
radically transformed by prevention and treatment programs more closely targeted to the 
individual patient”. These writers also emphasise the role of biomarkers and technological 
advances by explaining that “[Prevention and treatment] interventions will be developed by 
sequencing more genomes, creating bigger biobanks, and linking biological information to 
health data in electronic medical records (EMRs) or obtained by monitoring technologies.” 
(p.999).  
Speaking on similar lines, Margaret Hamburg and Francis Collins (2010), highlight the 
auspicious prospects of personalised and precision medicine by saying that “Researchers 
have discovered hundreds of genes that harbor variations contributing to human illness, 
identified genetic variability in patients' responses to dozens of treatments, and begun to 
target the molecular causes of some diseases. In addition, scientists are developing and using 
diagnostic tests based on genetics or other molecular mechanisms to better predict patients' 
responses to targeted therapy” (p.301). And, similarly, Larry Jameson and Dan Longo (2015) 
emphasise that “the convergence of genetics, informatics, and imaging, along with other 
technologies such as cell sorting, epigenetics, proteomics, and metabolomics, is rapidly 
expanding the scope of precision medicine by refining the classification of disease, often with 
important prognostic and treatment implications” (p.2229). 
So, as these quotes illustrate, personalised and precision medicine could be summarised as 
approaches to clinical care that aim at provided physicians with more refined diagnostic tests, 
more precise prognostic predictions, and more specific therapeutic recommendations, which 
can be “tailored” to particular patients by taking into account several biomarkers, in particular 
genetic factors (Hall et al., 2016). 
The message is clear: personalised and precision medicine promise patients to assess their 
personal risk by means of predictive models that take into account various interactions 
between the patient’s genomic profile and environmental variables which, it is claimed, will 
permit physicians to choose “the most appropriate interventions” for each patient (Hall et al, 
2016).  
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But now, the following question arises: do these approaches truly solve the PEI and offer 
physicians probabilities for individuals that make the exercise of clinical judgment no longer 
needed or advisable?  
On the one hand, one would think that the improvements generated by personalised and 
precision medicine are perfectly compatible with the idea of providing physicians with some 
latitude for the exercise of clinical judgment. After all, the fact that these approaches made 
possible the incorporation of new information into decision-making need not imply that place 
for the exercise of clinical judgment has been automatically collapsed (Dione-Labrie et al. 
2010). However, not everyone has the same opinion, and advocates of EBM who tend to 
interpret clinical discretion as a source of unwarranted variation in healthcare due to 
“therapeutic illusions” (e.g. Eddy, 2005; Casarett, 2016; Howick, 2011, among others), and 
are keen to decrease the influence of physicians’ judgment as much as possible, might be 
tempted to think that personalised and precision medicine provide them with a perfect case to 
demonstrate that true individualisation can be accomplished without resorting to clinical 
judgment. 
Similarly, the National research council report on precision medicine conveys the idea that 
this approach is able to tailor medical interventions to each patient (Committee on a 
Framework for Developing a New Taxonomy of Disease, 2011, obtained accessed through 
Hunter, 2016). This again suggests that resort to clinical judgment will be less and less 
necessary. 
Nonetheless, although I accept that personalised and precision medicine have the potential to 
improve clinical medicine by providing physicians with probabilities based on a larger 
number of factors relevant to the outcomes of interests 65, I do not think that these approaches 
to medical care can be used to render clinical judgment totally dispensable. 
The main reason why I think this is that the kind of information provided by personalised and 
precision medicine (e.g. biomarkers) are only part of the story. By this I mean to say that 
personalised research typically incorporates only a few among many factors that might be 
relevant in determining the probability of a certain outcome of interest for an individual. 
As I have pointed out several times throughout this thesis, there is a myriad of factors that 
might be relevant to the probability of the outcome of interest in any particular patient and 
such factors might come to be known to the physician via different sources, including her 
own personal clinical experience. Of course, by stressing that the factors considered by 
                                                        
65  In fact, personalised and precision medicine are already providing physicians with more fine-grained 
probabilities in the fields of oncology and cardiovascular medicine (e.g. Gill et al., 2004; Kent et al., 2002). 
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personalised and precision medicine do not exhaust all the information available to the 
physician, I do not want to convey the idea that physicians ought not to pay attention to 
biomarkers. On the contrary, to the extent that biomarkers constitute additional information 
available to the physician at the time of recommendations, it follows from the DA approach 
(§ 1.5) that physicians ought to consider them if they want to estimate the right probabilities 
for each patient. However, it is one thing to acknowledge that the inclusion of biomarkers in 
clinical decisions may lead to probabilities for more refined reference classes, and quite 
another to claim –as the most enthusiastic supporters of personalised and precision medicine 
do– that these approaches can account for “all relevant [patient’s] characteristics together” 
(Dorresteijn, et al., 2011) and therefore suggest that they provide the right probabilities for 
each individual. 
Even when some recommendations are based on a biomarker that is present in the patient in 
question, it would be unwise to automatically assume that its causal relevance to the outcome 
of interest might not be subject to several interaction effects due to additional features present 
in the patient which can only be detected by the physician during the clinical encounter. Thus, 
the PEI might still arise, and to the extent that it does, physicians should be permitted to 
exercise their clinical judgment in their patients’ best benefit.  
As the physician David Hunter (2016) when discussing precision medicine says: “In the 
future, we are likely to face a potentially bewildering array of probabilities — estimates of 
disease risk based on inherited germline sequencing and, once a disease is diagnosed, of 
prognosis and therapeutic options guided by “-omic” and other analyses…” (p.713). But it is 
precisely because of the presence of these “bewildering array of probabilities” potentially 
applicable to the individual patient that clinical discretion is essential in allowing the 
physician to decide on the best recommendations for the patient. 
3.6. Conclusions 
This chapter was concerned with the question of whether remodelling some of the research 
designs and analytical methods behind EBM recommendations (in particular, conventional 
RCTs) could deal effectively with the PEI, and thereby provide supporters of EBM with an 
immediate rejoinder to my challenge to the adequacy of the EBM recommendations in the 
presence of additional information. 
The suggestion was that suitable research improvements could account for all relevant 
information to the outcome of interest, and thereby collapse the distinction between the 
probabilities delivered by the best research available and the probabilities based on everything 
the physician knows about the patient.  
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Unfortunately for advocates of EBM, I showed that this line of argument is misguided. For a 
start, although Pragmatic Randomized Controlled Trials are extremely useful research 
improvements, which in my opinion can enhance the general prospects of the EBM 
movement, its advantage over conventional RCTs concerns the problem of external validity 
and in consequence does not directly address the PEI. As I pointed out, there is a sense in 
which, from the perspective of the treating physician, the PEI starts after worries about 
external validity have been dispelled and there is confidence that the EBM probabilities 
available are truly applicable to the target population. For it is at that precise moment that 
additional idiosyncrasies present in the patient require the application of judgment to estimate 
as best as possible the right probabilities for the individual.  
 
Subgroup analyses, on the other hand, do address the PEI, albeit partially, by providing 
physicians with more fine-grained probabilities. This is a valuable research improvement 
from the point of view of individualisation, for these probabilities will as a rule be superior to 
the probabilities delivered by conventional analyses in the sense that they are based on more 
relevant information about the patient in question. Nonetheless, the advantages of subgroup 
analyses, even in its more sophisticated forms, are hampered by a number of practicalities that 
make implausible to think that they can collapse the difference between the best research 
probabilities and the probabilities relative to everything the physician knows about the patient. 
So, to put it bluntly, individualised research need not be individualised enough for many 
patients and in such cases clinical judgment remain necessary to arrive at the right 
recommendations. 
As to N of 1 Randomised Controlled Trials, they also constitute a very useful research design, 
which could account for a great number of characteristics of individual patients. However, the 
fact that N1s are conducted in the patient in question should not be confused with the idea 
that the probabilities delivered by N1s exhaust all the information that might affect the 
outcome of interest. Even when the results of an N1 are available to the physician, the status 
of the patient might be subject to all sorts of variations that need to be attended to by the 
physician if she wants to ensure that recommendations are based on the right probabilities.  
 
Finally, the chapter concluded with a brief discussion on the potential capabilities of 
personalised medicine and precision medicine to solve the PEI. Not surprisingly, even if these 
movements have achieved a certain level of refinement in the area of diagnostics and 
therapeutics, I argued that it is questionable to regard these approaches as genuine methods of 
individualisation, for in truth the incorporation of biomarkers is better interpreted as step 
forward towards a more stratified medicine (in this sense akin to product of subgroup 
analyses), which will permit physicians the incorporation of a greater number of relevant 
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factors which were previously unknown to be relevant to the outcomes of interest, but which 
will not eliminate the need for careful judgment if the goal is to maximize expected utility for 
each individual. It would be dangerous if the need to obtain prescriptions that are tailored to 
the individual was obscured by the possibility of basing decisions on biomarkers, on the 
grounds that these latter probabilities always provide the physician with the best guide to 
individual decisions. To repeat, in spite of technological advancements, the right probabilities 
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Chapter 4: The DA: counterpoints and further objections 
4.1. Abstract 
This chapter elaborates on the Discretionary Approach (DA). I begin by distinguishing it from 
two standpoints that might be associated with it: Medical Particularism and Person-Centred 
Medicine. Then I address a range of possible criticisms of the DA: a lack of normative 
novelty; a lack of descriptive novelty; the charge of truistic obviousness; and the charge of 
impracticality. Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion of a more fundamental objection, 
namely: that the implementation of the DA may empirically worsen clinical care. My analysis 
indicates that while some concerns about the practical consequences of the DA are reasonable, 
EBM’s current empirical case again the DA is questionable. I conclude that updated empirical 
evidence is required to address the empirical effectiveness of EBM versus the DA—evidence 
that will then be provide in the final two chapters of the thesis. 
  
 112 
4.2. Useful counterpoints 
4.2.1. Medical particularism  
One of the reasons why some readers, in particular those sympathetic with EBM, might be 
highly suspicious of a proposal along the lines of the DA is because it could be read as an 
instance of a theoretical position I shall denote “Medical Particularism” (MP), which stands in 
sharp opposition to the principles of EBM care. In this section my argument will be that, on 
first inspection, the DA may appear similar to such stance, but closer examination reveals that 
the DA is in fact more akin to EBM care than to MP. 
Let me begin by offering a brief description of MP, before turning to its alleged connexion 
with the DA. 
What exactly is MP? This term is used to describe a theoretical position akin to that defended 
by the philosopher Jonathan Dancy in ethical theory (Dancy, 2004). It is important to note 
immediately that, as far as the author knows, MP is not a standpoint that has been officially 
defended in print by medical scholars or philosophers of medicine. Rather, MP is a position 
that has been mentioned in workshops, seminars, and critical discussions on the problems of 
the EBM approach (e.g. a number of workshops organised by the Centre for the Humanities 
and Health at King’s College London). 
A useful way to imagine an advocate of MP is as someone who believes that optimal clinical 
care does not follow from the application of rules to categories of patients (no matter how 
fine-grained). According to MP, the care of individual patients always rests on a special kind 
of judgment or intuition that considers the patient as something more than a set of features. 
Thus, understandably, physicians defending MP would presumably object to a project like 
EBM, which is implicitly premised on the applicability of general efficacy claims to 
particular patients, for from the standpoint of MP there is an insurmountable schism between 
two types of medical knowledge: general and particular. 
Consider, as an illustration, the remarks of the philosopher Jonathan Wolff at a conference on 
the topic: “a medical particularist would not assume that everything fits neatly together – that 
there is or could be a manual for the human body – and will have to proceed in absence of 
such a rulebook. Thus, [the medical particularist] would need far more than a range of 
medical principles, rules, regularities or research findings and the ability to apply them to be 
a good medical judge.” (Bullock and Kingma, 2014, p.999). 
The aforementioned quote illustrates that MP seems to raise a fundamental objection against 
the direct applicability of research evidence to individuals. So, from this perspective, 
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supporters of EBM are just missing the point, not because research (even in its more 
sophisticated forms) cannot account for a sufficiently great number of relevant features 
present in the individual, but because the application of general “population-level” 
knowledge to a particular patient necessarily requires some form of judgment or intuition that 
considers the patient in all its individuality, by which the MP means much more than a set of 
features, however detailed.  
Now, why would someone associate an approach such as the DA with MP? The most obvious 
answer to this question is that both the DA and MP raise objections against the EBM 
approach, and that the objections raised have something to do with the importance of clinical 
judgment.  
However, while the DA criticises the automatic extrapolation of research findings to 
individuals, even in the presence of extra information available to the physician, MP objects 
something far more fundamental: EBM is in the wrong track with respect to clinical inference 
at the most basic level, for to assume that research can –even in principle– be readily 
applicable to individuals is completely misguided from the point of view of MP. So, while a 
physician that supports the DA would not comply about recommendations that ignore the PEI, 
she would not deny the idea that research can be applicable to individuals. By contrast, the 
physician advocating MP would take issue with such application even if she has a research 
probability for a reference class defined by everything she knows about the patient. 
In addition, while the DA only requests more room for the exercise of judgment to account 
for the features not considered by the best research available (that is, to address the PEI), MP 
asserts that the gap between the general and the particular can only be bridged by some type 
judgment which is not clearly specified.66 
Recall the point expressed in chapter 1 (footnote 21). If a physician who supports the DA 
happens to have access to certain probabilities for male smokers of a certain age, and the only 
thing she knows about a particular patient is that she is a male smoker of the corresponding 
age, then she would not have problems in applying this kind of general medical knowledge to 
his patient. This situation illustrates that, from the standpoint of the DA, there is no 
ontological division between the general and the particular, and therefore there is no gap to be 
bridged using some kind of intuition. From the standpoint of the DA, the EBM approach is 
wrong in neglecting the PEI: because in real clinical scenarios there are many situations in 
                                                        
66 More specifically the difference between the DA and MP is the role assigned to clinical judgment. While in the 
DA it is explicit and circumscribed to address the PEI, the role assigned to judgment by MP leaves much more 
room for interpretation. In my view, apart from the general idea that judgment is necessary to bridge the gap 
between the general and the particular, it remains obscure what is involved in such kind of judgment or intuition. 
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which the physician happens to know more about the patient than she has valid research data 
for, EBM requires general revision so as to provide physicians with more room for clinical 
judgment.67 
Thus, while physicians who exercise their judgment in accordance with the DA would be 
happy to accept probabilities from research when they were probabilities obtained in the 
reference class conformed by everything they know about the patient in question; a physician 
who embraces MP, on the other hand, would reject any research probabilities, regardless of 
the reference class in which these were obtained, because according to MP, there is no such 
thing as the right reference class: clinical recommendations should not be understood in terms 
of reference classes, because clinical recommendations for individuals transcend anything 
written as a general rule such as “in circumstances a, b, c…n, the physician should do x”.  
So, in conclusion, close attention to the claims endorsed by the DA and MP, makes it clear 
that, while both approaches raise concerns about clinical judgment and the application of 
research evidence, these two approaches do it in different terms and with different 
implications. Hence, there is a clear sense in which the DA is much closer to EBM than to 
MP.  
4.2.2. Person-centred medicine  
Person-centred medicine (PCM) is another approach to clinical care that, in one of its current 
forms, emerged in response to the EBM movement. This approach has also some similarities 
with the DA, so it is worth clarifying what distinguishes the two. My main point will be that 
while the main criticism of the DA to EBM targets the PEI, the main objection of PCM is that 
EBM has been focused on providing research findings for the clinical management of 
“diseases” rather than evidence relevant to “the person” as whole (Miles and Mezzich, 2011). 
PCM, unlike MP, is an approach that has been defended in the medical literature, with its own 
journals68 as well as associations69 supporting it. Nonetheless, despite its popularity in certain 
circles of physicians, mostly opposed to the EBM approach, PCM has been vaguely and 
                                                        
67 This point could be stressed even more emphatically by saying that from the perspective of the DA, when the 
physician is commit herself to the claim “this treatment works for Mr Smith” she is also implicitly committing 
herself to the general claim “this treatment works for patients of the kind I know Mr Smith to be”. Furthermore, 
since the DA does not draw a an ontological line between the general and the particular, this approach is less 
subject to charges of “anti-scientism”, for there is no sense in which the DA discourages the generation of more 
and better scientific research, which could help physicians to improve the care of individuals.  
 
 
68 The two most famous are the “International Journal of Person Centered Medicine” and  “The European Journal 
for Person Centered Healthcare”. 
69 For example, The International College of Person-centered Medicine 
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variously defined as a standpoint for clinical care (Mezzich et al. 2010, 2011; Miles and 
Loughlin, 2011; Roberti di sarsina et al. 2010, 2012). 
Consider the following descriptions of PCM as illustrations: 
The International College of Person Centred Medicine (ICPCM) defined it as an approach 
“dedicated to the promotion of health as a state of physical, mental, socio-cultural and 
spiritual wellbeing as well as to the reduction of disease, and founded on mutual respect for 
the dignity and responsibility of each individual person.” (ICPCM, 2016).  
Mezzich and colleagues (2010) conceive it as: “a medicine of the person (of the totality of the 
person’s health, including its ill and positive aspects), for the person (promoting the 
fulfilment of the person’s life project), by the person (with clinicians extending themselves as 
full human beings, well grounded in science and with high ethical aspirations) and with the 
person (working respectfully, in collaboration and in an empowering manner through a 
partnership of patient, family and clinicians)” (Quoted from Miles and Loughlin, 2011.p.533). 
Other authors, such as Roberti di Sarsina and colleagues (2012), have defined PCM a little 
more precisely as an approach to care which aims at “individualizing treatments beyond 
clinical guidelines to suit the whole person in the context of his or her bio-psycho-spiritual 
biography.” (p.1), but they have also included it within its boundaries complementary 
medicine by referring to PCT as “a synergistic and harmonious blend of conventional and 
complementary medicine, but looks open to future developments.” (Roberti Di Sarsina and 
Iseppato, 2010, p.277).70 
The main idea behind these descriptions has been summarized by the founders of this 
movement, Andrew Miles and Juan Mezzich, when they say that PCM stresses that clinical 
care should be less “disease centred” and should include socio-cultural factors in decision-
making (Miles and Mezzich, 2011). In this respect, supporters of PCM have criticised EBM 
by arguing that knowledge of diseases “cannot but fail to understand the essence of the 
human person and the totality of ‘what is wrong’”(Miles, 2012, p.329). In their view, there is 
tension between the “disease centeredness” of EBM and the focus on the “person” which is 
characteristic of PCM (Loughlin, 2014).71 
                                                        
70 Notice that, advocates of PCM, in some passages, get very close to the idea of MP. Consider as an illustration 
this quote from Roberti di Sardinia and colleagues (2012): “Personalisation in medicine needs to consider the 
individual as a unique being where the whole is more than the sum of its parts.”(p. 9), which seems to suggest that 
there is an insurmountable gap between research and the individual, and no just an insufficient level of detail in the 
reference classes for which we have valid research data. 
 
71  In the opinion of some supporters of PCM, the difference between the kind of evidence provided by 
conventional clinical trials, which tells us what works for general classes of patients, and the kind of evidence 
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Given this description of PCM as an approach concerned with the “person”, there is some 
superficial similarity between the DA and PCM. However, this similarity depends on how 
one understands concepts such as “disease” and “person”. As I have emphasised through this 
dissertation, the main objection of the DA to the EBM approach has to do with the PEI. At its 
simplest, this is the problem that the physician often knows more about the patient than she 
has valid research data for (§ 1.4.4). If we assume that the use of the concept “person” in the 
context of PCM is equivalent to asking for a more fine-grained reference class of patients, 
then one could infer that supporters of PCM are criticizing EBM on the same grounds as the 
DA. For, on this reading, PCM advocates are objecting that the evidence usually provided by 
EBM is not necessarily applicable to the patient, since this evidence leaves too many relevant 
features out of the equation. Put it in terms of probabilities, one could say that PCM would 
agree that EBM probabilities are not the right probabilities for the patient, because they were 
not obtained in the right reference class. 
But all this is arguably assuming too much. Since there is no mention of probabilities in the 
discourse of PCM, it might well be that PCM only wants to stress that EBM 
recommendations have ignored patients’ preferences and values, and are in no way concerned 
with the adequacy of EBM probabilities.  
In fact, apart from notable exceptions (e.g. Miles and Loughlin, 2011), most authors in the 
PCM camp object that EBM’s recommendations neglect the patient’s interest and, therefore, 
are focused on the control of disease rather than on what truly matters to the patient (ICPCM, 
2016; Mezzich et al. 2010, 2011, Roberti di Sarsina et al. 2012).72  
In truth, the worry raised by the DA about the EBM approach is much more focused than the 
broad concerns expressed by advocates of PCM. It is one thing to object that EBM supports 
recommendations that ignore additional features about the patient that has not been 
considered from research probabilities; it is another to object that the EBM approach provides 
findings applicable to diseases that are irrelevant to a particular patient in all her individuality.  
Likewise, with respect to clinical judgment, the DA specifies a much more focused role than 
that urged by PCM. While the main task of the physician who embraces the DA is to address 
the PEI by considering everything she knows about the patient to estimate the right 
probabilities, the role of judgment within the context of PCM remains unclear. So, although 
                                                                                                                                                              
needed to fulfil the aim of PCM, is so vast that talk of an “evidence-based person centred medicine should be read 
as an oxymoron” (Kaltoft et al., 2011). I see no reason to accept this, given that it is perfectly possible to imagine a 
form of clinical care informed by research evidence, as EBM recommends, but focused on the patient, as PCM 
advises. 
72 Notice that while the DA explicitly requires physicians to pay attention to research evidence, PCM is less 
explicit about the importance of such evidence for clinical decision-making taken to the extreme, PCM seems 
prepared to neglect research evidence on similar grounds to MP. 
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both these approaches seem to be concerned with the fact that research findings do not tell 
physicians all they need to know to arrive at the correct recommendations, they do it in very 
different terms, using different language, and it is unclear that the proposed solutions would 
lead to the same recommendations. 
4.3. Further objections  
4.3.1. A normative “old hat” 
This objection might target two different aspects of the DA: (i) the emphasis on the “right 
probabilities” for clinical recommendations, and (ii) the role ascribed to clinical judgment. 
Let us consider the idea of the “the right probabilities” for clinical recommendations first. In 
this regard, Jeremy Howick, in his “The Philosophy of EBM” (2011), suggests that the EBM 
approach is committed with the view that “all relevant evidence must be considered”, and 
therefore indicates that this movement endorses the familiar “principle of total 
evidence”(PTE) (p.15). If Jeremy Howick is right that EBM is truly committed to the 
principle of total evidence, then there would indeed be nothing novel or distinctive in the 
DA’s suggestion that “the right probabilities for clinical recommendations are the 
probabilities in the reference class defined by everything the physician knows about the 
patient”. 
However, this line of reasoning is misguided. When Howick says that EBM endorses the PTE, 
he means something rather different from the adoption of the DA. (After all, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, the 4S Model and the EBGs model certainly do not support the idea that EBM 
accepts DA probabilities as the right probabilities for clinical recommendations. ) 
On closer examination, Howick’s advocacy of PTE turns out to be based on the rationale with 
which the Cochrane collaboration justifies the assessment of all research evidence available, 
including the so-called grey literature consisting of unpublished studies (Howick, 2011, p.15) 
73. So, to the extent that the members of the Cochrane collaboration endorse the PTE, their 
concern with systematic reviews has little to do with supporting clinical recommendations for 
individuals in accordance with the DA. After all, EBM’s teachings and implementation 
                                                        
73 Notice that although it is true that the Cochrane collaboration encourages reviewers to consider unpublished 
evidence, there are other reasons to think that neither the Cochrane collaboration nor EBM practice is truly 
committed to the PTE. I say this because it is well-known that the conduction of many systematic reviews involve 
not only the application of exclusion criteria to leave out studies that are irrelevant to the research question, but 
also the exclusion of relevant evidence that is discarded on the grounds that it is methodologically weak according 
to EBM standards. The application of these latter criteria, which cannot be defended in terms of irrelevance to the 
research question, cast doubt on the idea that the kind of systematic reviews supported by EBM are truly guided by 
the PTE. 
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strategies are committed to hierarchical rules of EBM that promote attention to selected 
research evidence rather than to all available information about the patient.74 
So, to summarize, the claim that the DA lacks normative novelty because the EBM approach 
has already endorsed the PTE seems no more than a “red herring”, for EBM does not truly 
support inferences based on this principle (See Ch.2. § 2.4). 
Now, turning to the role assigned to clinical judgment, the fact that some supporters of EBM 
have mentioned clinical judgment as part of the EBM approach might lead some readers to 
think that DA’s emphasis on clinical judgment again lacks originality, as it is only a repetition 
of an idea already accepted by the EBM approach. After all, a quick reading of EBM’s 
standard definition (§ 2.3), which represents it as a judicious endeavour, might suggest that 
the EBM discourse is well aware of the importance of clinical judgment. But again, as 
previously argued (§ 2.4), although EBM’s official definition seems to attribute clinical 
judgment a certain role, the 4S model makes it clear that the EBM version of judgment 
reduces its function to “applicability assessments”, which are strictly subordinate to EBM 
rules of evidence. 
It is worth emphasising that the role assigned to clinical judgment within the EBM camp is 
more heterogeneous than it first appears. In the opinion of many supporters of EBM, clinical 
judgment is above all (if not exclusively) concerned with the assessments of patients’ 
preferences and values (e.g. Karthikeyan and Pais, 2010). Thus consider the advice of the 
most extreme branch of EBM, represented by authors such as Jeremy Howick (2011) and 
David Eddy (e.g. 2005): they have argued that clinical judgment should not be assigned any 
evidential role during clinical care. So, according to these authors, clinical judgment is highly 
misleading not only when used to back up general efficacy claims (as happens when expert 
judgment is used to justify therapeutic recommendations for populations), but also when 
backing up efficacy claims restricted to particular patients.75 
So, in sum, the objection that the DA lacks normative novelty fails. Although ideas such as 
attending to all available evidence and exercising clinical judgment has been previously 
mentioned by some supporters of the EBM movement, the DA is more specific in its 
                                                        
74 Furthermore, even if one could simply ignore the tension generated by hierarchical rules of evidence, I argued 
earlier that there are powerful incentives, which encourage physicians to restrict their attention to the information 
backed up by valid research (or simply to comply with EBGs) (Ch2. § 2.4). Thus, it is very difficult to see how the 
resulting clinical recommendations could be classified as emerging in accordance to the PTE. 
 
75 Both Jeremy Howick (2011) and David Eddy (1990a) contend that their claims are supported by empirical 
evidence. However, in the last sections of this chapter (§ 4.4) I shall question the quality and relevance of such 
evidence and reveal the need for new empirical evidence, which will be provided in last chapters of this thesis (5 
and 6). 
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recommendations: first, the DA tells the physicians that the right probabilities ought to be 
based on everything the physician knows about the patient; and second, the DA is very 
explicit in that the role of clinical judgment is to estimate right probabilities for each patient. 
4.3.2. Is it not what the average physician is already doing? 
Let me now consider the objection that the DA only articulates more explicitly what the 
average physicians actually does in practice. According to this complaint, the DA lacks 
originality because its remarks on the right probabilities and the role of judgment only repeat 
elements presents in physicians’ normal clinical practice.  
This objection seems to find some support in the literature: various physicians have reported 
that they practice a type of medicine that is informed by research but fundamentally driven by 
their own judgment and clinical experience (e.g. Elwyn et al., 2016; McCartnery et al., 2016; 
Gupta et al., 2004; Grahame-Smith, 1995; Lancet editors, 1995; Tonelli, 1998). Nonetheless, 
the aforementioned references describe the practices of particular physicians, and this 
scarcely shows that all physicians proceed in this way. After all, it seems highly unlikely, 
given the widespread influence of the EBM movement76, that most physicians would practice 
along the lines of the DA and not following the principles of EBM described in chapter one 
and two. Moreover, given that the system of EBGs is highly influential in countries with 
centralised healthcare systems such as the United Kingdom77, with the resulting pressures 
attached to physicians’ compliance with EBGs, it seems probable that most physicians follow 
according EBM’s actual models of practice. 
Of course, as we will see in the last two chapters of this dissertation, the existence of various 
initiatives to promote the implementations and compliance with EBGs is itself some evidence 
that there are still few physicians who may follow their own approaches to practice (e.g. 
personal guidelines), either in therapy (Chapter 5) or in the context of diagnosis and prognosis 
(Chapter 6). However, not practicing according to EBM is not necessarily synonymous with 
practicing along the lines of the DA. There are many ways of not complying with EBGs, and 
following the DA is only one of them (others include out-dated beliefs, laziness, carelessness, 
or any other reason different from basing recommendations in the right probabilities).  
As far as I know, there is neither evidence nor principled reason to support the thesis that the 
DA truly represents how physicians practice, and to that extent the lack of descriptive novelty 
of this approach remains mere speculation. But notice that even if such evidence existed, I 
                                                        
76 See Chapter 1 (footnote 3). 
77 I admit that the thesis that most physicians practice some sort of judgment-based medicine may hold true in 
some developing countries (Baradaran-Seyed et al., 2013) or in the context of private medicine (Lazarus, 2005). 
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would not be moved by it. From my perspective, a charge against descriptive novelty is 
simply misguided, for the importance and potential positive impact of the DA does not lie in 
its descriptive accuracy but rather on its normative influence: If proven reasonable and 
feasible, the DA might be able to tell physicians that the way in which EBM has taught them 
to practice medicine could be improved, and to the extent that such improvement is 
achievable, then the DA would be vindicated.  
4.3.3. For a thoughtful physician, the DA is no more than a truism 
Some practically-minded physicians might object that the DA is scarcely news. After all, if 
the only thing the DA tells physicians is that they ought to base their recommendations on 
everything they know about the patient and apply their judgment when the PEI arises, then, 
the DA would seem little more than a truism, from the perspective of any sensible physician. 
My basic response to this objection is that, if the DA were indeed a truism for the sensible 
physician, I would be honoured rather than offended. What is more, I would be happy to 
know that there are physicians who do not require much thinking and argument to be 
convinced that clinical recommendations ought to be based on everything they know about 
their patients and that that their judgment plays a special role when comes to address the PEI. 
Furthermore, another desirable consequence would be that, if it were true that the proposal 
behind the DA really were evidently unquestionable to the thoughtful physician, and in fact 
what the DA does is little more than encourage physicians to exercise their common-sense, 
then that would suggest that my main objection against the EBM could be easily fixed by 
helping sensible physicians –those who already endorse the DA– to instil a sufficiently 
significant dose of “common-sense” into the average physician’s practice. And, of course, I 
would be very happy to accept such a scenario, even if the role of the DA is reduced to a mere 
reminder of what sensible physicians take as uncontroversial. 
Regrettably, although I think that many thoughtful physicians would classify the DA as a 
matter of common sense, I believe that common sense is too vague an idea to describe 
precisely what the DA is advocating. True, it might be that common sense may hold the 
principles of the DA within it; that is, that common sense encompasses the DA. But still, to 
describe the DA in such terms would do little to fix the current situation of clinical medicine, 
which in my opinion is far more complex than just “a lack of common sense”. So, even if the 
idea of basing recommendations on everything the physician knows about her patient in 
response to the PEI might seem trivial to the wise, it need not be trivial (and in fact it might 
seem controversial or even counterintuitive) to the common physician indoctrinated as an 
EBM practitioner. In fact, what I would expect from the average physician trained in EBM 
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would be very different sorts of criticisms against the DA, some of which I shall now turn my 
attention to: first, the DA is an approach that, in practice, cannot be executed by real 
physicians, and second, that, even if the DA were applicable in practice, physicians ought not 
to be practice it for it might worsen clinical care. 
4.3.4. A good but impractical idea  
The next objection is that, by stipulating that the right probabilities for clinical 
recommendations as those in the reference class defined by everything the physician knows 
about the patient, the DA is establishing too high a standard for the average physician. Even if 
the DA probabilities were the right probabilities to base clinical recommendations on, these 
recommendations would be, in practice, unattainable by real physicians in actual settings.  
Perhaps, in an ideal world, where physicians posses unbounded attention and memory, 
extremely keen observation skills, as well unlimited time, the claim that DA probabilities are 
the right probabilities for clinical recommendations would have some practical import. 
However, so the objection goes, in the real world the DA advice lacks practical application. 
I suspect, however, that this objection is based on a misunderstanding about what I am 
actually advocating for as a solution to the PEI. DA probabilities are the right probabilities 
from a prudential point of view, that is, physicians ought to be interested in them regardless of 
whether they are in practice capable of knowing about them. The value of this advice can 
only be understood in contrast to the mainstream idea that the right probabilities are what I 
have denoted EBM probabilities (Ch1, §1.5.1), which ignore part of the information available. 
Up to this point, what is at stake is what are the right probabilities, not whether physicians are 
actually capable of estimating them.78 Nonetheless, even if epistemological limitations are a 
problem, it remains a valuable point to clarify that the right probabilities are DA probabilities 
rather than EBM probabilities. So, I think that to object that the notion of the right 
probabilities has no practical utility is to misunderstand its role, for knowing what are the 
probabilities of interest is of practical value regardless of the physicians’ ability to estimate 
their value. 
The real practical value in identifying the probabilities of interest, is to provide physicians 
with a target for the exercise of their judgment. According to the DA, the role of judgment is 
to address the PEI by estimating as best as possible the right probabilities for each individual. 
After all, sufficiently good estimate of the right probabilities is better than a perfect estimate 
                                                        
78 This is a further matter, which has its own implications related to the various epistemological limitations that 
affect physicians during the clinical encounter. 
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of the wrong probabilities, given that the former are what physicians needs to arrive to the 
right recommendation for individual patients. 
In this regard, let me stress that I acknowledge that physicians’ judgment is subject to various 
practical constraints, which might make it difficult to estimate the right probabilities. 
However I do not think that the fact that judgment is affected by various limitations 
necessarily makes its exercise inadvisable. This is because this task is qualified in two 
important respects.  
First, according to the DA, the probabilities of interest are those in the reference class defined 
by everything the physician knows about the patient. These probabilities are certainly very 
refined, but it must be stressed that these are not single probabilities, whose estimation is, 
without doubt, much more evidently unattainable to physicians because of the potentially 
endless number of factors unknown to the physician that may affect the outcome of interest in 
standard circumstances. 
Second, while the DA prompts the obvious question of whether the physician should gather 
even more information before making a decision, and therefore threatens to turn clinical 
decision-making into a potentially endless gathering of further information, I have explained 
that rational physicians can address this issue by appealing to the Ramsey-Good result, which 
tells them that they ought to gather more information and defer recommendations only insofar 
the cost of doing so are worth it (footnote 22). This provides physicians with an intuitive 
answer to this challenge, which happens to be consistent with the observation that sensible 
physicians tend to decide when to gather more information by pondering the costs (broadly 
understood) involved in such action on a case-by-case basis. 
Furthermore, with regard to the estimation of the right probabilities, it is worth stressing that 
the main point behind the DA, and in fact the point that captures what I think is the key 
weakness of the EBM approach, is that the presence of the PEI makes it unavoidable for the 
physician to take a view about the extra features present in the patient. But at the same time, 
this does not mean that the DA expects physicians to be able to come up with perfect 
numerical estimates of the right probabilities. As I said earlier, the DA is premised on the idea 
that an imperfect estimate of the right probabilities is generally better than a perfect estimate 
of the wrong probabilities. So, to repeat, a useful way to bear in mind the role assigned to 
judgment according to the DA is to recall that the solution to the PEI does not lie in 
exercising judgment to provide a perfect estimate, but in exercising judgment to estimate the 
right probabilities.  
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Of course, I agree with supporters of EBM that the DA remains largely silent as to how 
exactly judgment should be exercised, apart from the general advice that the physician has to 
make a judgment about the extra features she knows about the patient. I admit that this is not 
a precise recipe, but I do not think that the DA needs to provide physicians with a precise 
recipe in order to be practically useful. As I pointed out at the end of the first chapter, one of 
the virtues of accepting DA probabilities as the right probabilities for clinical 
recommendation is evidential flexibility (Ch1. § 1.5.2). This implies that physicians not only 
know that they have to exercise their judgment, but also that their judgment is not subservient 
to the rules of EBM.  
True, this increased flexibility may be particularly challenging for inexperienced physicians, 
which might find specially difficult to make sense of extra information due to their lack of 
background knowledge. Furthermore, an additional challenge arises from the fact that there is 
no clear set of instructions for integrating different sources of information. Each of the extra 
factors present in the patient might have different weight, which could be very difficult to 
specify in particular if the factors are not probabilistically independent. For this reason, it is 
difficult to say something more specific than that the physician ought to start with certain 
prior probability for a set of hypotheses, and then that she ought to update the relevant 
probabilities on learning various facts about the patient so to address the PEI. 
Nevertheless, even if it is unclear how physicians have to estimate the right probabilities, 
from my perspective it remains of practical utility to remind them that they will not do a 
favour to the patient if they, as the EBM approach advises, put their judgment to one side and 
just assume that the extra features present in the patient are probabilistically irrelevant.  
At this point, however, supporters of EBM might raise a further (though related) objection: 
they might complain that if the DA is an approach that aspires to have some practical import 
on clinical care, we cannot simply put estimation problems to one side. After all, what is 
ultimately at stake is which of two practices will lead to the best clinical care: (a) exercising 
judgment so to address the PEI and estimate (as best as possible) the right probabilities or (b) 
ignoring the PEI and putting judgment to one side.  
In the final section of this chapter I shall dissect what I call the “bad consequences” objection 
to the DA, which attacks the DA and supports the EBM approach by arguing that historical 
comparisons between physicians’ judgment and prediction methods purely based on statistical 
methods demonstrate the empirically bad effects arising from the limitations of human 
judgment. 
4.4. The DA approach might worsen clinical care 
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An important source of concern about the DA is that its application might worsen the quality 
of clinical care. I this section I shall examine two claims underlying this worry. The first is 
that the DA is too permissive with regard to the epistemological import of clinical experience, 
and the second is that the DA is too optimistic about physicians’ capacities to estimate 
probabilities.  
Although I shall acknowledge that the DA might increase physicians’ reliance on clinical 
experience, and that it would be unreal to expect that physician will base their clinical 
recommendations on perfect estimates of the probabilities of interest, I shall contend that 
neither of these consequences imply that the DA will worsen clinical care.  
Nevertheless, I accept the aforementioned concerns as plausible worries, which need to be 
addressed with relevant empirical research comparing the effects of the DA and the EBM 
approach to the care of individuals.   
4.4.1. The DA it is too permissive with respect to clinical experience. 
In the first chapter, I pointed out that one of the positive by-products of directing physicians’ 
attention to DA probabilities is “evidential flexibility” (§ 1.5.2). Given this feature, the DA 
allows physicians to incorporate information from clinical experience when addressing the 
PEI, which can be particularly useful to improve their estimates of the right probabilities. 
However, not everybody thinks of this feature of the DA as a virtue.  
Supporters of EBM might be particularly reluctant to accept the DA’s position on clinical 
experience for, in their opinion, it exposes the DA as a laissez-faire approach to clinical care 
that will allow physicians to break sensible rules of evidence. This is mistaken because it 
permits an excessive reliance on misleading evidence and simultaneously distracts physicians 
from the best guide available to clinical decision-making: valid research findings. 
Consider the following remarks from David Eddy (1990a) a prominent supporter of EBM 79: 
“[Personal experiences] are notoriously misleading: the numbers of observations are 
small, there are no controls, patients and physicians decisions about interventions 
are not random, follow-up is incomplete and usually short term, and memories are 
highly selective.” (p.289). 
Or the comments of Robyn Dawes and colleagues (1989): 
                                                        
79 A useful summary of David Eddy’s view on EBM and the version of practice he endorses (Evidence-Based 
Guidelines), can be found in Eddy 2005, 2011. 
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“The clinician is also exposed to a skewed sample of humanity and, short of exposure 
to truly representative samples, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
relations among variables.” (p.1671) 
As these quotes show, hard-line supporters of EBM think that clinical experience is quite 
simply not to be relied upon, and therefore, clinical recommendations supported by it are 
likely to be the wrong clinical recommendations.80 
Now, as I stressed in the first chapter when discussing “evidential flexibility”, I do not deny 
that clinical experience can lead physicians astray (§ 1.5.2.3). As various authors have noticed 
(e.g. Dawes et al. 1989), clinical experience is typically based on unrepresentative samples, 
and because of this, I accept that it normally lacks generalizability. Furthermore, it has been 
known for a long time (e.g. Knapp et al. 1972) that standard clinical experience exposes 
physicians to “cases” not “controls”, and so makes it very difficult for physicians to ascertain 
whether the signs, symptoms, or outcomes of interest occur more often among patients with 
or without the ailment. 
However, I think that the limitations of clinical experience do not affect inferences which 
concern specific recommendations for particular patients, as much as inferences that are 
expected to support general, population-level, efficacy claims. Let me explain why. 
First, in regard to the lack of representativeness of standard clinical experience, it is worth 
noting that the representativeness of a sample depends on what population one wants to make 
inferences about. So, although I take it as uncontroversial that standard personal clinical 
experience is a poor evidential source to back up general medical knowledge, the particular 
experience of a physician may well be sufficiently representative to back up specific 
recommendations deliberately restricted to the kind of patients the physician is used to taking 
care of (§ 1.5.2.3). For example, even if the diabetic patients normally seen by a physician are 
not random members of the population of diabetic patients in the UK, the selective nature of 
this physician’s sample does not necessarily threaten the validity of the information she can 
obtain from her sample if the physician bears in mind that such information is in most cases 
only relevant to the kind of diabetics she generally sees, and is not necessarily transferable to 
diabetic patients from other localities (let alone to the population of diabetic patients in the 
UK). So, clinical experience can provide physicians with local knowledge about the particular 
spectrum of patients they serve (e.g. Poretsky 1985), and in the extreme case about particular 
                                                        
80 For example, Jeremy Howick (2011) stresses the perils of attending to clinical experience by bringing attention 
to historical anecdotes such as the accidental introduction of the “antenatal use of corticosteroids”, which was 
initially resisted by many expert physicians, who allegedly did not trust the result of clinical trials in part because 
their own clinical experience did not support the idea that lung disease was a really a problem (p.161). 
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knowledge about very specific classes of individuals. Of course, such information is often not 
generalizable, but it remains useful, in particular because it is the kind of information (local 
patient idiosyncrasies) clinical trials would remain silent about. 
Second, although the lack of controls that characterises clinical experience complicates the 
estimation of the evidential weight of potential interaction effects, in the context of medical 
prediction the physician might still use her personal experience to estimate the frequency of 
certain symptoms. If the physician is interested in the objective probability of the outcome of 
interest for the next diabetic patient coming to her clinic rather than for a diabetic patient 
randomly taken from the population, she may do well to rely on her clinical experience. 
Relevant here are reports of concrete cases that support the claim that incorporating 
information from clinical experience can improve clinical care. For example, Crandall and 
Getchew-Reiter (1993) studied the detection of life-threatening infections in a neonatal 
intensive care unit (NICU). After observing that clinicians could detect infants developing 
such infections even before blood tests came back positive, the researchers interviewed 
clinicians and identified a range of indicators (cues) and sign combinations (patterns) not 
previously described in the literature.  This supports the idea that clinical experience can 
provide useful information which can be incorporated in routine practice. 
Likewise, a group of researchers studied 30 trauma cases and recorded the adherence of 
experts and novices respectively to the Advance Trauma Life Support standard (ATLS) 
(Kahol et al. 2011; Vankipuram et al. 2012). This study found that seasoned physicians’ 
deviations from protocol were in most cases dynamic adjustments to adapt the standard 
guidelines and thus an improvement in efficiency and accuracy (Kahol et al. 2011; 
Vankipuram et al. 2012). Again, this supports the idea that physicians’ attention to their 
clinical experience allows for flexibility and adaptiveness, which in turn may bring about 
better outcomes for patients.  
So, although the aforementioned examples do not change the fact that clinical experience is 
limited in many respects and can be misleading, they do support the claim that sometimes it 
can be useful. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that, when it comes to assessing the 
relative merits of clinical experience over other evidential sources, the kind of research 
evidence ranked at the top of hierarchies of evidence can be misleading too. It is well known 
that clinical trials, even those carefully conducted, are not free from errors related to statistical, 
causal inference or external validity, which introduces uncertainty as to their potential to 
guide practice. And, even more importantly, as I argued in the first chapter, even if there were 
no such problems and the physician had access to a perfect estimate, if such estimate ignores 
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part of what the physician knows about the patient, it would be an estimate of the “wrong 
probabilities” and may well lead to the erroneous recommendations. 
So, to sum up, although I acknowledge that the DA might increase physicians’ reliance on 
their own clinical experience, and that such experience has its limitations, I do not think that 
physicians should automatically jettison such kind of information. This would not only be 
prudentially irrational but also, it might hamper physicians’ capacity to deal effectively with 
the PEI and therefore decrease their capacity to estimate the right probabilities. 
4.4.2. The DA underrates physicians’ limited capacities to estimate probabilities 
The DA entrusts physicians with an important responsibility: whenever they know something 
extra about the patient, they ought to exercise their judgment to estimate the right 
probabilities. But what if physicians are such poor estimators that, even if the DA directs their 
attention to the right probabilities the exercise of their judgment is incapable of arriving a 
minimally appropriate estimate? 
Backing for this worry is provided by the heuristics and biases tradition of research in 
psychology (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Tversky, 2004; Samuels et al., 2002; Papineau, 
2006). This research is extensive, controversial and with wide implications on many different 
topics. For the purposes of this chapter I shall limit myself to (i) admitting that there are 
various biases affecting human judgment (some of which are specifically relevant to our 
discussion), (ii) contending that the impact of these biases on physicians’ clinical decision 
making is far from clear, and therefore that (iii) it is reasonable to think that supporters of 
EBM (e.g. Howick, 2011) have overstated the perils of physicians’ judgment in the context of 
clinical medicine.81  
Let me start by describing, without attempting to be exhaustive, a small list of relevant biases 
that are relevant to the PEI. For a start, various authors (e.g. Elstein 1990, 1999) have 
provided evidence that (i) humans tend to over-attend to information consistent with their 
own hypotheses and to under-attend to contradictory information.82 Likewise, it has been 
documented that physicians are normally victims of overconfidence: that is, they typically 
overestimate the accuracy of their judgments (e.g. Berner and Graber, 2008; Elstein, 1999). In 
addition, it is now almost common knowledge that many physicians disregard frequency data 
                                                        
81 Notice that a potential line of argument to defend the DA against the objection that assigning such an important 
role to clinical judgment is erroneous would be to attack the external validity of the experiments provided by the 
psychologists in the heuristics and biases tradition in general. I shall not pursue this line argument because I shall 
focus on more specific objections. 
82 As Grove and Meehl (1996) says “this is simply the ineradicable tendency of the human mind to select 
instances for generalizations that it favours” (p.15). 
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and often makes predictions on the basis of some prototype or instance stored in memory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Pennycook et al. 2014; Charlin et al., 2007). 
However, although the aforementioned criticisms obviously raise doubts about the reliability 
of human judgment, it is unclear whether they necessarily lead to significant practical 
problems in the context of clinical care. For example, take the claim that physician tend to 
focus on part of the information available. While there is a sense in which this raises doubts 
about the capacity of physicians to successfully address the PEI, its practical consequences 
remain unclear. Studies on diagnostic reasoning suggest that it is unclear whether successful 
diagnosticians do this less than unsuccessful ones (Eva, 2005; Norman, 2005, Norman and 
Eva 2003; Ericsson, 2007). In fact, when we do this and the outcome is good we typically call 
it heuristic, but if we do the same but the outcome is bad, we then call it premature closure 
bias. Both labels, however, are instances of wisdom after the event, and there is no strong 
empirical evidence suggesting that partial focus is necessarily bad in natural settings (Norman, 
2014). 
Physicians’ overconfidence, on the other hand, does sound as if it will be problematic. 
However, the real issue is whether such overconfidence really does lead to worst clinical 
recommendations. Sometimes it is precisely overconfidence that allows the physician to 
exercise her judgment and focus on the most relevant elements of the case. Such a procedure 
is neither inconsistent with the DA, nor necessarily bad, for it is by no means clear whether it 
leads to systematic error (See Croskerry and Norman, 2008). 
Automatic disregard of base-rate fallacies is considered a serious error in probabilistic 
reasoning. However, one must be careful not to confuse this kind of bias with situations, 
which may be common in real-life, where the physician prefer to ignore base-rates from the 
literature, in favour of more idiosyncratic or local base-rates, which may often be more 
relevant to calculating the right probabilities for the patient. For example, a clinician who 
works in a penitentiary or forensic psychiatric clinic might conclude, after considered 
judgment, that the frequency of liars among psychiatric patients is very low. This is not a case 
of base-rate fallacy, but a case where the physician judges such information to be irrelevant to 
the probability for the patient she has in front of her—the fact that the patient has been 
hospitalised in a forensic psychiatric service changes the relevant base rate. 
So, although I do not deny that physicians’ judgment is vulnerable to various sorts of bias, I 
do not think it reasonable to conclude that the right attitude towards that problem is to 
abandon judgment altogether, and automatically apply valid research data on the basis of 
common membership to general diagnostic reference classes. After all, leading authors in the 
heuristic and biases tradition, and also in the field of expert knowledge, concur on the idea 
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that these biases do not necessarily prevent arriving at the right recommendations (Kanehman 
and Klein, 2009). 
More fundamentally, if the main question is whether physicians’ biases are so severe as to 
justify the abandonment of judgment and support clinical recommendations based exclusively 
on valid research data, as the extreme branch of EBM proposes (Howick, 2011), then 
documenting biases is not enough to answer this question, for what is really needed is 
comparative empirical evidence that predictions and prescriptions based on research data and 
without the interference of judgment are superior to those where clinical judgment is used to 
address the PEI. 
In this respect, some supporters of EBM (Howick, 2011) think that such evidence is already 
available and that it is sufficient to justify the otherwise controversial claim that clinical 
judgment “belongs to the bottom of the hierarchy [of evidence]” (p.167).  
In the last section of this chapter, I shall comment on the so-called actuarial versus clinical 
prediction research tradition, launched by the prominent psychologist Paul Meehl during 
1950s, and which is used by Jeremy Howick (2011) to substantiate his claims that, even if 
there are problems with the applicability of research, there is no reason to think that 
increasing the room for clinical discretion, as the DA recommends, would improve clinical 
care. 
4.4.3. The need for relevant and updated empirical comparisons 
When defending claims such as “where high-quality comparative clinical trials do exist, data 
should trump the judgment of experts in diagnostic, prognostic and therapeutic predictions” 
(Howick, 2011, p.166), or “allowing clinicians to “break” the mechanical rule will tend to 
make outcomes worse” (Howick, 2011, p.169) or that judgment ought to be restricted to 
“non-evidential roles” 83, supporters of the more extreme branch of EBM assert that the EBM 
position “is well supported” (Howick, 2011, p.161). 
                                                        
83 By a “non-evidential role” in the context of decision-making for individuals, Jeremy Howick (2011) literally 
means that “…expert judgment should not be used as evidence” (p.177) and that the function of the physician is to 
integrate “the best research evidence with patient values and circumstances”(p.177). Notice that the word 
“circumstances” in Howick’s usage should not be confused with my use of the word “information”, such as when 
I say that the objective probabilities of interest for the physicians are those in the reference class defined by all 
“information” about the patient available to him. While I interpret “information” in an evidential sense, that is, as 
an evidential input that aids the physician in the estimation of the right probabilities, Jeremy Howick speaks about 
the “patient’s values and circumstances” to convey the idea that the role of judgment is to consider what kind of 
interventions are both consistent with the patient’s interests and practically possible or feasible. Obviously the 
latter is something independent of the probability that the intervention in question will cause the outcome of 
interest for the patient). 
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According to Jeremy Howick (2011): “The hypothesis that expert judgment is useful in 
applying average statistical results to individual patients has been tested hundreds of times 
over the course of the last six decades. [But] with a mere handful of exceptions, they all 
suggest that following “mechanical” rules is as good as, or better than, expert judgment…” 
(p.167). 
In this final section, I am going to argue against Howick’s claims. My aim is to show that his 
assessment and interpretation of the evidence he cites in support of the EBM position on 
clinical judgment is deficient and that most of his analysis is unsound. However, my 
conclusion will not be that we should take the virtues of clinical judgment for granted, but 
rather that such virtues, and the virtues of an alternative approach such as EBM, deserve to be 
examined via updated and methodologically relevant empirical evidence.84  
The literature Howick cites to support the lack of utility of physicians’ judgment in clinical 
settings belongs to the “Actuarial versus Clinical Prediction” 85 tradition, launched by the 
psychologist Paul Meehl in his book “Clinical versus Actuarial Prediction a theoretical 
analysis and a review of the evidence” (Meehl, 1954). 
In his discussion of the experiments reported in Meehl’s book (1954), Howick (2011) ignores 
the fact that for Meehl the question of interest was not whether clinicians 86, given their 
various cognitive limitations, would be able to address the PEI and thereby provide patients 
with better predictions and prescriptions. Rather Meehl was interested in a different question, 
namely: whether clinicians or mechanical rules were better at combining the same data. In 
Meehl’s words (1954), he was interested in investigating “the relative efficiency of actuarial 
and non-actuarial methods of combining the same data to yield a prediction” (p.118). 
Meehl’s question is obviously a valid one, and particularly understandable once one considers 
the historical context in which he carried out his research was one where the prevailing 
assumption was that expert judgment, rather than research evidence, constituted the best 
source of general (population-level) knowledge at least in psychology and medicine. 87 
                                                        
84 To be fair, in his most tempered moments Jeremy Howick (2011) acknowledges at least some of the limitations 
of the evidence he cites, but for the most part he fails to see that his contentions are not well supported by the 
empirical data he offers. 
85 The term “actuarial” was quickly replaced by “mechanical” and later on by “statistical”. So the current debate is 
between the merits of “statistical” and “clinical” prediction. 
 
86 The term “clinicians” is a broader term used to describe workers of different backgrounds and educational 
levels who perform clinical work, usually physicians, psychologists, and nurses but also sometimes biochemists, 
medical technicians, and even sociologists who have direct contact with patients. 
87 One should not forget that Paul Meehl was an experimental psychologist, which was educated in a time when 
psychoanalytical theory was taught and applied in the United States as if it were almost an unquestionable truth. In 
that context, the psychoanalytic expert himself, represented the most sophisticated source of general knowledge, 
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However, as I said, Meehl’s question is very different to the question of whether addressing 
the PEI by increasing the room for clinical discretion results in better predictions and 
prescriptions. In fact, the kind of experiments that address Meehl’s research question 
artificially eliminate the PEI, by considering how the same data is processed by statistical 
rules and physicians. 
Of course, this observation does not invalidate all experiments cited by Howick (2011). But 
we should be suspicious of his assertion that “the EBM position on expert judgment as 
evidence is well supported by a plethora of largely ignored studies…”(p.161). Much of 
Howick’s plethora of studies is simply irrelevant to the point under discussion. 
As it happens, Howick also cites the research conducted by William Grove, a disciple of Paul 
Meehl (Grove et al. 2000). This was designed to examine the relative predictive performance 
of physicians’ judgment and statistical models from a broader perspective, and is indeed 
relevant to EBM’s general position on clinical judgment. However, Howick overlooks some 
crucial problems that limit both the validity and relevance of Grove’s findings to clinical 
medicine. Since these limitations are not restricted to Grove’s meta-analyses and also affect 
the work of other researchers in this area (Dawes et al, 1989; Marchesse, 1992; Ægisdǿttir et 
al. 2006), it is worth explaining why they render much of this research irrelevant to the 
assessment of EBM. 
For a start, most of the studies cited were conducted using case summaries instead of real 
cases. This is not trivial for several reasons. In the first place, case summaries artificially 
eliminate the PEI. In addition, the use of case summaries limits the external validity of the 
findings: as is well known, physicians rely on many sources of information, and not all of 
them are easily described let alone included in a case-summary (Patel and Groen, 1991). 
Moreover, to examine the merits of statistical predictions (SP) and clinical predictions by 
physicians (CP) on the basis of restricted datasets is also inadequate because another 
argument raised against judgment is that physicians’ predictive performance might be 
affected by “dilution effects” (Nisbett et al. 1981; Zukier, 1982; Tetlock and Bottger, 1989), 
which are also missed by experiments using case summaries. This is particularly important 
for the prospects of the DA because, if it is true that physicians facing real patients tend to 
pay attention to false clues and ignore relevant ones, then the accuracy of physicians’ 
estimates of the right probabilities would be highly diminished. So, given that, as Rakow and 
colleagues (2005) say: “[the] asymmetry in the information available to the doctors and the 
                                                                                                                                                              
that is, the best evidential source someone can hope for. The reader interested in these points is invited to read the 
first sections of Meehl’s book (1954, pp. 3 to 82). 
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prediction models merely reflects the inherent constraints and advantages in the everyday use 
of each approach” (p. 262), there are reasons to question the validity of studies based on case 
summaries, and pay particular attention to comparisons conducted in real settings, where 
physicians really confront the PEI, and their estimation skills are truly put to the test. 88 Of 
course, the practical success of the DA with respect to the estimation of the right probabilities 
assumes inter alia that when the physician is confronted with an actual patient, advantages 
such as the access to the patient’s characteristics will typically counterbalance disadvantages 
such as the physician’s cognitive overload, or potential “dilution effects”, but this hypothesis 
needs to be examined, and that cannot be done in artificial settings with case summaries.  
Another set of problem with previous studies comparing SP with CP is that in many of them 
(a) the outcome of interest did not pertain to clinical medicine, (b) the predictive tasks were 
outside the medical domain or (c) the tasks did not involve physicians. As interesting as it 
may be to know that certain algorithms predict better than humans outcomes such as “voting 
behaviour”, “job satisfaction”, “next day’s weather”, “marriage success”, “adjustment to 
prison life”, or “parole violations” (Grove et al. 2000), the superiority of SP over CP reported 
by primary studies focused on the aforementioned outcomes is not relevant to the question of 
whether the predictive performance of physicians’ judgment is superior or inferior to that of 
statistical models. Furthermore, since the scope of application of both the EBM approach and 
physicians’ judgment does not extend to non-clinical settings, primary studies focused on 
military personnel or graduate students are scarcely useful to either substantiate the claims 
defended by EBM or support my defence of physicians’ judgment.  
Likewise, since there is some evidence suggesting that the judgment of members of different 
professions has different predictive abilities (Kaufmann and Athanasou 2009, Kaufmann et al., 
2013), and that the level of experience might affect predictive performance (LaDuca et al., 
1988, Smith et al., 2003), studies that report that the predictive performance of business 
managers, social workers, psychoanalytic psychotherapists, members of parole boards, and 
medical students is inferior to that of statistical models is loosely connected to the claim on 
which the practical success of either the EBM approach or the DA is premised. To repeat, 
what we are interested in is in primary studies showing that when properly qualified 
physicians (not medical students) apply their judgment they do not do it in such way that 
results in a greater number of erroneous predictions than the corresponding number of 
erroneous predictions that follow from the strict application of statistical algorithms. So, my 
                                                        
88 Notice a special case of extra information that might help physicians, which is not captured by case summaries, 
is the information about local patters of disease. As we will see in the last chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6), deeper 
knowledge about the kind of patients that normally visit their clinic seems to be an important comparative 
advantage for physicians.  
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point is simply that if one wants to investigate the merits of judgment to handle PEI, we need 
to focus on relevant studies (that is, studies that include physicians predicting clinical 
outcomes). 
Finally, another, more technical, limitation that weakens the validity of several studies 
allegedly supporting the EBM’s position on judgment, and one that was ignored by Jeremy 
Howick’s analysis, was that in many primary studies the performance of SP was measured in 
derivation samples. As several authors have pointed out, one should not assess the 
performance of a statistical model on the patients on which the model was first created,  
because it is to be expected that the model will perform better on the data from which it was 
derived than on any new sample, regardless of the fact that new samples have been drawn 
from the same underlying population (e.g. Dawid 1976; Spiegelhalter and Knill-Jones 1984; 
Bleeker et al., 2003). This is because the derivation of statistical rules might be based on non-
repeating relations among variables, and as a result, the estimates obtained by many 
researchers are often affected by problems such as “over-fitting”.89 So, the point here is that 
several studies cited by Howick were studies in which the performance of the models was 
measured using estimates obtained during the derivation process and therefore overestimate 
the performance of such models.90  
Thus, although the aforementioned problems do not entirely invalidate Howick’s defence of 
the EBM position on clinical judgment, at the very least they cast doubt on the soundness of 
his analysis.  
So, to sum up, careful attention to what Howick describes as “a plethora of largely ignored 
studies” supporting the EBM’s position on clinical judgment reveals that many of those 
studies are irrelevant, methodologically questionable or both. Of course, some of the evidence 
cited by Howick might be relevant and informative in assessing the merits of physicians’ 
judgment and the practical prospects of the DA. However, my analysis suggest that the data 
presented by Howick are far less compelling than he suggests, and for this reason I do not 
think it provides supporters of EBM with a strong case against physicians’ judgment, let 
alone against the DA.  
                                                        
89 For a clear exposition of the problem of “overfitting”, which from the philosophical point of view is captured by 
the distinction between predicting and accommodating see (Hitchcock and Sober 2004) 
90 Notice that “new sample” here is not used to describe a new sample composed by obviously different patients 
but rather a new sample composed by members of the original target population. In this respect several authors 
have reported actual cases where the predictive performance of statistical models applied to new samples of 
patients drops significantly (Toll et al. 2008; Justice et al. 1999). 
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Since the superiority of SP over CP, and more generally of the EBM approach over the DA is 
an empirical matter, the sensible next step is to conduct more careful and systematic 
investigation of the practical performance of both EBM and the DA. In the end, what is at 
issue here is whether EBM –an approach that favours automatic reliance on statistical rules– 
is actually more beneficial to patients than the DA –an alternative approach which attends to 
the PEI and calls for clinical discretion.  
4.5. Conclusions 
The first aim of this chapter was to demarcate the DA from apparently similar positions, 
which nevertheless have rather different implications for clinical care. It was observed that 
the DA ought not to be confused with MP, a position which questions all inferences based on 
general classes, nor with PCT, an approach based a broad but indefinite notion of adequate 
care.  
In addition, this chapter considered a set of concerns as to the practicalities involves in the 
DA. I argued that the precision of the DA ensured its normative novelty. In addition, I 
contended that a charge descriptive unoriginality is unjustified for it is plausible to think that 
the average physician nowadays practices clinical medicine according to the standard models 
of EBM. I then accepted that from the perspective of the thoughtful experienced physician the 
postulates of the DA might be truistic, and observed that this was scarcely an objection to the 
DA. As a first response to the charge of impracticality, I observed that a rough estimate of the 
right probabilities can well be better than a perfect estimate of the wrong ones.  
Finally, the last sections of this chapter were concerned with the possibility the DA will in 
practice lead to an increased number of wrong decisions. I observed that there was no 
principled reason why the DA should have this consequence. I then added a critical appraisal 
of the literature cited by supporters of EBM to substantiate the claim that clinical judgement 
was generally inferior to statistical prediction. I showed that such literature has serious 
methodological limitations, and that what is needed is a methodologically sound comparison 
between the DA and the EBM approach. This will be the subject of the last two chapters of 
this thesis.  
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Chapter 5:  EBM guidelines vs. “usual care”: A re-analysis of systematic reviews 
 
5.1. Abstract 
The Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) approach to medical practice encourages physicians to 
comply with Evidence-based Guidelines (EBGs) based on the best research evidence 
available (2.4.2). One of the fundamental assumptions of the EBGs model of care is that 
physicians’ compliance with EBGs leads to better health outcomes. Throughout this 
dissertation I have cast doubt on this assumption by arguing that the correct recommendations 
for individuals need not be based on research probabilities. Instead I argued that research 
evidence ought to inform care but that sound clinical recommendations ought require the 
exercise of physician’ judgment on the basis of everything she knows about the patient. 
The main aim of this chapter is to compare the performance of successfully implemented 
EBGs with that of “care as usual” with respect to patient outcomes in the hope that this 
comparison will shed empirical light on the relative therapeutic virtues of the EBM approach 
and the DA. With this purpose in mind I shall conduct a reanalysis of systematic reviews 
investigating the efficacy of EBGs versus “care as usual” as proxies for the aforementioned 
approaches. 
In this study, eight systematic reviews of the effectiveness of EBGs published from 1993 
onwards were identified and analysed. These reviews reported the results of 149 primary 
studies, all of which were assessed in full. Forty-two primary studies measured patient 
outcomes (28.2%), and only ten of them met the methodological requirements for comparing 
EBGs with “care as usual” as a proxy of the DA. Among them, eight studies indicated that 
EBGs were either ineffective (n= 4) or mostly ineffective (n=4) with respect to patient 
outcomes. Only two studies favoured the application of EBGs over “care as usual”. 
This reanalysis of systematic reviews indicates that therapeutic recommendations based on 
EBGs does not necessarily improve patient outcomes. In fact, the data collected suggest that 
“care as usual”, which relies on clinical discretion, usually obtains better patient outcomes 
than those obtained by EBGs. To the extent that the successfully implemented EBGs and 
“care as usual” are reasonable proxies for the EBM approach and the DA, this reanalysis 
challenges the superiority of the EBM approach, and answers the concern that adopting the 




5.2. Background  
5.2.1. The rationale behind EBGs  
Between 1980 and 1990, when David Sackett and colleagues (EBM group 1990), were 
developing the fundamental principles of the 4S model of EBM practice (§ 2.4.1), David 
Eddy, the physician who first used the term “evidence-based” in the medical literature, was 
aiming to persuade policy-makers, medical associations, and physicians themselves that 
clinical care should be standardised on the basis of Evidence-Based guidelines (EBGs) (Eddy 
1982, 1990a-e, 2005, 2011). 
Eddy’s first task was to question the quality of clinical decisions (Eddy, 1990a). To do so, he 
directed attention to what later came to be called “unwarranted variation” in healthcare 
(Wennberg, 2002). This concept aimed to establish a link between a lack of an obvious 
explanation for many clinical recommendations and poor-quality clinical care. In Eddy’s 
Words (1990): 
“The plain fact is that many decisions made by physicians appear to be arbitrary–highly 
variable, with no obvious explanation. The very disturbing implication is that this 
arbitrariness represents for at least some patients, suboptimal or even harmful care” (p.289) 
Eddy’s understanding of variation in healthcare focused on the limitations of physicians’ 
judgment. From his perspective, this was only capable of following simple “if-then” rules 
(Eddy, 1982), and–to make things worse–was informed by the wrong evidential sources (e.g. 
clinical experience and physiopathological rationale) (§ 1.5.2 and § 4.4). So, for instance, 
with regard to physicians’ capacity to determine the right decisions, Eddy asserts (1990a): 
“It is easy to appreciate that if a physician’s perception of the outcomes of alternative 
interventions is incorrect, the chance that he or she will choose the best intervention for a 
patient is severely threatened.” (p.287).91  
Supporting Eddy’s ideas, John Wennberg (2011)–another prominent figure in the area of 
EBGs and the researcher who provided much of the empirical evidence supporting the 
existence of variation in care (e.g. Wennberg, 1973, Wennberg et al. 1989)–assumed that 
“Much of the variation in use of healthcare is accounted for by the willingness and ability of 
doctors to offer treatment rather than differences in illness or patient preference” (p.687) and 
                                                        
91 David Eddy backed up his assertion that physicians provided “inappropriate” care with studies suggesting that 
physicians were inconsistent in their recommendations for what appeared to be “similar” patients (e.g. Chassin, 
1987). 
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that the majority of the recommendations made by physicians were biased, poorly justified, 
and likely to lead to bad patient outcomes (Wennberg, 2002). 
 Against this backdrop, the standardisation of care via EBGs emerged as a reasonable 
approach to improve the quality of care (Bodgan-Lovis et al. 2012, Tannenbaum, 2012; Eddy, 
2011). For, from this perspective, with proper practice standardization on the basis of the best 
research evidence, most of the “unwarranted” differences in care could be eliminated 
(Claridge, 2005; Eddy, 2011; Kinney, 2004).92 
5.2.2. A problematic assumption of the EBGs programme 
As Avendis Donabedian (2005)—a renowned researcher in the field of quality of care—
warned: “the process of evaluation [of healthcare] itself requires much further study. A great 
deal of effort goes into the development of criteria and standards which are presumed to lend 
stability and uniformity to judgments of quality and yet this presumed effect has not been 
empirically demonstrated.” (p.715-716).  
So, as Donabedian suggests, it is naïve to think that standardising healthcare interventions 
would immediately improve the quality of care. The situation is obviously much more 
complex, and therefore are problems with aiming to improve clinical care simply by “getting 
research intro practice” (e.g. Haines and Donald, 2002; Garner et al., 1998; Haynes and 
Haines, 1998). This assumes that the main failures related to improving the “science” backing 
up clinical recommendations (Sackett and Rosenberg, 1995) or overcoming “implementations 
problems” (Grimshaw, 1995). Again, Donobedian (2005) expressed his worries eloquently: 
“One must also consider whether, with increasing standardization, so much loss of the ability 
to account for unforeseen elements in the clinical situation occurs that one obtains reliability 
at the cost of validity. (p.715-716). Nevertheless, most of the focus of the EBGs programme 
has been on developing better “strategies to improve compliance with evidence-based clinical 
management guidelines” (Frankel et al., 1999. p. 533).  
As I shall discuss in subsequent sections, there are at least two ways to measure the quality of 
healthcare (Donabedian, 1981; 2005): in terms of measures of process or in terms of patient 
outcomes. As we will see, several advocates of the EBGs movement have focused on what is 
known as measures of process rather than patient outcomes. Of course, measuring quality of 
care in terms of compliance with certain processes has several practical advantages (Goddart 
et al., 2002). But the main worry with this strategy is that it does not really tell us whether the 
interventions promoted by EBGs truly improve the health of patients. Rather it assumes that, 
                                                        
92 Readers interested in what has come to be known as the “quality of care” movement can consult Marjoua and 
Bozic, 2012 and Luce et al., 1994. 
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because such interventions are based on the best research available, their successful 
implementation will automatically bring about improvements in patient outcomes (e.g. Mittal 
et al., 2014; Bowyer et al., 2014; Pereira et al., 2014).93  
5.2.3. Basic concepts for this chapter’s analysis  
In this chapter’s analysis, the EBM approach will be equated to an approach where physicians’ 
therapeutic recommendations are in accordance with EBGs. As explained earlier, this 
approach aims at standardizing care by encouraging compliance with recommendations based 
on the best research available, and therefore effectively reduces the latitude for the exercise of 
clinical discretion.94 
Furthermore, it is important to note from the outset that in this chapter my attention will be 
restricted to therapeutic EBGs. This is not because there are no EBGs developed for 
diagnostic and prognostic purposes (in fact, there are many of them). The main reason for this 
is that the (a) therapeutic recommendations and (b) diagnostic and prognostic ones need not 
be based on the same kind of data (§ 1.3.2 and 1.3.3). Because of this, I shall examine the 
empirical merits of the EBM approach against the DA separately for therapeutic prescriptions 
and diagnostic and prognostic predictions.95 I shall consider therapeutic prescriptions in the 
present chapter, and turn to diagnostic and prognostic predictions in the next chapter. 
Finding a suitable empirical proxy for the DA is, of couse, not a straightforward task. The 
ideal situation would have been one in which the DA could have been operationalised by 
measuring the clinical outcomes that followed from therapeutic recommendations made by a 
random sample of physicians whose judgment was (i) informed by everything they know 
                                                        
93 The other side of the coin, which we already discussed in chapter 2 (§ 2.4.2), is the assumption that lack of 
compliance with interventions supported by the best evidence will result in worse patients outcomes (Grimshaw et 
al., 2004). 
94 Focusing on the performance of EBGs is not necessarily the only satisfactory way to examine the empirical 
consequences of the EBM approach. In this regard, the application of other models of EBM practice, such as the 
4S model (§ 2.4.1), may well result in different patient outcomes. Nonetheless, since both the EBGs model and the 
4S model share a commitment to the rules of EBM and consequent marginalization of the PEI, it seems reasonable 
to assume that these different EBM models of practice will have relatively similar effects on patient outcomes. 
Still, it is worth recognizing that there may be at least two important sources of variance between the EBGs model 
and the 4S model. First, there is the time lag with which the best valid research is incorporated into EBGs, which 
might be shorter in the case of the 4S model, since physicians themselves might be more flexible about keeping 
themselves updated. Second, since the 4S model, unlike the EBGs model, does not involve official standards of 
practice, it might provide EBM practitioners with more latitude in adapting their recommendations to their patients’ 
personal utilities, which might be reflected in more individualised recommendations and ultimately in better 
outcomes. Nonetheless, I do not think that these differences outweigh the commonalities between the EBGs model 
and the 4S model, and so I shall continue to assume that at least some extrapolations, albeit qualified, are possible. 
95 There are further practical reasons for separating therapeutic from diagnostic and prognostic judgment. The 
literature comparing the accuracy and of clinical judgment in the context of diagnostic and prognostic tasks (§ 5.2) 
is highly technical, and requires detailed attention to subtleties. By contrast, comparisons between EBGs and 
physicians’ recommendations in the context of therapy are more straightforward, involving less complex 
methodological underpinnings and requiring less background knowledge. 
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about the patient (which includes information from any source the physician deems relevant 
to the patient, including valid research evidence (§ 1.5.2), and (ii) took into account the 
patient’s preferences and values when aiming to maximize expected utility (§ 1.5.1).  
This issue is important because it would inappropriate to devalue the DA by measuring the 
performance of physicians who are ignorant of crucial research or careless about patients’ 
welfare. The point of the DA is to overcome excusive reliance on controlled research and to 
allow physicians to address the PEI. The DA is not designed to encourage physicians to go 
back to the dark pre-EBM ages when valid research played very little role in informing 
decision-making. So we would like our comparisons to be based on DA practitioners who do 
not ignore EBGs, but rather consider their content in addition to the extra information they 
have about the patient.  
Regrettably, as this is an empirical investigation based on research already conducted, and as 
far as the author’s knowledge there are no physicians trained in the exercise of the DA, there 
was no good alternative to assuming that “usual care”–that is, the standard control group in 
investigations of the impact of EBGs in healthcare, would be a “workable” proxy with 
sufficient similarity to the DA to permit an informative comparison. 
The rationale for using the performance of physicians exercising “usual care” as a proxy for 
the DA is based on the following assumptions. First, it is reasonable to expect that the impact 
of clinical practice according to “usual care” will rarely be better than that of physicians’ 
exercising their clinical judgment according to the DA. After all, the performance of 
physicians practicing “usual care” will be normally hampered by all (or most) the limitations 
normally attributed to the exercise of clinical judgment (e.g. decisional inconsistency, 
vulnerability to errors in human reasoning, etc.), as well as a potential neglect of relevant 
research evidence due to factors such as laziness or carelessness. In fact, it is possible that 
“usual care” recommendations are made in a generally haphazard way, without seriously 
addressing the PEI at all. 
Given this, if the data indicated that EBGs perform no better that “usual care”, this would be 
highly suggestive that the DA is superior to EBGs. Of course, on the other hand, if the data 
suggested that EBGs lead to better patient outcomes than “usual care”, this would not be a 
knock out argument against the prospects of the DA, even though it would provide some 
support for the hypothesis that compliance with EBGs in real settings can improve patients’ 
outcomes.  
In the light of these points, this chapter will settle for comparing EBGs with “care as usual”. 
Since my analysis will indicate that EBGs do not in fact lead to better outcomes than “usual 
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care”, this will provide some support for preferring the DA to the EBM approach. 
5.2.4. Outcome measures  
As mentioned earlier, the performance of different approaches to clinical practice can be 
studied by both (a) process and (b) outcome measures (Donobedian, 2005, Marjoua and Bozic, 
2012). Process measures are focused on the actions performed by clinicians during their 
practice (Donobedian, 2005). In studies using process measures the benchmark is some 
intervention or procedure (e.g. ordering of a test, prescription for a medication) that has been 
a priori specified as normatively adequate and attributed a certain benefit for the patient 
(Aday et al., 2004). 
Two remarks about process measures are in order. First, in the era of EBM, measures of 
process are standardly defined by paying attention to the best available research evidence, 
cost-benefit considerations, and applicability analyses.96 Second, a noteworthy feature about 
the process of evaluation of EBGs is that many interventions have been considered 
“successfully implemented” once there is evidence of improvement in process outcomes; that 
is, when there are data suggesting that an increased number of physicians is complying with 
the process recommended, regardless of the consequences of those processes on the health 
status of patients (Ramsdale and Dale, 2013). 
However—and following the most recent recommendations for comparative effectiveness 
research and quality measures in healthcare (Berlin and Cepeda, 2012; Berger et al., 2012; 
Chung and Shauver, 2009)–the present analysis will compare EBGs with “usual care” not in 
terms of process measures, but in terms of patient outcomes. Attention to patient outcomes is 
essential because of the need to avoid circularity. Using measures of process to assess the 
benefits of EBGs in is not informative in the present context, precisely because such quality 
indicators presuppose that the mere act of complying with EBGs improves the care of patients. 
By contrast, patient outcomes count as independent indicators because they directly measure 
the patient’s health status (Donabedian, 2003, 2005). Patient outcomes include various 
markers of disease (e.g. blood pressure, body mass index, glycated haemoglobin), and clinical 
endpoints whose occurrence is considered relevant (e.g. death, disease progression or 
complications).  
It must be noticed, however, that the availability of some measure of process is also important 
to ensure the adequacy comparison between EBGs and “usual care”. This is because measures 
of process provide specific information about physicians’ compliance with EBGs. In the 
                                                        
96 The interested reader is invited to consult Qaseem and colleagues (2010), who describe the process followed in 
developing EBG for the American Colleague of Physicians (ACP).  
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absence of such measure, it would be unclear whether the effect on patient outcomes 
observed in the EBGs group can be truly attributed to the implementation of EBGs, or to the 
interference (positive or negative) of physicians’ judgment who decided, for some reason, not 
to comply with EBGs.97  
So in this chapter I shall be examining the relative performance of EBGs (as proxy for the 
EBM approach) and “care as usual” (as proxy of the DA approach) with respect to patients’ 
outcomes in the context of therapy. And my focus will be on the performance of successfully 
implemented EBGs, so as to ensure, as much as possible, that we are comparing research-
based guidelines with clinical judgment. 
5.3. Methods 
5.3.1. Search strategy 
A systematic literature search was conducted in three electronic databases (Cochrane 
Database of Systematic Reviews, Medline and Embase) to identify systematic reviews that 
studied the impact of EBGs in medical practice. Given that the differences between EBGs and 
other types of guidelines is not completely clear (Grilli et al., 2000; Shekelle et al., 1999; 
Wolf et al., 2011, Brouwers et al., 2010), we judged it appropriate to initiate our analysis by 
adopting a comprehensive search strategy, in which we attempted to find every systematic 
review assessing the impact of clinical guidelines in medicine.98 
Databases were searched without language restriction, covering a period from 1950 to March 
2015, and using several combinations of keywords (Appendix 1). Systematic reviews of 
related topics (e.g. health policy, comparative-effectiveness research), references from 
systematic reviews already retrieved, and other relevant articles (including editorials, 
commentaries, narrative reviews, and technical reports on EBGs) were examined to identify 
additional systematic reviews missed during the primary search. 
Two reviewers independently screened the titles and abstracts, and identified potentially 
relevant systematic reviews. These articles were further selected according to the following 
                                                        
97 This points to another way in which the worth  of EBGs could be overvalued: insofar as we are demanding a 
measure of process to ensure that EBGs were actually followed,  this might selec cases where the reason for 
compliance with EBGs was precisely because physicians exercised their judgment and concluded that the best 
recommendation for the patient was the one advised by the EBG. Nonetheless, since the conditions under which 
physicians have to comply with EBGs in studies, as opposed to real clinical circumstances (Grimshaw, 2004), are 
relatively fixed, I do not think that the magnitude of this influence is need be a serious concern. 
98 Note, however, that this was only for the sake of completeness: our comparisons required primary studies 
measuring the impact of EBG recommendations based on assessment of research evidence and not relying 
exclusively on consensus of experts. On this matter we adopted a similar criteria to Wolf and colleagues (2011), 
Bahtsevani and colleagues (2004), Barbui and Cipriani (2011), and the collaboration AGREE (Brouwers et al., 
2010; Cluzeau et al., 2009). For more details on EBGs, return to section 4.3.1.3 in this chapter. 
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criteria. Since our main interest was to contrast the EBGs with “usual care” as applied by 
physicians we do not include systematic reviews assessing the impact of EBGs directed to 
change the practice of other health professionals (nurses, dentists, social workers, etc.), or 
attempting to promote structural changes in the organization of care that were not directly 
related to the exercise of physicians’ judgment in the context of therapeutic recommendations. 
In addition, systematic reviews investigating the impact of interventions not integrated into 
EBGs or quality assurance procedures not associated with EBGs were excluded due to the 
absence of a clear basis on which to establish an adequate comparison between the EBGs and 
“usual care”. Discrepancies between reviewers were resolved by discussion and consensus.  
5.3.2. Selection of primary studies 
For the reasons presented in (§ 5.3.1.1 and § 5.3.1.2) we only included primary studies in 
which both process and patient outcomes were considered. In order to minimize the loss of 
potentially relevant information, and in accordance with the criteria followed by the majority 
of previous reviewers in this area (Grimshaw, 1993; Worrall et al., 1997; Bahtsevani et al., 
2004; Weinman et al., 2007; Lugtenberg et al., 2009), we did not restrict the selection of 
primary studies to randomized trials 99. After the exclusion of duplicates each primary study 
was examined. During this process we excluded all studies (i) in which there were clear 
problems with the comparability of the groups (obvious differences between the groups with 
respect to known confounding causes) or (ii) where it was unclear whether physicians in the 
EBGs group were explicitly authorised to rely on their judgment before making a 
recommendation in accordance with EBGs. In addition, since our interest was to assess the 
effect of EBGs on patients’ outcomes, we excluded studies in which we were not able to 
determine that the recommendations were explicitly generated with attention to valid research 
results (§ 5.3.3 and footnote 6). The full list of primary studies excluded from the qualitative 
synthesis and the reasons for their exclusion can be found in (Appendix 1).  
5.3.3. Data extraction and management of missing data 
The following data were collected from each primary study: (1) clinical area (medical 
condition for which the guideline was designed) (2) study design (RCT, Before and after 
study, and interrupted time series analysis) (3) participants and setting of the study, (4) type 
of intervention applied to the intervention and control group, (5) process measures, (6) patient 
outcomes, (7) effects on process measures, and (8) effects on patient outcomes. Whenever a 
parameter was not given in a primary study, it was coded as “not provided”.  
                                                        
99  Notice that most types of study designs in this subject, including randomized trials, are subject to the 
Hawthorne effect (the positive effect on the performance of physicians just because they know that their clinical 
recommendations are being examined) See Grimshaw and Russell (1993).  
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5.3.4. Quality assessment of primary studies 
Two reviewers independently assessed the methodological quality of the primary studies 
included using the quality criteria developed by the Cochrane Effective Practice and 
Organisation of Care Group (EPOC) (EPOC, 2002). The EPOC quality criteria checklist 
includes criteria for randomised trials, controlled before and after studies and interrupted time 
series. Given important methodological differences across studies we were not able to weight 
their quality using a single measure (EPOC, 2002). 
5.3.5. Data synthesis 
The impact of EBGs and “care as usual” on patient outcomes was assessed for each primary 
study by comparing the difference in the outcomes observed in (i) the group where physicians 
followed EBGs and (ii) the group where physicians followed “care as usual”. The set of 
primary studies included were summarised in the qualitative synthesis (§ 4.4.2). 
Due to the high levels of heterogeneity of the primary studies, we did not pool the results in a  
meta-analysis (Deeks et al., 2008). Following the approach adopted by Lugtenberg and 
colleagues (2009) the effect of EBGs and “care as usual” on patients’ outcomes for each 
primary study was summarized in four categories: Category (i) “Effective”: significant effect 
on all outcomes measured; Category (ii) “Mostly effective”: significant effect on the majority 
of outcomes measured; Category (iii) “Mostly ineffective”: study failed to demonstrate a 
significant effect on the majority of outcomes measured; Category (iv) “Ineffective”: no 
significant effect on any of the outcomes measured. 
5.4. Findings 
The process of identification and selection of systematic reviews (SRs) and primary studies 
are shown in Figure 1. Eight SRs were identified. 100 These SRs reported the results of 219 
primary studies. After excluding duplicates, 149 were reviewed in full. The majority of the 
primary studies reported in previous SRs (n= 107, 71.8%), could not be included in this 
analysis because researchers did not measure patient outcomes or because physicians’ 
compliance in recommendations in the EBGs group could not be established. The remaining 
32 primary studies (28.2 %) measured process and patient outcomes and were included in the 
qualitative synthesis. Previous SRs assessing patient outcomes are shown in Table 1. 
Excluded studies and the reasons for exclusion are listed in (Appendix 2). 
                                                        
100 Lugtenberg et al., 2009; Worrall et al., 1997; Leeds group, 1994; Bahtsevani et al., 2004; Bazian group, 2005; 
Grimshaw et al., 1993; Barbui et al., 2014; and Weinman et al., 2007. 
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Table 1: Systematic reviews included in this analysis: 
Author (year) PS 
reported  
PS reported 
assessing PO (*)  
PS assessing PO not reported in 
previous SRs (**) 
PS included 
Grimshaw (1993) 59  9 (15.2%) 9 (15.2%) 1  
Leeds (1994) 91  14 (15.4%) 4 (14.3%) 0  
Worrall (1997) 13  13 (100%) 3 (100%) 0  
Bahtsevani (2004) 8 5 (62.5%) 5 (62.5%) 2  
Bazian (2005) 5 3 (60%) 3 (60%) 1  
Weinman (2007) 18 13 (72.2%) 13 (72.2%) 0  
Lugtenberg (2009) 20 8 (40%) 8 (40%) 6  
Barbui (2014) 5 2 (40%) 2 (40%) 0  
Total 219 † 67† 42 (28.2%) 10  
SR= Systematic Reviews, PS= Primary Studies, PO= Patient Outcomes. † Total includes  
* % Relative to the total number of PS included in each SR** % relative to new PO included in each SR 
 
5.4.1. Characteristics of primary studies 
The characteristics of the ten primary studies included are described in Table 2 (see below) 
5.4.2.  Qualitative synthesis 
Of the ten primary studies included, four failed to show significant effects on any patient 
outcomes measured (category iv)101, four did not show significant effects on the majority of 
outcomes measured (category iii) 102  and only two 103  showed significant effects on the 
majority of outcomes (category ii). None of the studies included showed significant effects on 
all outcomes measured (category i). Nine of the ten studies included showed significant 
effects on process of care.104 
                                                        
101 Van Kasteren et al., 2005, Smeele et al.,1999;  Renders et al.,2001,2002; and Cummings et al., 1989. 
102 Lobo et al., 2002-2004; Frijling et al., 2002-2003, Jans et al., 2000-2001, Bekkering et al., 2005ab; and Ofman 
et al., 2003. 
103 Perlstein et al.,1999,2000; and Dufault and Willey- Lessne,1999. 
104   Lobo et al., 2002-2004; Frijling et al., 2002-2003,; Bekkering et al., 2005ab; Ofman et al., 2003; and 
Cummings et al., 1989; Renders et al., 2001,2002; Jans et al., 2000,2001;Perlstein et al.,1999,2000; and Dufault 
and Willey-Lessne.,1999; and Van Kasteren et al.,2005. 
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Figure 1: Flow diagram of study selection process Adapted from PRISMA (Transparent 

























































Records identified through other sources  (n = 4) 
Excluded records:  (n = 773) 
Reasons:  
- Other types of articles. 
- Clearly irrelevant topic. 
- Duplicates. 
Excluded after 1st assessment (n=107) 
 
Reasons: 
No process measure (n=10) 
No patient outcomes (n=97) 
 
 
Primary studies included in  
Qualitative synthesis (n =  10 ) 
Records identified through database searching (n = 777) 
Systematic Reviews excluded after 
full-text assessment:  (n = 25) 
 
Reason: Systematic Review 
focused on a different issue. 
Systematic reviews assessed for eligibility  
(n =  33) 
Primary studies included in 
 Quantitative synthesis: (n = 0) 
Reason: Heterogeneity 
Primary studies excluded after 
screening: (n = 70) 
 
Reason: Duplicates 
Primary studies assessed in full-
text for eligibility after duplicates 
removed  (n =149) 
Records screened  
(n =  781 ) 
Systematic reviews included (n = 8) 
Primary studies screened (n = 219) 
Excluded after 2nd assessment  (n= 32) 
-Intervention not clearly based on 
research (n= 12) 
-No relevant/appropriate comparison 
groups (n=20) 
Primary studies with patient 
outcome measures (n =42) 
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Physicians following EBGs failed to show significant improvements in patient outcomes 
inmost medical conditions studied, including: Surgical site infections 105, Asthma and Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 106, Diabetes type II 107, Cardiovascular disease 108, Low back 
pain 109, Peptic ulcer 110, and Smoking111. In this analysis, physicians who practiced according 
to “usual care” were outperformed by physicians following EBGs with respect to the inpatient 
management of various types of pain 112 and Bronchiolitis. 113 
The overall designs of the studies differ. Five Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) 114 and 
five (non-randomized) before and after studies115, including one interrupted time series design 
116 were included in the qualitative synthesis.  
With respect to study designs, four of the five RCTs included indicated improvement in 
process of care but failed to demonstrate significant improvement in patient outcomes. 117 By 
contrast, the two studies suggesting that guidelines were more effective than usual care were 
before and after studies.118 
5.4.3. Quality analysis 
Several methodological aspects of the studies included deserve comment. For a start, in the 
study conducted by Cummings and colleagues (1989), physicians in the EBGs’ group 
followed recommendations that were based on research evidence published before the formal 
advent of EBM. This is not necessarily a reason to invalidate a comparison between EBGs 
and “care as usual”, but it must be explicitly acknowledged that what is being examined is the 
effect on patients’ outcomes after the application of recommendations that are currently out-
dated.  
Furthermore, in the study conducted by Bekkering and colleagues (2005ab) physicians in the 
                                                        
105 Van Kasteren et al.2005 
106 Smeele et al.1999 
107 Renders et al.2001-2002 
108 Lobo et al. 2002-2004 and Frijling et al. 2002-2003 
109 Bekkering et al.2005ab 
110 Ofman et al. 2003 
111 Cummings et al. 1989 
112 Dufault and Willey- Lessne.1999 
113 Perlstein et al.1999-2000 
114 Lobo et al. 2002-2004; Frijling et al. 2002-2003, Smeele et al.1999; Bekkering et al.2005ab; Ofman  et al. 
2003; and Cummings et al. 1989. 
115  Renders et al.2001-2002; Jans et al. 2000-2001;Perlstein et al.1999-2000; and Dufault and Willey- 
Lessne.1999 
116 Van Kasteren et al.2005 
117 Lobo et al. 2002-2004; Frijling et al. 2002-2003; Bekkering et al.2005a and b; Ofman et al. 2003; and 
Cummings et al. 1989 
118 Perlstein et al.1999-2000; and Dufault and Willey- Lessne.1999. 
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“care as usual” group were explicitly aware of the recommendations included in EBGs. 
Although this differs from the standard definition of “usual care”, this study was included as 
closer proxy to the use of clinical judgment in the context of the DA (§ 5.3.1).  
In addition, since the study conducted by Smeele and colleagues (1999) physicians’ 
compliance with EBGs was not complete, the lack of effect in patients’ outcomes should be 
interpreted with caution, as part of it could be attributed to non-adherence. Moreover, the 
results reported by Dufault and Willey- Lessne (1999) with respect to patients’ outcomes 
should also be taken with a grain of salt due to short follow-up periods, large number of 
dropouts, unclear time frames and a degree of uncertainty as to physicians’ compliance in the 
EBGs group.  
As a further matter, although Perlstein and colleagues  (1999-2000) reported an improvement 
in patients’ outcomes in the EBGs group, what these authors considered patients’ outcomes 
were indirect measures (e.g. decreased admission rates, length of stay, less resource 
utilization, etc.), it is unclear whether these outcomes deserved to be classified as such 
because they could also be a by-product of measures of process which are disconnected with 
the patients’ health status (e.g. a decrease in length of stay could be equally explained by a 
quicker improvement in the patient’s condition or by changes in the process of care such as 
the introduction of stricter discharge criteria). 
Another aspect that deserves attention is that even though the five before and after studies 
included119 follow-up periods which were reasonably long, and, more generally, were well-
conducted according to the EPOC quality checklist (EPOC 2002), one has to bear in mind 
that comparisons of populations that are not concurrent in time are particularly susceptible to 
unknown confounding factors. 
Finally, it must be noticed that for the sake of simplicity, we only reported the overall effect 
size of recommendations on patients’ outcomes; however, different recommendations in the 
EBGs group had different effect sizes (see table 2).  
5.5. Discussion  
This reanalysis of systematic reviews shows that implementing recommendations supported 
by valid research evidence via EBGs does not generally improve clinical care measured in 
terms of patient outcomes. Instead, our analysis indicates that physicians delivering “care as 
usual” typically achieve better patient outcomes than physicians that comply strictly with 
EBGs. 
                                                        
119  Renders et al.2001-2002; Jans et al. 2000-2001;Perlstein et al.1999-2000; and Dufault and Willey- 
Lessne.1999, Van Kasteren et al.2005. 
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To our knowledge, this is the most recent and comprehensive reanalysis of systematic reviews 
comparing the impact of EBGs with “care as usual” and the first one suggesting that the 
“successful” implementation of EBGs (that is, where evidence-based recommendations where 
actually adopted by physicians rather than merely providing EBGs to physicians –or making 
available to them without checking compliance) does not necessarily result in improvements 
in clinical care over “care as usual”.  
It is important to stress that this seemingly paradoxical result from the perspective of 
supporters of EBM, where recommendations backed up by valid evidence did not result in 
improved patient outcomes, could only be detected because this reanalysis, unlike previous 
systematic reviews, paid attention to both process and patient outcomes, which permitted us 
to examine how EBGs work in an ideal scenario – where recommendations were actually 
followed by physicians in the intervention group. 
Notice that our results suggest that sometimes EBGs improve care by a moderate amount 
compared to usual care. In this respect, it is interesting to speculate as to what would happen 
with EBGs outside research settings, that is, if EBGs were poorly implemented. On the one 
hand, one might think that this will improve care even less because deficient implementation 
would result in physician neglecting potentially relevant recommendations that might help 
some patients. This line of thinking leads us to believe that since suboptimal implementation 
is closer to reality and the ideal implementation suggest ineffectiveness, EBGs in the real 
world are surely not as beneficial to patient outcomes as it is widely supposed. But on the 
other hand, one might think that suboptimal implementation might bring about unintended 
positive consequences for patients, for that would imply less pressure for physicians to 
comply with EBGs and therefore more room to apply personal guidelines based on their 
judgment informed by everything they know about the patient. However, it must be 
remembered that, according to the DA, the case for increasing the room for clinical discretion 
is not substantiated by the idea that judgment alone (that is, judgment uninformed by relevant 
research) necessarily leads to better recommendations, but rather by the idea that clinical 
discretion is necessary in the presence of the problem of extra information (PEI).  
It is also important to compare the findings of this reanalysis with those of previous 
systematic reviews. In this regard, our results are at odds with those of two landmark reviews 
on the effectiveness of EBGs in the United Kingdom (Grimshaw, 1993a; Leeds, 1994), which 
supported the launch of a structured program to develop EBGs, and a research agenda to 
investigate how to increase physicians’ adherence to EBGs. Both Grimshaw and colleagues 
(1993a) and the review conducted by the University of Leeds (1994) concluded that 
“guidelines do improve clinical practice, when introduced in the context of rigorous 
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evaluations.”(Grimshaw et al., 1993a. p.1317), and that “properly developed guidelines can 
change clinical practice and may change inpatient outcome” (Leeds, 1994. p.3). However, 
close examination of their findings revealed that most comparisons were focused on process 
measures and comparisons focused on patients outcomes where few and inconclusive. 
Worrall and colleagues (1997), who focused on EBGs applied in primary care, Bahtsevani 
and colleagues (2004), and more recently Barbui and colleagues (2014) presented more 
qualified conclusions. These authors suggested that “there is very little evidence that the use 
of [EBGs] improve patients outcomes…” (Worrall et al., 1997. p.1705), that “There is a 
tendency toward support for the idea that outcomes improve for patients…if evidence-based 
clinical practice guidelines are used, although these findings could be specific to the settings 
and context of the studies reported in this systematic review.” (Bahtsevani et al., 2004. p.427), 
and that “…uncertainty remains in terms of clinically meaningful and sustainable effects of 
treatment guidelines on patient outcomes…” (Barbui et al., 2014. p.1). 
On the other hand, the Bazian group (2005) acknowledged that the findings were scarce and 
methodologically problematic, but opted to favour optimistic conclusions “increasing the 
production and availability of EBGs can improve quality of care” (p.270).120 
Weinman and colleagues (2007) –who focused on psychiatric EBGs– opted to remain largely 
agnostic as to the efficacy of EBGs on patients’ outcomes: “There is insufficient high-quality 
evidence to draw firm conclusions on the effects of implementation of specific psychiatric 
guidelines” (p.420). However, they explicitly recognised that the “effects on provider 
performance or patient outcome were moderate and temporary in most cases” (p.420). 
Finally, in consistency with our findings, Lugtenberg and colleagues (2009) confirmed that 
the Duch experience with EBGs was that “EBGs can be effective in improving the process 
and structure of care. [But] the effects of guidelines on patient health outcomes were studied 
far less and data are less convincing.” (p.385). 
So, in summary, while most previous reviewers recognised the lack of evidence confirming 
the superiority of physicians following EBGs rather than “usual care”, they were not able to 
rule out the possibility that this was due to poor implementations of EBGs—because they 
failed to focus on patients’ outcome in cases where EBGs were successfully implemented. 
This review has limitations that deserve discussion. As previously mentioned, the small 
number of studies conducted to compare EBGs with usual care with respect to patients’ 
outcomes, and the poor quality of the primary studies already conducted, introduces 
                                                        
120 It must be noticed that the Bazian group is not constituted by academic researchers but it is an organization that 
conducts reviews commissioned by third parties (e.g. pharmaceutical companies). 
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uncertainty as to the robustness of the findings. Furthermore, another limitation of this 
analysis is that our original set was constituted by the reviews originally included by previous 
reviewers, so it might be possible that our conclusions have inherited problems in the 
methods used to select studies used by previous reviewers. Although it is reasonable to think 
that eight systematic reviews conducted by different groups provides a sufficiently 
appropriate universe of primary studies, one might worry about specific reviews on the 
impact of EBGs on particular diseases, which might have been missed by general systematic 
reviews. However, an informal search for EBGs published on specific diseases conducted in 
PUBMED did not reveal new primary studies. 
Another worry about the implication of this systematic review is that the standards for 
developing guidelines have been actively evolving during the last 20 years. This might 
provide supporters of EBM with some grounds to claim that guidelines that are truly 
“evidence-based” will usually lead to better patient outcomes. However, this an untested 
hypothesis, and moreover one that is not supported by the current evidence. Given this, it is 
striking that guideline makers continue to focus their attention on improving adherence to 
EBGs, rather than on measuring whether EBGs truly improve patient outcomes.  
Overall, then, there seems no good empirical basis for the view that strict compliance with 
EBGs is general better than “usual care” in the clinical context. Our analysis suggests that the 
application of such recommendations, in many cases, does not improve patient outcomes. 
Moreover, since it seems reasonable to take that the performance of “care as usual” as a lower 
limit to worth of the DA, this reanalysis of published systematic reviews provides some 




Table 2: Primary studies measuring the performance of guideline recommendations against usual care. 
 
Study Clinical area Study design Participants / Setting Guideline group (GG) Control group 
(CG) 
Effect on process of care Effect on patient outcomes 
 
Van Kasteren 








13 hospitals; 1763 procedures 
before/ 2050 after. 
Implementation of 
guideline that included 
performance feedback.  
Before guideline Effective: Improvement in all 
four measures of process. 
 
Ineffective: No changes on 
overall Surgical Site Infections 
rates 
Smeele et al.  
(1999). 
 
Asthma & COPD RCT (Cluster). 
 
34 GPs were randomized:  
GG (n=17) & CG (n=17).  




guideline: group education 
and peer review 
programme. 
 
No intervention Mostly ineffective: 
Improvement in two measures 
of structure of care. No change 
on any of the six measures of 
process of care. **Notice lack 
of adherence to process. 
Ineffective: No improvement in 
any of the 3 patient outcomes 
(symptoms, smoking habit, 
disease specific quality of life) 
measured. 
 
Renders et al.  
(2001&2002) 
 
Diabetes type II Before and after 
study 
(controlled). 
27 GPs: GG (n= 22) & CG (n= 
5).  
389 patients: GG (n= 312) & 
CG: (n= 77). 
Implementation of 
guideline: distribution, 
education, audit and 
feedback. 
Before guideline Effective: Improvement in all 
9 indicators of process. 
Ineffective: No improvement in 
any of the 14 patient outcomes 
measured (BP, HbA1c, etc.).  
 
Lobo et al.  
(2002 & 2004)  
&  
Frijling et al.  





RCT (Cluster)  
 
124 Practices were randomized.   
185 GPs. 2268 patients: 
Diabetes (n= 537), 
Cardiovascular Disease (n= 
617), and Hypertension (n= 
1114). 
Implementation of 
guideline: support from 
facilitators, discussion of 
feedback reports, and 





Improvement in process of 
cardiovascular care (5 of 12 
indicators) and process of 
diabetes care (2 of 7 
indicators).  
Mostly ineffective: No 
improvement in any aspect in 
patients with hypertension. 
Improvement in only 2 of 8 
aspects of HRQL in diabetes 
patients and in only 3 of 8 
aspects in patients with 
cardiovascular disease. 
Jans et al.  
(2000 & 2001) 
Asthma & COPD Before and after 
study 
(Controlled) 
19 practices: GG (n=14) & CG 
(n= 5). 370 patients: GG (n= 
280) & CG (n=90). 
Implementation of 
guideline: identification of 
barriers, documentation of 
the care provided, specific 
education, feedback and 
peer review. 
Before guideline Mostly effective: 
Improvement in 4 of 8 aspects 
(including monitoring of 
medication compliance and 









Improvement in only 1 of 4 





(2005a & b) 
 
Low back pain RCT (Cluster) Practices were randomised. 
Block-randomisation: 
Physiotherapists (n= 113); 
practices (n= 68). 
Implementation of 
guideline: Dissemination 
and active training strategy 
(education, discussion, role 





Improvement in all 4 measures 
of process (including: setting 
functional treatment goals and 
giving patient information). 
Mostly ineffective: No 
significant difference in 
outcomes (physical functioning 
and pain) despite the difference 
in process measures between 
groups. 
Perlstein et al.  
(1999 & 2000) 
 
 
Bronchiolitis Before and after 
study 
(Controlled) 
Records (n=1.979) from 




for the inpatient care of 
infants with bronchiolitis. 
No intervention Mostly effective: 
Improvement in 5 measures of 
process (including, guideline 
use, use of antibiotics, use of 
blood gas and use of B2 
agonists) 
Mostly effective: Decrease in 
admission rates, readmission 






Pain management Before and after 
study 
Clinicians (n=102) 
Surgical and oncology patients 
with a history of pain in the 
month before hospitalization (n 
= 239) *** CG not well 
described. 
Use of clinical pathways in 
management of cancer 
pain, acute and traumatic 
pain, and low back pain. 
Before guideline Mostly effective: Clinicians 
adherence to clinical pathways 
was checked by clinical audit. 
Mostly effective: Improvement 
in 4 patient outcomes measured 
at three days but no difference 
when patients were discharged 
home. 





RCT (Cluster) 8 primary care clinics, 406 
patients.  
GG (n= 200) CG (n=206) 
 
Guideline implementation 
for the management of 
dyspepsia and eradication 
of Helicobacter pylori 
(Education and provision 
of serological testing) 
No intervention Effective: Improvement in all 
3 process measures (H pylory 
testing, use of recommended 
regimen, Proton-pump 
inhibitor discontinued after 8-
12 weeks)  
Mostly ineffective: No 
improvement health-related 
quality of life and satisfaction 
with care at 6 months. No 








RCT 4 Medical centres.  
81 Physicians: GG (n=40) CG 
(n=41) 
3 hours of training. Self-
help booklets to distribute 
free to smokers, reminders.  
 
No intervention Effective: Improvement in 5 
process measures (including 
more counselling and more 
appointments) 
Ineffective: No significant 
improvement in rate of 
abstinence after 9 months  
 
Effects of Guideline Recommendations on patient outcomes (10 Studies from 17 Articles.). Categories: Effective (significant effect on all outcomes), Mostly effective (significant effect on the majority of 
outcomes), Mostly ineffective (no significant effect in the majority of outcomes), Ineffective (no significant effect on any outcome).  
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5.6. Conclusions  
Overall, the results of this reanalysis of systematic reviews comparing EBGs and “care as 
usual” with respect to patient outcomes provides no evidence that physicians’ adherence to 
EBGs leads to superior clinical care. In the majority of the studies, compliance with EBGs 
was reflected in improvements in measures of process, but this did not translate into better 
outcomes for patients. Insofar the comparison between the EBGs and “usual care” constitutes 
a proxy for the relative performance of the EBM approach the DA, this reanalysis challenges 
the view that the EBM approach is superior to the DA. Furthermore, our findings address 
some concerns about the possible negative consequences of allowing physicians to exercise 
their clinical discretion, and thereby vindicate, albeit partially, the viability of the DA in the 
context of therapy. Nonetheless, due to the limitations presents in primary studies, further 
studies specifically designed to test the performance of EBGs against the DA are needed. 
Finally, since the EBGs model is only one way to exercise EBM, a full vindication of the DA 
in the context of therapy would require additional studies examining the relative performance 
of other versions of EBM (such as the 4S model) against the DA. 
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5.7. Appendices  
5.7.1. Search strategy 




1. exp Practice Guidelines as Topic/ 
2. guideline.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier] 
17. 1 or 2 
3. exp Treatment Outcome/ 
14. exp "Outcome and Process Assessment (Health Care)"/ 
4. outcome.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier] 
7. patient.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier] 
18. 4 and 7 
10. effectiveness.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword 
heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier] 
11. clinical.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier] 
19. 10 and 11 
21. 3 or 14 or 18 or 19 
9. exp Comparative Effectiveness Research/ 
50. 9 or 21 
15. exp "Process Assessment (Health Care)"/ 
16. process.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier] 
20. 4 and 16 
22. 15 or 20 
51. 17 and 22 and 50 
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Chapter 6: Clinical versus statistical prediction in diagnosis and prognosis 
6.1. Abstract  
The central aim of this chapter is to address the concern that the application of the 
discretionary approach (DA) in the context of diagnosis and prognosis might worsen clinical 
care. I shall do this by conducting a systematic review of studies comparing the relative 
predictive performance of “statistical models” against physicians’ judgment. 
Three medical databases were searched up to September 5, 2015. All types of studies 
comparing the performance of predictions made by validated models against predictions 
made by physicians under real clinical circumstances were considered. Eligible studies 
included a measure of discriminative accuracy. Two independent authors selected eligible 
studies, extracted data, and assessed study risk of bias.  
Sixty-eight studies comprising 121 pairwise comparisons were eligible. The accuracy of 
statistical models and physicians varied importantly across predictive tasks. Differences in 
discriminative accuracy, measured either by areas under receiver-operating characteristic 
curves (AUCs) or by overall accuracies (OAs), could be ascertained in 69 comparisons, of 
which 18 (26·1%) favoured models, 32 (46·4%) favoured physicians, and 19 (27·5%) 
indicated no significant differences. These proportions allow rejection of the hypothesis that 
most comparative studies show statistical models to be significantly better than physicians’ 
judgement (p = 0.000118).  
Available evidence indicates that, by and large, physician’ judgment achieves greater 
predictive discrimination than statistical models. This systematic review thus provides 
support for the thesis that increasing clinical discretion in response to PEI would not worsen 













6.2. Background   
Sound clinical care rests upon accurate predictions. Yet in many areas of medicine correct 
diagnosis or prognosis is exceedingly difficult (Shojania et al., 2003; Christakis and Iwashyna, 
1998; Hunter, 1996). Nowadays, in part as a result of the influence of the EBM approach to 
clinical care (Guyatt et al., 2008; Howick, 2011), risk scores, prediction rules and other tools 
based on statistical modelling have a prominent place in the armamentarium with which 
physicians attempt to deal with clinical uncertainty (Richardson et al., 2015).  
Decisions based on statistical tools have several potential advantages. For a start, they offer 
increased objectivity, standardization of practices, and cost containment (Steyerberg, 2009; 
Singh et al., 2008). But more fundamentally, as discussed in chapter 4 (§ 4.4) the rationale 
behind EBM’s support for statistical methods of prediction is supposed to be that they 
typically deliver more accurate predictions than physicians’ informal judgment (Howick, 
2011). A long research tradition in psychology, dating back to Paul Meehl (Meehl, 1954) and 
continuing with more recent reviews (Dawes et al., 1989; Marchese, 1992; Grove et al., 2000; 
Ægisdǿttir et al., 2006), seems to support the claim that various types of statistical models 
generally do better than physicians in a wide range of predictive tasks. However, as 
previously argued (§ 4.4.3), the validity and relevance of this research to clinical medicine 
remains unclear. Methodological problems, which include comparisons in derivation samples, 
use of non-medical judges, reliance on hypothetical cases rather than real patients, and the 
study of outcomes not pertaining to clinical medicine, make it difficult to know whether 
statistical models genuinely outperform clinical judgement in actual clinical settings or vice 
versa.  
I also noted in chapter 4 (§ 4.4.2) the use of models is often defended by reference to the 
extensive literature on the general fallibility of human judgment (Gilovich et al., 2003; 
Dawson and Arkes 1987; Elstein, 1999), together with studies revealing that physicians 
exhibit poor forecasting performance with respect to several predictive tasks (Brokaw et al., 
2004; Smith et al., 2002; Gerestein et al., 2009; Leung et al., 2012). However, the 
implications of such biases in clinical care remain unclear.  
Moreover, it is noteworthy that many supporters of EBM have overlooked that there are 
familiar dangers in reliance on models (Howick, 2011).121  First, a significant number of 
                                                        
121 Note that not all supporters of EBM have the same opinion as to the merits of statistical models. For example, 
Knottnerus et al., 2002, in his book “The Evidence Based of clinical Diagnosis”, offer what in my opinion is a 
reasonably balanced view about the merits and limitations of both physicians’ judgments and statistical prediction 
methods. 
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statistical tools do not meet current methodological standards (Collins et al., 2014; Maguire et 
al. 2011, Keogh et al., 2014; Mallett et al., 2010); second, several replication studies suggest 
that the stability of the accuracy of prediction rules across time and geographical areas often 
lacks robustness (Yap et al., 2006; Bleeker et al., 2003; Crowe et al., 2003; Kong et al., 2014; 
Rabin et al., 2014); and third, there is always the risk that models will ignore predictively 
relevant factors that are identifiable in specific clinical scenarios (Laupacis et al., 1997; 
Sniderman et al., 2015; Van Calster et al., 2015).  
In this systematic review we aim to examine studies comparing the relative predictive 
performance of clinical judgement and statistical models in real clinical settings, so to address 
the objection that the application of the DA in the context of diagnosis and prognosis might 
worsen clinical care.  Since the previous chapter provide relevant empirical evidence on the 
performance of therapeutic judgment, the present chapter will focus specifically on predictive 
accuracy in diagnostic and prognostic tasks. In order to refine our understanding of the 
potential of the DA, we also examined whether the comparative accuracy of models and 
medical judgement is affected by physicians’ level of training and by whether the models are 
local rather than imported.  
6.3. Methods 
6.3.1. Search strategy 
We systematically searched MEDLINE, EMBASE and PsycINFO for articles in any language 
from the earliest date of each database to April 20, 2015 using the Ovid Platform. The search 
was updated in September 5, 2015. Different search strategies were piloted attending to 
general guidelines (Sampson et al., 2009; Hausner et al., 2015), and specific 
recommendations for diagnostic (Beynon et al., 2013) and prognostic studies (Dretzke et al., 
2014). The final search was designed using relevant keywords and MeSH terms (§ 6.7.1). 
Complete reference lists of relevant articles were checked for additional studies. 
6.3.2. Eligibility criteria  
All type of studies comparing the performance of predictions made by validated models 
against predictions made by medical physicians under real clinical circumstances were 
eligible.  
To avoid biased comparisons the accuracies of both physicians and models had to be obtained 
in independent samples from those used during the derivation of the prediction method under 
comparison (Steyerberg, 2013). Clinical Prediction Rules, Risk scores, Diagnostic Decision 
Support Systems and similar tools used for diagnostic or prognostic prediction were 
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admissible. Model-based computer aids to assist the interpretation of psychological and 
medical tests (e.g. Rorschach test, neuropsychological batteries, electrocardiography, images, 
etc.) were outside the scope of this study.  
Physicians in any stage of training (but not medical students) had to be responsible for 
making the predictions. Physicians had to have direct access to patients and other sources of 
information normally available in clinical settings depending on the predictive task. Access to 
structured data-collection forms was admissible only if this was not the only source of 
information and the estimates provided by statistical models were not made available to 
physicians by researchers. Studies where the information available was artificially restricted 
to pre-selected sets of relevant data (e.g. case summaries) were not included.  
The predictive tasks were required to forecast clinical outcomes. Dichotomous, ordinal or 
nominal clinical outcomes were predicted probabilistically (via point probability estimates, 
probability intervals, or ordinal risk categories) or binarily (present/absent). In tasks where 
predictions were closely connected to decisions (e.g. prediction of appendicitis and decision 
to take the patient to the operating room), physicians’ judgments had to be requested 
explicitly and in a manner directly related to the outcome predicted so to avoid conflation 
between predictive accuracy and utility assessments affecting clinical decisions. 
Studies were required to report accuracy in terms of discrimination measures for one or more 
thresholds. The report of calibration measures was not necessary for inclusion. Research 
comparing the adequacy of predictions, subsequent clinical decisions, or both solely in terms 
of economic costs and other utilities were not included. 
6.3.3. Data extraction and quality assessment 
Two of the team members were responsible for the selection of potentially relevant studies. 
Two independent authors assessed the selected full text articles for inclusion, and extracted 
data on setting, predictive task (medical condition, timing of the prediction and type of 
outcome), reference standard, mode of elicitation of physicians’ predictions (probabilistic or 
binary), number of physicians and specialty, type of statistical model, population, and place in 
which models were derived and validated, using a predesigned standardized form.  We 
categorized physicians’ experience as (i) physicians in training only, (ii) mixed experience (in 
training and fully trained physicians), and (iii) fully trained physicians only. Disagreements 
during data extraction were resolved through referral to a third investigator, and team 
discussion. The quality of included studies was assessed independently by two authors using 
criteria selected from pertinent guidelines: QUADAS-2 (Whittng et al., 2011), STARD 
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(Bossuyt et al., 2003)122, TRIPOD (Moons et al., 2015), and GRADE statements (Guyatt et al., 
2011). The form used to assess the quality of studies included design and type of enrolment, 
adequacy of the reference standard, risk of verification and incorporation bias, missing data, 
and quality of statistical analysis and reporting.  
6.3.4. Statistical analysis 
The main unit of analysis were independent pairwise comparisons. To be considered 
independent, comparisons had to involve a new population, predictive task, sample of 
physicians, or statistical model.  
Due to the high levels of heterogeneity and the variety of measures reported we did not pool 
the total set of comparisons. Instead we focused on the direction of findings and tested the 
hypotheses that statistical models discriminate better than physicians and vice-versa by 
adopting a method based on the “sign test” (Borenstein et al., 2009). 
The accuracies of probabilistic predictions were preferably summarized in terms of single 
measures averaged across multiple thresholds (areas under received operative characteristic 
curves (AUCs) and Ordinal c-indices). When these measures were not reported and could not 
be calculated (e.g. when the predictive task consisted of placing the patient into several 
nominal categories), the proportion of correct predictions over total predictions (overall 
accuracy (OA)) was used as the primary measure. When possible, sensitivities, specificities 
and odds ratios were also reported. We used the cut-off provided by the authors, and when 
unavailable or multiple cut-offs were possible we used the highest Youden’s index to select 
one. Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test and standard calibration plots were accepted as 
measures of calibration. 
Standard significance tests for non-independent samples (p-value level ≤ 0.05) or the absence 
of overlap between respective 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were used as criteria to 
establish superior discrimination. When unavailable, binomial-proportion CIs were calculated. 
Comparisons without adequate tests and with overlap between CIs were classified as 
“inconclusive”. The proportion of comparisons favouring one approach was then compared 
with the proportion of comparisons indicating no difference or favouring the other approach 
using binomial exact tests at probability 0.5 (Greenland et al., 2008). In addition, for the 
purposes of maximizing data analysed an inductive threshold (≤ 25% overlap between 95% 
CIs) was applied to reclassify inconclusive comparisons into those suggesting a difference 
                                                        
122 The full list of articles that detail the standards for the reporting of diagnostic accuracy studies (STARD) are 
available in the following address: www.stard-statement.org (accessed 8 January 2015) 
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between models and physicians and those suggesting no difference.  
In the subgroup analyses, the influence of different levels of training and of local versus 
external derivation were investigated using the Cochran–Armitage test for trend and Fisher’s 
exact test, respectively. Due to the wide range of outcomes and populations included, funnel 
plots were not used to assess publication bias. This study is registered with PROSPERO, 
number CRD42015020607. 
Supplementary analyses in which we pooled comparisons involving similar predictive tasks 
and excluded overrepresented outcomes are shown in (§ 6.7.2). Analyses were conducted in 
Stata version 12 software. Depending on the measures and the number of comparisons we 
used the commands metandi, metaprop or metan. 
6.4. Findings 
6.4.1. Study characteristics  
We examined 5069 titles and abstracts and selected 225 articles for full-text assessment (Fig. 
1). Sixty-eight studies comprising 121 comparisons involving 74 samples of physicians and 
79 models met our inclusion criteria. Sixty-two comparisons (51.2%) were focused on 
diagnostic outcomes, which ranged from ankle fracture to various gastrointestinal conditions 
such as acute appendicitis. Among the 59 prognostic comparisons included, prediction of 
mortality was the most common task. Additional prognostic outcomes included complications 
(e.g. bleeding after myocardial infarction) and condition-specific adverse outcomes such as 
self-harm. Comparisons were carried out in different settings of care (Table 1). Patient sample 
sizes varied considerably (median 405, interquartile range (IQR): 231-956). Both adults and 
children were included in patient samples. The timeframe between prognostic predictions and 
outcomes ranged from few days to 5 years.  
Most studies used one sample of physicians. Only 3 studies reported estimates for more than 
one sample of physicians. Physician sample sizes were reported in only 43 comparisons 
(35.5%). When reported the median was 15 physicians (IQR: 9-31). Information about the 
training level could be obtained for 102 comparisons, of which 18 included only physicians in 
training, 45 fully trained physicians exclusively, and 39 physicians in both categories. Eighty-
seven comparisons (71.9%) were between physicians and models that had initially been 
derived from patients from different centres (imported models). 
Areas under receiver operating characteristic curves (AUCs) were obtained for 59 
comparisons from 26 studies. In 28 comparisons (10 studies) AUCs were the only measure 
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available. Overall accuracies (OAs) were available for 86 comparisons from 56 studies. In 14 
comparisons OAs were the only measures available because predictive tasks consisted of 
deterministic predictions over sets of nominal categories (e.g. differential diagnoses). 
Table 1 presents the main features of the set of comparisons included. The characteristics of 
each comparison included can be found in (§ 6.7.3). 
 
Table 1: Sample description 
Sample description  Comparisons   
n (%) 
Comparison settings † Inpatient hospital settings 59 (48.8) 
 Emergency departments 56 (46.3) 
 Outpatient clinics 30 (24.8) 
Type of outcomes Diagnostic 62 (51.2) 
 Prognostic 59 (48.8) 
Physician prediction mode  Probabilistic 1 73 (60.3) 
 Deterministic 2 46 (38.0) 
 Both 2 (1.7) 
Physicians’ experience † Fully-trained physicians only  45 (37.2) 
 Physicians in training only  18 (14.9) 
 Mixed level  39 (32.2) 
 Not available 19 (15.7) 
Physicians’ specialty Surgical specialties 20 (16.5) 
 Medical specialties 68 (56.2) 
 Surgical and medical specialties 2 (1.7) 
 Not reported 31 (25.6) 
Statistical models Local 3 34 (28.1) 
 Imported 87 (71.9) 
Accuracy measures † AUC/ORC 4 59 (48.7) 5 
 Overall accuracy 6 86 (71.1) 7 
 Sensitivity and specificity 76 (62.8) 
 Odds ratio 76 (62.8) 
 Calibration measures 8 17 (14.0) 
Total  121 (100.0) 
† Non-exclusive alternatives. 1 Predictions about the probability of outcomes via numerical estimates or 
classification into non-quantitative risk categories (e.g. “likely” or “unlikely”). 2 Predictions about the current or 
future occurrence of the outcomes in binary terms (e.g. “present” versus “absent”). 3 Statistical models derived 
for patients from the same centre where comparisons were conducted. 4AUC: Area Under Received Operational 
Characteristics curve. ORC: Ordinal C-Index. 5 In 28 comparisons AUCs were the only measure available. 6 
Overall Accuracy (True positive predictions + True Negative predictions / Total predictions). 7 In 14 
comparisons OAs were the only measure available because predictive tasks consisted of deterministic 
predictions over sets of nominal categories (e.g. differential diagnoses). 8 Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
test and standard calibration plots. 
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Adapted from PRISMA (Transparent report of systematic reviews and meta-analyses). 1 Studies where the 
information available was artificially restricted to pre-selected sets of relevant data (e.g. case summaries) were not 
included.2Access to structured data-collection forms was admissible only if this was not the only source of 




6506 records identified through databases 
(Medline, EMBASE, and PsycINFO)   
6567 records identified 
5069 abstracts screened after 
duplicates removed 
 
61 records identified through manual search (references 
from previous reviews and landmark articles) 
 
157 excluded after eligibility assessment 
  Reasons: 
- 70 because predictions were not based on actual patients1. 
- 56 because the accuracy of physicians’ judgment or statistical models by 
review definition was not measured or reported 2.  
- 14 because predictions were made by students or non-medical 
professionals. 
- 12 because comparisons were made in derivation samples only.  
- 3 because comparisons were reported in studies already included. 








-Other methodological problems (n=) 
4844 excluded after abstract screening 
 
Reasons: 
- Irrelevance (other type of articles, different research questions). 
- Studies that evidently failed to meet inclusion criteria. 
1498 duplicates 
225 full-text articles 
assessed for eligibility  
68 primary studies included  
 
 171 
6.4.2. Quality analysis 
The quality of studies is summarized in table 2. Predictions were prospective in all except 17 
comparisons (14.0%), in which statistical models were applied retrospectively. Enrolment 
was consecutive in 89 comparisons (73.5%). Reference standards were considered adequate 
for most comparisons (102, 84.3%). In 51 comparisons (42.1%) outcomes were confirmed 
using the same test or, in case of objective outcomes such as death, with complete follow-up. 
A composite of tests was used in 59 comparisons (48.7%), and in 11 comparisons (9.1%) 
confirmation was unclear or not attained. Most comparisons (102, 84.3%) were considered 
free of incorporation bias. In 62 comparisons (51.2%), a blind application of the reference 
standard could not be ascertained. Forty-three comparisons (35.5%) came from studies where 
missing data was less than 5%. Sample-size calculations were present in only 13 comparisons 
(10.7%). 
6.4.3. Predictive accuracy  
The predictive accuracy of physicians and models across different measures of discrimination 
is shown in table 3.  Due to the absence of adequate tests, a substantial number of 
comparisons was considered inconclusive (AUCs/OCDs: 41.1%, OAs: 46.5%, odds ratios: 
89.5%). Among the remaining 69 comparisons, 18 (26.1%) favoured models, 32 favoured 
physicians (46.4%) and 19 (27.5%) indicated no significant differences in terms of 
AUCs/OCDs or OAs. These proportions allow rejection of the hypothesis that most 
comparisons show statistical models to be significantly better than physicians’ judgement 
(binomial exact test, p=0.000118). In contrast, these findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that physicians discriminate better than models in most comparisons (binomial 
exact test, p=0.631). The sensitivity of statistical models was more often superior to that of 
physicians (12 comparisons favouring models versus 8 comparisons favouring physicians) but 
the specificity of physicians was more frequently superior to that of models (29 comparisons 
favouring physicians versus 14 comparisons favouring models).  
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The application of the inductive threshold over the total set of comparisons (n=121) yielded 
56 comparisons (46.3%) suggesting no difference, 43 (35.5%) indicating that physicians 
discriminated better than models, and 22 (18.2%) favouring models’ discrimination in terms 
of AUCs or OAs (Table 3), again suggesting the superiority of physicians over statistical 
models. When the sample was reduced to 95 non-redundant predictive tasks via random-
effects models applied to homogeneous tasks, analyses in terms of AUCs or OAs using both 
standard and inductive thresholds yielded similar results (Appendix 2). Likewise, when 
overrepresented outcomes were excluded from the analysis the data yielded analogous 
findings (Appendix 2). 
6.4.4. Subgroup analyses 
Pre-specified subgroup analyses applying the inductive threshold to AUC/OCDs or OAs 
indicated that imported statistical models outperformed physicians even more rarely (in only 
12 (13.8%) of the 87 comparisons) but this inferiority was reversed in the smaller subgroup of 
local models (n=34 comparisons), in which 10 (29.4%) comparisons favoured models versus 
6 (17.6%) comparisons favouring physicians. This reduction in the proportion of comparisons 
favouring physicians in the subset of local models was statistically significant (Fisher’s exact 
test, p=0.011) (Table 4). The Cochran–Armitage test for trend suggested that the proportion 
of comparisons in which models were significantly better than physicians decreased with 
increasing level of training (p=0.024) (Table 5). 
6.4.5. Calibration analysis 
Of 38 studies investigating probabilistic predictions, only 12 compared physicians’ 
calibration with that of models. In 9 of the 17 comparisons reported (52.9%) models were 
better calibrated than physicians, who tended in most cases to overestimate outcomes. Models’ 
superior calibration, however, was accompanied by better discrimination in only 3 of 9 
comparisons. 
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Table 2: Study quality           
Author (year) N Comparisons 
included 
















Missing data  
<5% †† 
De Groot et al (2014) 
4 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Yes 
Easter et al (2014) 
3 Prospective U Yes Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No No 
Jain et al (2014) 3 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 No Yes8 Yes 
Mán et al (2014) 1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No No Unclear Yes Yes11 Unclear 
Thompson et al (2014) 5 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Chew et al (2013) 7 Prospective Not C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 Yes No Yes8 Yes 
Farion et al (2013) 
2 Prospective Not C Not stated Adequate No Yes 
No or 
unclear 
Yes Yes9 No 
Laurent et al (2013) 6 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes No Yes 
Meltzer et al (2013) 1 Prospective Not C Not stated Unclear No Yes4 Unclear Yes No No 
Peñaloza et al (2013) 
2 Mixed1 C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes Yes11 No 
Wang et al (2013) 1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No Yes4 Yes Yes No Unclear 
Litton et al (2012) 2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes No No 
Peñaloza et al (2012) 
1 Mixed1 Not C Not stated Unclear No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No No 
Bruins Slot et al (2011) 
1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes6 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Yes 
Dionne et al (2011) 
2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes6 
No or 
unclear 
Yes Yes8 No 
Tenorio et al (2011) 
1 Mixed1 Unclear Not stated Adequate No Unclear 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Yes 
Geersing et al (2010) 1 Mixed1 C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 Yes Yes No Yes 
Lintula et al (2010) 
2 Prospective C Yes Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes Yes10 Yes 
Chan et al (2009) 
1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Yes 
Kabrhel et al (2009) 1 Prospective Mixed2 Not stated Unclear No Yes4 Yes Yes No Yes 
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Lintula et al (2009) 
2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes Yes10 Yes 
Kline et al (2008) 
1 Prospective Mixed2 Yes Unclear No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No No 
Cooper et al (2007) 
1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Unclear No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Yes 
Van Gerven et al (2007) 
3 Prospective Unclear Not stated Unclear Unclear Unclear 
No or 
unclear 
Yes Yes11 Unclear 
Carrier et al (2006) 2 Mixed1 C Not stated Unclear Yes Yes4 Yes Yes No Unclear 
Hadjianastassiou et al (2006) 2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes Yes11 Yes 
Mitchell et al (2006) 
2 Prospective C Yes Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No No 
Kabrhel et al (2005) 1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No Yes4 Yes Yes No Yes 
Quinn et al (2005) 
1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Yes 
Stein et al (2005) 1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes6 Yes Yes Yes9 No 
Blattler et al (2004) 
1 Mixed1 C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Yes 
Pruekprasert et al (2004) 
1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No No 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Unclear 
Scholz et al (2004) 2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes No Yes 
Al Omar and Baldwin (2002) 1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No Yes6 Yes Yes No Unclear 
Cornuz et al (2002) 1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 Yes Yes No No 
Glas et al (2002) 2 Prospective C Yes Adequate No Yes6 Yes Yes Yes8 Yes 
Attia et al (2001)  1 Prospective Unclear Yes Adequate No Yes6 Unclear Yes No No 
Bigaroni et al (2000) 2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Unclear Unclear Yes No Unclear 
Bojan et al (2000) 2 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No Yes6 Unclear Yes No Unclear 
Marcin et al (2000) 3 Prospective C Yes Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 No Yes8 Yes 
Sanson et al (2000) 
2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No No 
El Solh et al (1999) 
1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes6 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Unclear 
Pons et al (1999) 1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 No Yes11 No 
Beyth et al (1998) 1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 Yes Yes No No 
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Hallan et al (1997) 
1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No No 
Richman et al (1997) 2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 Yes Yes No No 
Brillman et al (1996) 1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes6 Yes Yes No Yes 
Stevens et al (1994) 1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 No Yes8 No 
Detrano et al (1992) 2 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No Yes6 Unclear No Yes8 Unclear 
Meyer et al (1992) 1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes No Yes 
Baxt (1991) 1 Prospective C Yes Adequate No Yes4 Yes Yes Yes9 No 
Emerman et al (1991) 4 Mixed1 C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes Yes9 Yes 
Leivovici et al (1991) 1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes6 Unclear Yes No Yes 
Bankowitz et al (1989) 
1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Unclear Yes Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No No 
Brannen et al (1989) 1 Prospective C Yes Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes Yes8 Yes 
Chang et al (1989) 1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes No No 
Katzman-McClish et al (1989) 1 Prospective Mixed2 Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes Yes8 Yes 
Sutton (1989) 
3 Mixed 1 Mixed3 Not stated Unclear Yes Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes Yes9 No 
Kruse et al (1988) 3 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes5 Yes7 Yes Yes8 Unclear 
Kirkeby and Riso (1987) 
1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Unclear Unclear Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Unclear 
Poretzky et al (1985) 
1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Adequate No Unclear 
No or 
unclear 
Yes Yes11 No 
Ikonen et al (1983) 
1 Prospective Not C Not stated Unclear Unclear Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Unclear 
Evenson et al (1975) 
2 Mixed 1 C Not stated Adequate Unclear Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No No 
Horrocks and De Dombal (1975) 
1 Prospective C Not stated Adequate Unclear Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Unclear 
De Dombal et al (1975) 
2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate Unclear Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Unclear 
Oddie et al (1974) 
2 Prospective C Not stated Unclear Unclear No 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Unclear 
De Dombal et al (1972, 1974) 
2 Prospective C Not stated Adequate No Yes4 
No or 
unclear 




1 Prospective Unclear Not stated Unclear Unclear Yes4 
No or 
unclear 
Yes No Unclear 
C:  Consecutive. † Ascertainment of the outcome blind to both clinical and statistical predictions. ‡ Confidence intervals or standard errors available or possible to calculate for at least 1 measure per 
comparison.  †† Cut off suggested by Schaffer (1999). 1. Prospective clinical prediction and retrospective statistical prediction for at least one model. 2. Consecutive and random. 3. Consecutive and 
convenience. 4. Complete follow-up, but confirmation based on different tests/observations. 5. Complete follow-up for an objective outcome (e.g. death). 6. Complete confirmation with the same test. 7. 
Objective outcome. 8. Hanley and McNeil (1983) or De Long et al (1988). 9. McNemar’s test of proportions. 10. Chi-squared test (Randomized study, two independent samples) 11. Test not fully specified 
or inadequate. 
 
Table 3: Discriminative predictive performance across all measures  
 
 AUC/ORC  
















n = 76 
n (%) 
 
AUC/ORC or if absent 
Overall Accuracy n = 121 
n (%) 
 
Standard threshold †       
Physicians better than models 12 (19.7) 29 (33.7) 6 (7.9) 8 (10.5) 29 (38.2) 32 (26.4) 
Models better than physicians 8 (13.1) 14 (16.3) 2 (2.6) 12 (15.8) 14 (18.4) 18 (14.9) 
No significant difference 16 (26.2) 3 (3.5) 0 (0) 3 (3.9) 1 (1.3) 19 (15.7) 
Inconclusive  25 (41.1) 40 (46.5) 68 (89.5) 53 (69.7) 32 (42.1) 52 (43.9) 
           
Inductive threshold ‡           
Physicians better than models 15 (24.6) 35 (40.7) 20 (26.3) 11 (14.5) 33 (43.4) 43 (35.5) 
Models better than physicians 10 (16.4) 16 (18.6) 17 (22.4) 17 (22.4) 18 (23.7) 22 (18.2) 
No difference 30 (49.2) 35 (40.7) 32 (42.1) 48 (63.2) 25 (32.9) 56 (46.3) 
Inconclusive  6 (9.8) 0 (0) 7 (9.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
       
† Statistically significant differences and their absence indicated by proper statistical test at p value  < 0.05. If adequate test not available differences inferred from lack of overlap in 95% confidence 
intervals. Comparisons without adequate test and with overlap in 95% confidence intervals were considered inconclusive. AUC: Area under Receive Operative Characteristics curve. ORC: Ordinal C – 
Index. ‡ Statistical differences and their absence indicated by proper statistical test at p value  < 0.05. If adequate test not available differences inferred from lack of overlap in 95% confidence intervals. 


























AUC/ORC or if absent 
Overall Accuracy n (%) 
 
Imported models (n = 87)      
Physicians better than models 13 (28.3) 30 (50.0) 19 (32.8) 9 (15.5) 27 (46.6) 37 (42.5) 
Models better than physicians 6 (13.0) 8 (13.3) 8 (13.8) 12 (20.7) 12 (20.7) 12 (13.8) 
No difference 23 (50.0) 22 (36.7) 25 (43.1) 37 (63.8) 19 (32.8) 38 (43.7) 















Local models (n = 34)       
Physicians better than models 2 (13.3) 5 (19.2) 1 (5.6) 2 (11.1) 6 (33.3) 6 (17.6) 
Models better than physicians 4 (26.7) 8 (30.8) 9 (50.0) 5 (27.8) 6 (33.3) 10 (29.4) 
No difference 7 (46.7) 13 (50.0) 7 (38.9) 11 (61.1) 6 (33.3) 18 (52.9) 















AUC: Area under Receive Operative Characteristics curve. ORC: Ordinal C – Index. ‡ Statistical differences and their absence indicated by proper statistical test at p value  < 0.05. If adequate test not 
available differences inferred from lack of overlap in 95% confidence intervals. Comparisons without test were considered as suggesting difference when there was less than 25% overlap in 95% confidence 




Table 5: Discriminative predictive performance by level of training ‡ 
 




















AUC/ORC or if absent 
Overall Accuracy n (%) ‡ 
 
 
Physicians in training only (n = 18)      
Physicians better than models 2 (18.2) 5 (38.5) 4 (44.4) 2 (22.2) 3 (33.3) 5 (27.8) 
Models better than physicians 2 (18.2) 3 (23.1) 0 (0.0) 1 (11.1) 2 (22.2) 5 (27.8) 
No difference 7 (63.6) 5 (38.5) 5 (55.6) 6 (66.7) 4 (44.4) 8 (44.4) 
Inconclusive  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Total 11 (100) 13 (100) 9 (100) 9 (100) 9 (100) 18 (100) 
Mixed training level  (n = 28)     
Physicians better than models 7 (35.0) 10 (40.0) 5 (17.9) 3 (10.7) 9 (32.1) 15 (38.5) 
Models better than physicians 4 (20.0) 4 (16.0) 6 (21.4) 4 (14.3) 6 (14.3) 7 (17.9) 
No difference 9 (45.0) 11 (44.0) 12 (42.9) 21 (75) 13 (46.4) 17 (43.6) 
Inconclusive  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (17.9) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Total 20 (100) 25 (100) 28 (100) 28 (100) 28 (100) 28 (100) 
Fully trained physicians only (n = 34)      
Physicians better than models 6 (25.0) 16 (47.1) 10 (37.0) 5 (18.5) 15 (55.6) 19 (42.2) 
Models better than physicians 0 (0.0) 5 (14.7) 7 (25.9) 7 (25.9) 6 (22.2) 3 (6.7) 
No difference 12 (50.0) 13 (38.2) 10 (37.0) 15 (55.6) 6 (22.2) 23 (51.1) 















AUC: Area under Receive Operative Characteristics curve. ORC: Ordinal C – Index. ‡ Statistical differences and their absence indicated by proper statistical test at p value  < 0.05. If adequate test not 
available, differences inferred from lack of overlap in 95% confidence intervals. Comparisons without test were considered as suggesting difference when there was less than 25% overlap in 95% confidence 






The main goal of this systematic review was to provide relevant empirical evidence to address 
the objection that the application of the DA in the context of diagnosis and prognosis might 
decrease the quality of the care of individual patients. In particular, my aim was to provide a 
methodologically robust empirical answer to the question of the alleged predictive superiority 
of statistical models over clinical judgment (e.g. Grove et al., 2000; Howick, 2011).  
Our systematic review did not corroborate previous findings suggesting that the predictive 
performance of statistical models is generally superior to physicians’ judgment. Rather, it 
suggests that, by and large, physicians’ predictions are more accurate than predictions made 
by statistical models. Analyses with both the standard and the inductive thresholds indicated 
that physicians were nearly twice as likely as models to show superior AUCs or OAs. 
Furthermore, this study revealed that the training level of physicians, and whether the model 
was used in its local or an external setting influenced the relative accuracy of predictions 
made by physicians and statistical models.  
This systematic review was designed to provide a comprehensive update on the topic of 
prediction in diagnosis and prognosis. Our inclusion criteria were designed to address the 
limitations of previous reviews, and to maximize the generalizability and relevance of the 
findings to the medical field. Towards these ends, we made several pragmatic decisions that 
deserve discussion. 
First, our choice of comparisons as the main unit of analysis was motivated by the presence of 
many sources of heterogeneity, including: patient and physician characteristics, predictive 
task circumstances, types of outcomes, reference standards, accuracy measures, and statistical 
analyses.123 Second, in order to facilitate the interpretation of comparisons without statistical 
tests for paired samples we complemented standard inference with a relatively conservative 
inductive threshold (§ 6.3.4). 124  An alternative would have been to ignore inconclusive 
comparisons, or to have relied on tests for unpaired samples (Grove et al., 2000). We decided 
against these options to avoid eliminating valuable information while being explicit as to the 
adequacy of statistical inferences across primary comparisons.  
                                                        
123 Because of the possibility that overrepresented outcomes (e.g. mortality) and models (e.g. Wells’ score) might 
have biased the overall result, we carried out supplementary analyses. Both the analysis by non-repetitive 
predictive tasks (§ 6.7.2, Table 7) and the exclusion of overrepresented outcome groups (§ 6.7.2, Tables 8 and 9) 
indicated findings similar to the main analysis.  
124 Although the use “inductive thresholds” is not common in medical research (Siontis et al., 2012), in this case it 
was well justified because it made it possible to obtain trends for the whole dataset that were both plausible and 
consistent with findings in the subset of comparisons where standard statistical inferences were possible. 
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Third, variation in the design and reporting of primary studies meant that we could not apply 
one discrimination measure across the whole set of comparisons. We acknowledge that AUCs 
and OAs as primary measures have important limitations 125 (Alberg et al., 2004; Cook, 2008; 
Van Calster et al., 2012; Mallett et al., 2012), however, they were chosen so to maximize the 
use of the information available. The relative superiority of physicians over models was less 
clear in terms of odds ratios; this suggests that the advantage of clinical judgment derived in 
part from outcome prevalences. However, the absence of strong reasons to suspect 
unrepresentativeness (studies were done in routine practice and enrolment was typically 
consecutive) argues that OAs will be a good indication of overall discriminatory performance 
in real clinical settings.126  
The quality of included studies also deserves comment. Although several studies had 
important methodological drawbacks such as incomplete reporting and small sample sizes, 
quality analyses did not suggest the presence of significant biases in any direction. This 
implies that our findings are not likely to be biased but inherent limitations related to 
statistical estimation inherited from primary studies introduce some uncertainty into our 
conclusions.127  
Our findings are at odds with previous reviews (e.g. Grove et al., 2000; Ægisdǿttir et al., 
2006; Marchese, 1992), which have favoured statistical models over physicians’ judgment 
and have been used by advocates of EBM (a) to defend the development and application of 
statistical models as one of the cornerstones of the EBM approach in the context of diagnosis 
and prognosis (e.g. Perel et al., 2013; Gottlieb, 2009; Adams and levenson, 2012; Chew, 
2014), (b) to cast doubt on the clinical relevance of physician’s judgment and derivatively of 
an approach such as the DA (Howick, 2011, Eddy, 1990a), and (c) to substantiate the 
rationale of EBM hierarchies that place statistical models over physicians’ judgment (McGinn 
et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2009). 
                                                        
125 In particular, the practical import of AUCs can be difficult to interpret and AUCs may even be misleading if 
they depend substantially on clinically irrelevant cut-offs. OAs are also liable to arbitrariness, can easily conceal 
variations in the frequency of different types of classificatory errors, and depend heavily on sample prevalences.  
126 Notice that, in the subset of comparisons with paired measures of discrimination, models typically had better 
sensitivity and physicians better specificity. This may suggest that models are better at “ruling out” outcomes than 
physicians, and that physicians are better at “ruling in” outcomes than models. However, it should be noted that 
the relevant frequencies often depended on arbitrary cut-offs; thus, these trends can be easily inverted. In addition, 
in several studies in which physicians made probabilistic judgements cut-offs were imposed subsequently by 
researchers, so true positive and true negative rates may not accurately reflect physicians’ sensitivities and 
specificities in these studies. 
127 Publication bias could not be assessed statistically due to the heterogeneity of studies, but it is reasonable to 
think that if present it may favour models, given that studies are often done to demonstrate the usefulness of a 
particular model for clinical practice. 
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We are inclined to attribute this to the comprehensive analytic approach we have adopted, 
which was able to successfully address the limitations of previous reviews. These limitations 
include (1) measurements of statistical prediction on derivation samples, which overestimate 
the performance of statistical models, (2) reliance on simplified case summaries, which 
artificially eliminate the PEI and decreases the external validity of the findings (3) inclusion 
of medical students and non-medical professionals, which, among others, raises doubts about 
the kind of judgment on which predictions are based, and (4) the study of outcomes not 
pertaining to clinical medicine, which decreases the relevance of the findings to the point in 
question, namely: whether the performance of models or judgment is better in clinical 
contexts. Thus, it is important to stress that this systematic review offers the most updated and 
unbiased data available on the relative predictive performance of statistical models and 
physicians’ judgment. 
Notice also that the trends found in our subgroup analyses suggest directions for further 
research, which would clarify the scope of the application of clinical judgment and 
derivatively the DA. The apparent superiority of local over imported models can be 
interpreted in different ways. One possibility is that this superiority might have been due to 
“over-optimism” in research into local models (Moons et al., 2004; Siontis et al., 2012). 
However, this suggestion is in tension with the fact that all comparisons were made with new 
patients. A more obvious explanation is that physicians’ relative advantage over imported 
models derives from their experience with local patterns of disease. This hypothesis is 
supported by recent evidence suggesting that prognostic discrimination worsens when new 
models are transported to different geographical areas (Siontis et al., 2015). Adequate studies 
are needed to confirm and further investigate this hypothesis, and in particular to investigate 
to what extent physicians’ sensitivity to local patterns of disease are constrained by clinical 
complexity and the difficulty of gaining predictive feedback (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). 
Further research is also needed into the influence of physicians’ levels of training on 
predictive ability, which is crucial to determine how exactly physicians are able to use their 
judgment effectively to address the PEI, and clarify the practical import of the characteristic 
of the DA that I denoted “evidential flexibility”. As I pointed out in the first chapter, the DA 
allows the physician to use different evidential sources to address the PEI and estimate the 
right probabilities for each individual (§ 1.5.4). With regard to “clinical experience”, one of 
the potential sources to inform physicians’ judgment in the context of the DA, a recent meta-
analysis including studies in psychology suggests that it has a small but positive impact on 
accuracy (Spengler and Pilipis, 2015). However, the scarce data focused on physicians 
indicates that the relation between “clinical experience” and “predictive accuracy” is not 
consistent (Marcin et al., 1999; Conway et al., 2014; de Melo et al., 2013; Kong et al., 1989) 
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and may vary across different tasks. This does not necessarily undermines “evidential 
flexibility” as a virtue in the context of the DA but it certainly calls for further study of the 
ways in which different kinds of clinical experience affect how physicians exercise their 
judgment to deal with the PEI. 
Nevertheless, despite the abovementioned qualifications, a number of practical lessons are 
implied by this systematic review. First, a preference for standardized prediction tools over 
physicians’ informal predictions based on belief that the former has superior predictive 
accuracy is not warranted by our findings. Such belief, which as I said, has been endorsed by 
supporters of EBM is likely to be based on misconceptions about clinical judgment and 
statistical models demands revision or at least qualification.  
Second, the fact that physicians in local settings generally outperform statistical models 
suggests that in the context of diagnosis and prognosis the PEI acquires practical importance 
for the EBM approach. Of course, one could interpret the problems of statistical models as a 
matter of lack of external validity and calibration (Sampson et al., 2009), but this 
interpretation fails to consider the superior performance of physicians’ in local settings could 
also be explained by their ability to estimate the right probabilities when they are familiar 
with the extra information that needs to be accounted for by exercising clinical judgment.  
Third, this systematic review also has implications for our discussion on the relationship 
between EBGs and standards of care and quality measures (§ 2.4.2). For, according to our 
findings, judgements about particular cases that diverge from diagnostic or prognostic EBGs 
based on statistical models should not automatically be viewed as sub-optimal. This not only 
calls for new diagnostic and prognostic EBGs128, which should now pay more attention to 
evidence about the comparative accuracy of physicians’ judgments, but it also calls for a 
richer and more nuanced interpretation of the notion of “best” (in this case diagnostic and 
prognostic) practices, one that do not uses incentives to reward compliance with methods that 
are less accurate or that forces physicians to rely on methods of inferior accuracy in order to 
protect themselves from malpractice lawsuits.129 
Fourth, although I take these findings to call into question an automatic reliance on predictive 
models and highlight the discriminative accuracy of clinical judgment, I do not take them to 
show that statistical models ought to be ignored. In fact, insofar as statistical models provide 
                                                        
128 Current diagnostic and prognostic EBGs are typically designed to advise the reliance on statistical models, 
which is encouraged by placing these methods higher than clinical judgment in standard rankings of evidence (e.g. 
McGinn et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2009). 
129 Notice that I do not take the results of this systematic review to show that statistical models are not useful. Even 
if they are generally less accurate than physicians, I recognise that there may be many reasons to rely on them, 
including efficiency.  
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the physician with information about the patient, the exercise of clinical judgment in 
accordance with the DA (that is, in the light of everything the physicians knows about the 
patient) demands attention to relevant information from models. As I illustrated in the first 
chapter with a clinical case (§ 1.5.1), the role of clinical judgment in diagnosis is to address 
the PEI, which does not necessarily imply ignoring information provided by statistical models.  
Finally, with respect to a potential synergy between statistical models and clinical judgment, 
notice that the potential benefits of an approach such as the DA would also be vindicated in 
cases where physicians’ judgment complements models’ predictions. Nonetheless, since the 
prevailing idea endorsed by supporters of EBM was that physicians ought not to rely on their 
judgment because their judgment is biased and offers a worse predictive performance than 
models, I decided to focus on whether models generally discriminate better than physicians in 
real settings and leave investigation of synergies between physicians’ judgment and statistical 
models as a further research project. 
6.6. Conclusions  
This chapter sheds light on the empirical worth of the DA in the context of diagnosis and 
prognosis. The systematic review addressed the question of whether statistical models 
outperform physicians with respect to predictive accuracy in real settings. Our data suggests 
that supporters of EBM are wrong to assume that the predictive accuracy of statistical models 
is typically superior to that of physicians. This suggests that the PEI constitutes a real problem 
for EBM in this context. The findings of this chapter thus offer an empirical vindication of the 
DA in the context of diagnosis and prognosis, and so complement the previous chapter’s 







6.7. Appendices  
6.7.1. Search Strategy 
1. Statistical prediction.mp. 2. mechanical prediction.mp. 3. actuarial prediction.mp.  4. algorithmic prediction.mp. 
5. Computer-aided.mp. 6. exp Decision Support Techniques/7. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 8. diagnosis.mp.  9. 
diagnoses.mp.  10. diagnostic.mp.  11. prognosis.mp.  12. prognostic.mp.  13. risk prediction.mp. 14. exp risk 
assessment/ 15. 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 16. physician.mp.   17. physicians.mp.  18. doctor.mp.   19. 
doctors.mp.   20. practitioner.mp.   21. practitioners.mp.  22. medic.mp.   23. medics.mp.   24. psychiatrist.mp.   25. 
psychiatrists.mp.   26. neurologist.mp.   27. neurologists.mp.  28. surgeon.mp.  29. surgeons.mp.  30. 
p?ediatrician.mp.  31. p?ediatricians.mp.  32. gynecologist.mp.  33. gynecologists.mp.  34. obstetrician.mp.  35. 
obstetricians.mp.  36. internist.mp.  37. internists.mp.  38. cardiologist.mp.  39. cardiologists.mp.  40. 
pathologist.mp.  41. pathologists.mp.  42. radiologist.mp.  43. radiologists.mp.  44. dermatologist.mp.  45. 
dermatologists.mp.  46. gastroenterologist.mp.  47. gastroenterologists.mp.  48. anesthesiologist.mp.  49. 
anesthesiologists.mp.  50. ophthalmologist.mp.  51. ophthalmologists.mp.  52. rheumatologist.mp.  53. 
rheumatologists.mp.  54. endocrinologist.mp.  55. endocrinologists.mp.  56. geriatrician.mp.  57. geriatricians.mp.  
58. Otolaryngologist.mp.  59. Otolaryngologists.mp.  60. neonatologist.mp.  61. neonatologists.mp.  62. 
urologist.mp.  63. urologists.mp.  64. immunologist.mp.  65. immunologists.mp.  66. nephrologist.mp.67. 
nephrologists.mp.68. intensivist.mp.69. intensivists.mp. 70. clinical prediction.mp.  71. medical prediction.mp.  72. 
clinical  judg?ment.mp. 73. exp Judgment/ 74. judgment.mp. 
75. 16 or 17 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 34 or 
35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 54 
or 55 or 56 or 57 or 58 or 59 or 60 or 61 or 62 or 63 or 64 or 65 or 66 or 67 or 68 or 69 or 70 or 71 or 72 or 73 or 
74.  
76. 7 and 15 and 75  
MEDLINE (05/09/15): 2860 
EMBASE (05/09/15): 3517 
Psyco (05/09/15): 129 
Total: 6506. 
Total after duplicates were removed: 5008.  
Total after additional records were added: 5069 
 
6.7.2. Supplementary analyses 
In order to establish whether overrepresented predictive tasks might have exerted a strong 
influence over the overall result, we pooled the outcomes obtained in sets of comparisons 
involving homogeneous predictive tasks; that is, comparisons involving the same type of 
population (e.g. adults), the same outcome (e.g. hospital mortality), the same setting (e.g. 
critical care units) and the same model (e.g. model based on APACHE II score). By pooling 
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the results of each uniform set, we summarized 37 “individual comparisons” into 11 “pooled 
comparisons” (Table 7). The total set of comparisons in this analysis was thus reduced from 
128 to 95. 
 
Table 7: 11 sets of homogeneous predictive tasks † 
Predictive tasks (studies)  Input 
comparisons  
 
 Pooled accuracy measures 
 
   AUC 
 
      Sen Spe OA OR 
 
AA in adults,  
Alvarado Score (40, 45, 68) 
3 Physicians  - 0.93 (0.73-0.98) 0.79 (0.57-0.92) 0.88 (0.68-0.96) 48.5 (65-359.5) 
Model - 0.75 (0.69-0.81) 0.72 (0.47-0.88) 0.73 (0.56-0.86) 7.1 (2.7-18.6) 
 
AA in adults,  
Lintula Score (54) 
2  Physicians  - 0.94 (0.65-0.99) 0.81 (0.72-0.88) 0.87 (0.78-0.93) 79.1 (6.9-909.7) 
Model - 0.86 (0.78-0.91) 0.85 (0.24-0.99) 0.84 (0.59-0.95) 44.5 (1.5-1349.2) 
 
AA in children,  
Lintula Score (57) 
2  Physicians  - 0.89 (0.72-0.96) 0.59 (0.44-0.72) 0.73 (0.58-0.84) 15.0 (1.8-124.0) 
Model - 0.91 (0.53-0.99) 0.79 (0.55-0.92) 0.84 (0.58-0.95) 47.6 (1.5-1469.5) 
 
PE in adults,  
Wells’ Score (46,56,61,64,77) 
5  Physicians  - 0.70 (0.45-0.87) 0.68 (0.52-0.80) 0.66 (0.59-0.72) 4.9 (3.0-8.2) 
Model - 0.73 (0.64-0.80) 0.58 (0.43-0.72) 0.62 (0.52-0.72) 3.7 (2.1-6.5) 
 
PE in adults,  
PERC Score (49,58) 
2  Physicians  - 0.83 (0.54-0.95) 0.63 (0.48-0.75) 0.68 (0.65-0.71) 8.0 (3.5-18.2) 
Model - 0.97 (0.92-0.99) 0.17 (0.07-0.37) 0.33 (0.27-0.40) 7.7 (5.3-11.3) 
 
DVT in adults,  
Wells’ Score (47,67,71,74) 
6 Physicians  - 0.82 (0.54-0.95) 0.80 (0.62-0.91) 0.76 (0.63-0.86) 18.6 (8.6-40.4) 
Model - 0.67 (0.54-0.78) 0.71 (0.57-0.81) 0.69 (0.61-0.76) 4.9 (3.6-6.6) 
 
Mortality in ICU,  
APACHE II (48,91-93,95) 
7 Physicians  - 0.65 (0.50 0.78) 0.87 (0.80 0.92) 0.79 (0.77-0.82) 12.5 (8.6 to 18.3) 
Model - 0.61 (0.50 0.70) 0.89 (0.77 0.96) 0.79 (0.76-0.81) 13.0 (6.7 to 25.0) 
 
Mortality in ICU,  
PRISM III-12 (76) 
3  Physicians  0.92 (nr) - - - - 
Model 0.92 (nr) - - - - 
 
Diagnosis in AAP,  
DIAG (94) 
2 Physicians  - - - 0.66 (0.64-0.67) - 
Model - - - 0.59 (0.56-0.61) - 
 
Diagnosis in AAP,  
Leeds’ system (96,98,103,104) 
4 Physicians  - - - 0.74 (0.69-0.78) - 
Model - - - 0.80 (0.44-0.95) - 
 
Diagnosis in LGIS,  
Leeds’ system (101) 
2  Physicians  - - - 0.74 (0.53-0.88) - 
Model - - - 0.81 (0.72-0.87) - 
 
AA: Acute Appendicitis. PE: Pulmonary Embolism.  DVT: Deep Venous Thrombosis. ICU: Intensive Care Unit. AAP: Patients 
with acute abdominal pain. LGIS: patients with lower gastro-intestinal symptoms.  AUCs: Areas Under Received Operator 
Characteristics Curve. Sen: Sensitivity. Spe: Specificity. OA: Overall Accuracy. OR: Odds Ratio. nr: Not Reported. (-) Not 
available.  † The pooled accuracies for the 11 predictive tasks sets were added to the remaining 84 single comparisons to form a 
total of 95 non-redundant comparisons. This latter dataset was analysed in terms of the number of comparisons favouring either 
physicians, models or suggesting no difference (table 8). 
 
The strategy used to pool the results of different sets of predictive tasks was determined by 
the number of comparisons in need of pooling within each set and the accuracy measures 
available (Takwoingi et al., 2015). We pool sensitivities, specificities and odds ratios for sets 
with four or more comparisons using a bivariate random effects model (metandi command in 
Stata). In sets where only three or fewer comparisons were available we pooled overall 
accuracies, sensitivities and specificities using a univariate random effects model (Metaprop 
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command in Stata). Finally, we calculated pooled odds ratios for sets with less than four 
comparisons using a random effects model (Metan command in Stata). 
In the set of 95 non-redundant comparisons, the standard threshold indicated that in terms of 
AUCs or, when absent, OAs, physicians were more often better discriminators than models 
(Table 8). The proportions obtained allow rejection of the hypothesis that most comparisons 
show statistical models to be significantly better than physicians’ judgement (binomial exact 
test, p=0.0042). In contrast, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that physicians 
discriminate better than models (binomial exact test, p=0.881). The inductive threshold failed 
to detect differences in most comparisons; but where differences were found, physicians tend 
to discriminate better than models (Table 8). These findings were consistent with the analysis 
using the whole set of comparisons. 
Table 8:  Analysis of 95 non-redundant predictive tasks 
 
AUC or if absent OA 
N (%)  
Standard threshold †   
Physicians better than models 21 (22.1)  
Models better than physicians 12 (12.6)  
No significant difference 11 (11.6)   
Inconclusive  51 (53.7)  
   
Inductive threshold ‡ 
Physicians better than models 26 (27.4)  
Models better than physicians 15 (15.8)  
No difference 50 (52.6)  
Inconclusive result 4 (4.2)  
Total  95 (100.0)  
   
† Statistically significant differences and their absence indicated by proper statistical test at p value  < 0.05. If 
adequate test not available differences inferred from lack of overlap in 95% confidence intervals. Comparisons 
without adequate test and with overlap in 95% confidence intervals were considered inconclusive. AUC: Area 
under ROC curve. OCD: Ordinal C – Index. ‡ Statistical differences and their absence indicated by proper 
statistical test at p value  < 0.05. If adequate test not available differences inferred from lack of overlap in 95% 
confidence intervals.  Comparisons without test were considered as suggesting difference when there was less 
than 25% overlap in 95% confidence intervals. Overlaps equal or greater than 25% were considered as 
suggesting no difference. 
 
In addition, in order to assess whether certain outcomes that were more represented in 
primary studies might have biased the overall result we grouped comparisons in 24 sets of 
similar outcomes (Table 9).  Unlike the analysis in terms of predictive tasks (table 7 and 8), in 
this case we were unable to obtain pooled estimates for every group of outcomes due to the 
presence of different accuracy measures (either AUCs or OA) across different studies. For 
this reason, we decided to test whether the exclusion of outcome groups with more than ten 
comparisons (Pulmonary Embolism and Deep venous thrombosis, mortality in intensive care 
units, surgical mortality, gastrointestinal diseases) would change the direction of findings. 
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Among the remaining 37 comparisons, 9 (%) favoured models, 17 favoured physicians (%) 
and 11 (%) indicated no significant differences in terms of AUCs/OCDs or OAs. These 
proportions obtained with the standard threshold, like those obtained in the main analysis 
(Table 4) and the analysis in terms of non-redundant predictive tasks (Table 8), allow 
rejection of the hypothesis that most comparisons show statistical models to be significantly 
better than physicians’ judgement (binomial exact test, p=0.003) but are consistent with the 
hypothesis that physicians discriminate better than models (binomial exact test, p=0.741). The 
application of the inductive threshold typically failed to identify differences in discrimination 
(32 of 66 comparisons). However, where discriminatory differences could be ascertained 
physicians performed better than models (24 of 66 versus 11 of 66 comparisons). 
Table 9: Number of comparisons and discriminative performance across 24 groups of similar outcomes  
 







threshold ‡  
    
GI bleeding intervention (37) 2 2 I 2 P 
GI bleeding mortality (37) 2 2 I 2 P 
Brain injury in children (38) 3 2 P, 1 I 2 P, 1 SM 
Surgical mortality (39,44,62,79) 12 8 I, 3 SM, 1 ND 7 ND, 5 SM 
Acute Appendicitis (40,45,54,57,68,81) 8 3 ND, 3 P, 1 SM, 
1 I 
4 ND, 3 P, 1 
SM 
Stroke outcomes (41)  5 4 I, 1 P 4 ND, 1 P 
ACS mortality (42)  5 3 SM, 1 P, 1 ND 3 SM, 1 P, 1 
ND 
Bleeding (42,80)  3 2 ND, 1 SM 2 ND, 1 SM 
Asthma exacerbation (43) 2 2 I 2 ND 
PE or DVT in adults (46,47,49,53,55,56,58,61,64,67,71,74,77)  17 7 P, 7 I, 3 SM 9 P, 5 ND, 3 
SM 
ICU mortality (48,69,76,84,86,91-93,95)  15 7 ND, 5 P, 3 I 7 P, 8 ND 
Coronary disease diagnosis (50,63,85,87,97)  7 3 I, 2 ND, 1 P, 1 
SM 
3 P, 3 ND, 1 
SM 
Back pain (51)  2 1 ND, 1 SM 1 ND, 1 SM 
Gastro-Intestinal diseases (52,94,96,98,100,101,103,104)  11 
5 I, 3 P, 3 SM 
4 ND, 4 P, 3 
SM 
Self harm (59)  1 1 P 1 P 
Carcinoid heart disease (60)  3 3 I 3 ND 
Syncope outcome (65)  1 1 I 1 ND 
Infectious diseases (66,73,75,78,89)  6 
3 I, 2 P, 1 SM 
3 ND, 2 P, 1 
SM 
Extremities fractures (70,72,82)  5 4 P, 1 ND 4 P, 1 ND 
Admission and hospitalization (83,99)  3 
1 I, 1 P, 1 SM 
1 ND, 1 P, 1 
SM 
Pneumonia (88)  4 4 I, 1 SM 2 ND, 2 SM 
Thyroid diagnosis (102) 2 2 I 2 ND 
Congenital cardiac diagnosis (105)  1 1 I 1 ND 




Abbreviations: GI: Gastrointestinal. ACS: Acute Coronary Syndrome. PE: Pulmonary Embolism. DVT: Deep 
Venous Thrombosis. I: Inconclusive comparison. P: Physicians better than models. SM: Statistical models better 
than physicians. ND: No difference. Notes: * Discriminative accuracy measured in terms of Area under Received 
operating characteristic curves, Ordinal C – Indices or when absent Overall Accuracies. † Statistically significant 
differences and their absence indicated by proper statistical test at p value  < 0.05. If adequate test not available 
differences inferred from lack of overlap in 95% confidence intervals. Comparisons without adequate test and with 
overlap in 95% confidence intervals were considered inconclusive. ‡ Statistical differences and their absence 
indicated by proper statistical test at p value  < 0.05. If adequate test not available differences inferred from lack of 
overlap in 95% confidence intervals.  Comparisons without test were considered as suggesting difference when 
there was less than 25% overlap in 95% confidence intervals. Overlaps equal or greater than 25% were considered 
as suggesting no difference. 
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6.7.3. Predictive discriminative performance by study 
 




















   
Cut-off 
 
Sensitivity         
(95% CI) 
 




Accuracy (95% CI) 
 
Odds Ratio  (95% 
CI) 
             
             
De Groot et al 
(2014) 
Before endoscopy, 
probability of GI bleeding 
requiring intervention. 
Any intervention to 






Clinical a Consultant gastroenterologists 68.8 (667/970) 0.77 (NR) ≥ 1% 0.83 (0.79-0.85) 0.60 (0.54-0.65) 0.75 (0.73-0.78) 7.0 (5.2-9.6) 
Statistical Blatchford Score 68.8 (667/970) 0.86 (NR) ≥ 1  0.99 (0.98-1.00) 0.14 (0.10-0.18) 0.73 (0.70-0.75) 25.9 (9.2-73.1) 
 Before endoscopy, 
probability of mortality. 
All cause mortality. 
(30 days). 
Follow-up. Clinical a Consultant gastroenterologists 4.5 (44/968) 0.68 (NR) ≥ 1% 0.77 (0.62-0.88) 0.53 (0.50-0.56) 0.54 (0.51-0.57) 3.8 (1.9-7.8) 
Statistical Blatchford score. 4.6 (43/943) 0.67 (NR) > 2  0.95 (0.83-0.99) 0.13 (0.11-0.16) 0.17 (0.15-0.20) 3.2 (0.8-13.3) 
 After endoscopy, 
probability of GI Bleeding 
requiring intervention. 
Any intervention to 






Clinical a Consultant gastroenterologists 14.9 (140/941) 0.68 (NR) ≥ 1% 0.71 (0.62-0.78) 0.60 (0.56-0.63) 0.61 (0.58-0.65) 3.6 (2.4-5.3) 
Statistical Rockall Score. 14.6 (140/956) 0.69 (NR) > 2  0.95 (0.90-0.98) 0.23 (0.20-0.26) 0.34 (0.31-0.37) 5.8 (2.7-12.5) 
 After endoscopy, 
probability of mortality.  
All cause mortality  
(30 days). 
Follow-up. Clinical a Consultant gastroenterologists 4.4 (41/937) 0.66 (NR) ≥ 1% 0.61 (0.45-0.75) 0.68 (0.65-0.71) 0.68 (0.65-0.71) 3.3 (1.8-6.4) 
Statistical Rockall Score 4.6 (44/952) 0.76 (NR) > 2  0.98 (0.86-1.00) 0.22 (0.19-0.24) 0.25 (0.22-0.28) 11.8 (1.6-86.5) 
Easter et al  
(2014) 
Brain injury in children 







CT or follow-up 
(Records or telephone 
interview). 
  
Clinical a Paediatric and EM staff 2.1 (21/1009) 0.94 (0.89-0.98) ≥ 1% 0.95 (0.76-1.00)  0.68 (0.65-0.71) 0.68 (0.66-0.71)  42.3 (5.7-316.9) 
Statistical  PECARN rule 2.1 (21/981) 0.81 (0.80-0.83)  + 1.00 (0.84-1.00) 0.62 (0.59-0.66) 0.63 (0.60-0.66)  71.3 (4.3-
1180.8) 
 CATCH rule 2.1 (21/1002) 0.67 (0.61-0.74)  + 0.91 (0.70-0.99) 0.44 (0.41-0.47) 0.45 (0.42-0.48) 7.4 (1.7-32.1) 
 CHALICE rule 2.2 (19/858) 0.84 (0.76-0.93)  + 0.84 (0.60-0.97) 0.85 (0.82-0.87) 0.85 (0.82-0.87)  29.6 (8.5-103.1) 
Jain et al  
(2014) 
Probability of operative 
mortality after cardiac 
surgery. 
Any death cause, or after 
1 month, directly 
attributable. 
Follow-up (death). Clinical a Cardiac surgeons 3.3 (168/5099) 0.73 (0.69-0.77) - - - - - 
Statistical  Veterans Affairs Risk Score. 3.3 (168/5099) 0.78 (0.75-0.82) - - - - - 
 Probability of mortality 
after cardiac surgery. 
Any death cause (1 
year). 
Follow-up (death). Clinical a Cardiac surgeons.  7.1 (360/5099) 0.61 (NR) - - - - - 
Statistical  Veterans Affairs Risk Score. 7.1 (360/5099) 0.72 (NR) - - - - - 
 Probability of mortality 
after cardiac surgery. 
Any death cause (5 
years). 
  
Follow-up (death). Clinical a Cardiac surgeons.  18.5 (942/5099) 0.64 (NR) - - - - - 
Statistical  Veterans Affairs Risk Score. 18.5 (942/5099) 0.72 (NR) - - - - - 
Mán et al 
(2014) 
Diagnosis of AA in adults. 
 





Clinical b Staff surgeons 29.7 (41/138) 0.93 (NR) BP 1.00 (0.89-1.00)  0.95 (0.88-0.98)  0.96 (0.91-0.99) 1395.9 (75.4 - 
25834.9) 








Poor functional outcomes 
after ischemic stroke. 
Oxford Handicap Scale 
score (6 months). 
Follow-up 
(questionnaire by post). 
Clinical c 18 staff and residents in  
geriatrics, IM and neurology. 
35.2 (328/931) 0.74 (0.72-0.76)  ≥ 3  0.44 (0.39-0.49) 0.96 (0.94-0.97) - 18.9 (NR) 
Statistical Reid’s model 35.2 (328/931) 0.75 (0.73-0.77)  NR 0.45 (0.34-0.52)  0.96 (0.93-0.98) - 19.6 (NR) 
 Weimar’s model 35.2 (328/931) 0.73 (0.71-0.76)  NR 0.43 (0.35-0.51) 0.96 (0.92-0.98)  - 18.1 (NR) 
 SSV model 35.2 (328/931) 0.72 (0.70-0.74)  NR 0.43 (0.36-0.51)  0.95 (0.93-0.98) - 14.3 (NR) 
 Appelros’ model 35.2 (328/931) 0.73 (0.71-0.75)  NR 0.42 (0.35-0.50)  0.95 (0.93-0.97 - 13.8 (NR) 
 Lee’s model 35.2 (328/931) 0.69 (0.66-0.71)  NR 0.38 (0.32-0.45) 0.94 (0.91-0.96) - 9.6 (NR) 
Chew et al Probability of mortality All cause mortality. Follow-up  Clinical a Physicians 3.1 (48/1542) 0.65 (0.60-0.71) - - - - - 
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(2013) after ACS (6 months). (Records or phone). Statistical GRACE 3.1 (48/1542) 0.81 (0.77-0.85) - - - - - 
  PURSUIT 3.1 (48/1542) 0.43 (0.36-0.49) - - - - - 
 Probability of mortality 
after ST-MI (6 months). 
All cause mortality. Follow-up  
(Records or phone). 
Clinical a Physicians  Not stated 0.70 (NR) - - - - - 
Statistical TIMI Not stated 0.78 (0.71-0.85)  - - - - - 
 Probability of mortality 
after Non-ST-MI (6 
months). 
All cause mortality. Follow-up  
(Records or phone). 
Clinical a Physicians Not stated 0.66 (NR) - - - - - 
Statistical TIMI Not stated 0.68 (0.60-0.75)  - - - - - 
 Probability of mortality 
after ACS (1 month). 
All cause mortality. Follow-up  
(Records or phone). 
Clinical a Physicians 2.4 (37/1542) 0.71 (0.65-0.77) - - - - - 
Statistical GRACE 2.4 (37/1542) 0.79 (0.74-0.84)  - - - - - 
 Probability of clinical 
bleeding event after ACS (6 
months). 
Composite (Including 
laboratory findings and 
interventions). 
Follow-up (records or 
phone interview). 
Clinical a Physicians 4.7 (73/1542) 0.47 (0.43-0.52)  - - - - - 
Statistical ACUITY 4.7 (73/1542) 0.51 (0.47-0.55)  - - - - - 
  CRUSADE 4.7 (73/15f42) 0.51 (0.47-0.56)  - - - - - 
Farion et al 
(2013) 
  
Severity of exacerbation in 
children with asthma. 
 
Mild (Stay less than 4 
hrs.). Moderate (Stay 4–
16 hrs.). Severe (Stay > 
16 hrs. or admission). 
Follow-up (Records 
and visit/phone contact 
after 10-14 days). 
Clinical c Staff, fellows and residents in 
EM.  
68.3 (56/82) - Mod. 
+ 
0.79 (0.680.89)  0.77 (0.610.93)  0.78 (0.690.87) 12.2 (4.037.2) 
Statistical PRAM 68.3 (56/82) - ≥ 4 0.71 (0.600.83) 0.77 (0.610.93)  0.73 (0.640.83)  8.3 (2.824.6) 
 Farion’s model † 68.3 (56/82) - Mod. 
+ 
0.70 (0.580.82)  0.73 (0.560.90)  0.71 (0.610.81)  6.2 (2.217.6) 







Probability of operative 
mortality in adults with 
severe aortic stenosis 
surgery. 
  
All cause mortality (30 
days). 
  
Follow up (Records,  
postal and telephone 
contact). 
  
Clinical a 15 experienced cardiologists. 5.7 (18/314) 0.66 (0.53-0.80) - - - - - 
Statistical Additive EuroSCORE.  5.7 (18/314) 0.71 (0.59-0.83)  - - - - - 
 Logistic EuroSCORE.  5.7 (18/314) 0.72 (0.60-0.84) - - - - - 
 EuroSCORE II  5.7 (18/314) 0.77 (0.65-0.89) - - - - - 
 STS Score 5.7 (18/314) 0.73 (0.61-0.86) - - - - - 
 Ambler Score 5.7 (18/314) 0.70 (0.59-0.81) - - - - - 
 ACEF score 5.7 (18/314) 0.66 (0.52-0.79) - - - - - 
Meltzer et al 
(2013) 








Clinical b Staff and residents in EM.  20.3 (53/261) - BP 0.79 (0.66-0.89) 0.68 (0.61-0.74) 0.70 (0.64-0.76) 8.0 (3.9-16.6) 
Statistical Modified Alvarado score 20.3 (53/261) 0.69 (NR)  ≥ 4  0.72 (0.57-0.83) 0.54 (0.47-0.61) 0.58 (0.52-0.64) 3.0 (1.6-5.8) 
Peñaloza et al 
(2013) 
  
Probability of PE in adults. 
  
Composite including PE, 
VTE or related death. 
Follow-up (3 months) 
Expert panel 
adjudication. 
Clinical a Staff and residents in EM.  31.3 (325/1038) 0.81 (0.78-0.84) Mod. + 0.90 (0.86-0.93)  0.58 (0.54-0.61) 0.68 (0.65-0.70) 11.6 (7.9-17.1) 
Statistical Wells Score 31.3 (325/1038) 0.71 (0.68-0.75)  ≥ 2 0.81 (0.76-0.85)  0.60 (0.56-0.63)  0.66 (0.63-0.69) 6.4 (4.7-8.8) 
 Revised GENEVA 31.3 (325/1038) 0.66 (0.63-0.70)  ≥ 4  0.89  (0.85-0.92)  0.33 (0.30-0.37)  0.51 (0.47-0.54) 4.1 (2.8-6.0) 
Wang et al 
(2013) 
Probability of DVT in 
adults. 
  
DVT defined by duplex 
scans and ultrasound. 
Scans, ultrasound and 
follow up (45 days).  
Clinical a Vascular medicine specialists. 47.2 (191/405) - High 
risk 
0.76 (0.70-0.82)  0.89 (0.84-0.93) 0.83 (0.79-0.86)  25.7 (15.0-44.1) 
Statistical Wells Score 47.2 (191/405) - ≥ 2  0.62 (0.55-0.69) 0.72 (0.65-0.78) 0.67 (0.63-0.72) 4.2 (2.8-6.4) 
Litton et al 
(2012) 
Mortality in critically ill 
patients. 
Not stated. Follow up. Clinical c 12 Intensive care specialists  23.4 (585/2497) - < 2 yrs. 0.65 (0.61-0.69)  0.85 (0.84-0.87)  0.80 (0.79-0.82) 10.7 (8.7-13.2) 
Statistical Knaus, model based on 
Apache II 
23.4 (585/2497) 0.80 (0.78-0.82) 28% 0.65 (0.61-0.69) 0.81 (0.79-0.83) 0.77 (0.75-0.79) 7.8 (6.4-9.6) 
PREDICT 23.4 (585/2497) 0.80 (0.78-0.82) 20% 0.65 (0.61-0.69) 0.77 (0.75-0.79) 0.74 (0.72-0.76) 6.2 (5.1-7.6) 
Peñaloza et al 
(2012) 
Probability of PE in adults. 
  
Composite including PE, 
VTE or related death. 
Sequential testing (Roy 
et al. 2006). 
Clinical a Residents and specialists in 
EM. 
29.8 (286/959) - Mod. + 0.91 (0.87-0.94) 0.55 (0.52-0.59) 0.66  (0.63-0.69) 12.4 (8.1-19.1) 
Statistical PERC rule 29.8 (286/959) - ≥ 1  8.2 (3.0-22.6) 0.37 (0.34-0.40)  0.99 (0.96-1.00)  0.10 (0.08-0.13) 




Probability of ACS in 
adults. 
  
ACS was deﬁned in 
accordance with ESC 
and ACC guidelines. 
Expert panel 
adjudication. Follow-
up (1 month). 
  
Clinical a ≈175 general practioners staff. 22.1 (66/298) 0.75 (0.68-0.82) > 20% 0.85 (0.73-0.92) 0.34 (0.28-0.41) 0.45 (0.40-0.51) 2.9 (1.4-6.0) 
Statistical Bruins Slot’s model † 22.1 (66/298) 0.66 (0.58-0.73) > 20% 0.74 (0.62-0.84) 0.51 (0.45-0.58) 0.56 (0.51-0.62) 3.0 (1.7-5.6) 
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Dionne et al 
(2011) 
  
Probability of severe 
functional limitations (2 
years) in patients with non-
specific back pain. 
Roland and Morris 
Disability questionary.  
Follow up (telephone 
interview at 2 years). 
  
Clinical a Physicians  18.6 (195/1049) 0.69 (0.64-0.73)  ≥ 50% 0.37 (0.31-0.45) 0.85 (0.83-0.88) 0.76 (0.74-0.79)  3.5 (2.4-4.9) 
Statistical Cassandra rule (17 items) 18.6 (202/1085) 0.73 (0.69-0.77)  0.76 0.78 (0.72-0.84) 0.50 (0.47-0.54) - 3.5 (NR) 
  Cassandra rule (5 items) † 18.6 (201/1079) 0.78 (0.74-0.81) 0.80 0.79 (0.73-0.85) 0.60 (0.56-0.63) - 5.6 (NR) 
Tenorio et al 
(2011) 
  
Diagnosis of celiac disease 
in children. 
  
Not stated. Specific history, 
serology, and 
histological findings.  
Clinical b ≈ 18 trainees and staff in  
paediatric gastroenterology.  
36.8 (14/38) - BP 0.64 (0.36-0.86)  0.96 (0.77-1.00) 0.84 (0.68-0.93)  41.4 (4.2-405.2) 
Statistical  Tenorio’s model  † 36.8 (14/38) - - 0.93 (0.64-1.00)  0.79 (0.57-0.92) 0.84 (0.68-0.93)  49.4 (5.2-473.4) 
Geersing et al 
(2010) 
  
Probability of DVT in 
adults. 
  
Composite including PE, 
VTE or related death. 
  
Sequential tests and 
follow-up (90 days).  
Expert panel 
adjudication.  
Clinical a ≈ 300 General practitioners. 13.6 (136/1002) 0.82 (0.78-0.86) > 20% 0.95 (0.89-0.98) 0.40 (0.37-0.43) 0.48 (0.44-0.51) 12.3 (5.7-26.7) 
Statistical OUDEGA rule 13.6 (136/1002)  0.80 (0.77-
0.84)  
≥ 4  0.95 (0.89-0.98) 0.57 (0.54-0.60) 0.62 (0.59-0.65) 24.4 (11.3-52.7) 
Lintula et al 
(2010) 
Initial examination 
diagnosis of AA in adults. 
AA defined by surgical 
and histological 
findings. 
Surgery and histology 
or follow- up (1 
month). 
Clinical b 31 staff general surgeons.  44.4 (36/81) - BP 0.89 (0.73-0.96) 0.80 (0.65-0.90)  0.84 (0.74-0.91) 32.0 (9.0-114.0) 
Statistical Lintula Score 54.2 (52/96) - ≥ 21  0.87 (0.74-0.94) 0.59 (0.43-0.73) 0.74 (0.64-0.82) 9.3 (3.4-25.2) 
 Final examination diagnosis 
of AA in adults. 
AA defined by surgical 
and histological 
findings. 
Surgery and histology 
or follow- up (1 
month). 
Clinical b 31 staff general surgeons. 44.4 (36/81) - BP 1.00 (0.88-1.00)  0.84 (0.70-0.93)  0.91 (0.82-0.96)  374.7 (20.7 - 
6799.2) 
Statistical Lintula Score 54.2 (52/96) - ≥ 21 0.87 (0.74-0.94)  0.98 (0.86-1.00) 0.92 (0.84-0.96)  276.4 (32.6-
2341.5) 
Chan et al 
(2009) 
Probability of DVT in 
pregnant women. 
Composite: sequential 
testing and symptoms. 
Ultrasound and follow 
up (3 months).  
Clinical a Thrombosis specialists. 8.9 (17/192) - Mod + 0.88 (0.62-0.98) 0.74 (0.66-0.80) 0.75  (0.68-0.81) 21.0 (4.6-95.5) 
Statistical Chan (Based on LEFT rule) † 8.8 (17/194) - ≥ 1  1.00 (0.81-1.00) 0.50 (0.43-0.58) 0.55 (0.47-0.62) 35.4 (2.1 to 
597.7) 
Kabrhel et al 
(2009) 
  
Probability of PE in adults. 
  
Composite including PE, 
VTE or attributable 
death  
Ultrasound or V/Q 
scan. Angiography. 
Follow-up (45 days). 
Clinical a Physicians. 6.9 (545/7932) - Mod + 0.69 (0.65-0.73) 0.70 (0.69-0.71)  0.70 (0.69-0.71)  5.3 (4.4-6.5) 
Statistical Wells score 6.9 (545/7940) - ≥ 2 0.68 (0.64-0.72) 0.72 (0.71-0.73) 0.72 (0.71-0.73)  5.5 (4.5-6.6) 




diagnosis of AA in children. 
AA defined by surgical 
and histological 
findings. 
Surgery and histology 
or follow- up (1 
month). 
Clinical b 31 staff general surgeons 45.0 (27/60) - BP 0.85 (0.65-0.95) 0.52 (0.34-0.69) 0.67 (0.53-0.78)  6.1 (1.7-21.6) 
Statistical Lintula Score † 36.4 (24/66) - ≥ 21 0.83 (0.62-0.95)  0.69 (0.53-0.82)  0.74 (0.62-0.84)  11.2 (3.2-39.2) 
 Final examination diagnosis 
of AA in children. 
AA defined by surgical 
and histological 
findings. 
Surgery and histology 
or follow- up (1 
month). 
Clinical b 31 staff general surgeons 45.0 (27/60) - I 0.96 (0.79-1.00) 0.67 (0.48-0.81)  0.80 (0.67-0.89) 52.0 (6.2-435.1) 
Statistical Lintula Score † 36.4 (24/66) - ≥ 21 1.00 (0.83-1.00) 0.88 (0.74-0.96) 0.92 (0.82-0.97) 334.1 (17.7- 
6316.7) 
Kline et al 
(2008) 
  
Probability of PE in adults. 
  
Composite including PE, 
VTE or related death. 
  
Ultrasound or V/Q 
scan. 
Angiography/venograp
hy.  Follow-up (45 
days). 
Clinical a Physicians. 6.9 (561/8138) - Mod + 0.70 (0.66-0.74) 0.69 (0.68-0.70) 0.69 (0.68-0.70) 5.4 (4.5-6.5) 
Statistical PERC rule 6.9 (561/8138) - ≥ 1  0.96 (0.94-0.97) 0.25 (0.24-0.26) 0.30  (0.29-0.31) 7.6 (5.1-11.5) 
Cooper et al 
(2007) 
Probability of new episodes 
of self-harm (6 month). 
Not stated. 
  
Follow up (Records 
and databases). 






0.85 (0.83-0.87)  0.38 (0.37-0.39)   0.46 (0.45-0.47) 3.4 (2.9-4.0) 
Statistical Manchester Self Harm Rule †  17.1 
(1506/8825) 
- ≥ 1   0.94 (0.92-0.95)  0.26 (0.24-0.27) 0.37 (0.36-0.38)  5.8 (4.6-7.3) 




Probability of heart disease 
in patients with low grade  
mid-gut carcinoid tumour. 
Presence of moderate to 
extreme tricuspid valve 
insufficiency. 
Follow up.  Clinical a 1 specialist in carcinoid 
tumours 
40.7 (22/54) 0.66 (NR)  ≥ 50% - - 0.69 (0.54-0.80) - 
Statistical Van Gerven (noisy threshold) 
† 
40.7 (22/54) 0.66 (NR)  BP - - 0.72  (0.58-0.83) - 
 Van Gerven (naive bayesian) 
† 
40.7 (22/54) 0.60 (NR)  BP - - 0.63  (0.49-0.75) - 
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 Van Gerven (regression) † 40.7 (22/54) 0.59 (NR)  BP - - 0.67 (0.52-0.79) - 
Carrier et al 
(2006) 
  
Probability of PE in adults. PE or DVT. 
  
V/Q scan, angiography, 
or CT. 
Ultrasonography. 
Follow-up (3 months). 
Clinical a Physicians 18.1 (78/432) - ≥ 20% 0.86 (0.76-0.92) 0.38 (0.33-0.43) 0.47 (0.42-0.52)  3.8 (1.9-7.4) 
Statistical Wells Score 18.4 (76/413) - > 4  0.83 (0.72-0.90) 0.41 (0.35-0.46) 0.48 (0.44-0.53) 3.3 (1.8-6.3) 
   Rodger's model 19.8 (79/399) - ≥ 1 0.96 (0.89-0.99)  0.29 (0.24-0.34) 0.42 (0.37-0.47) 10.2 (3.1-33.2) 
Hadjianastassi
ou et al (2006) 
 
Probability of postoperative 
mortality in adults with 





Clinical a Residents in ICU NR (NR/438) 0.82 (0.79-0.85)  - - - - - 
Statistical Apache II model (LR) †  NR (NR/438) 0.87 (0.82-0.91)  - - - - - 
 Apache II model (ANN) †  NR (NR/438) 0.87 (0.83-0.91)  - - - - - 
Mitchell et al 
(2006) 
Probability of acute 
coronary event in adults. 
Coronary intervention, 
MI or death within 45 
days. 
Follow up (Records, 
telephone). Expert 
panel adjudication. 
Clinical a Staff and residents in EM 4.6 (51/1114) 0.78 (0.70-0.86) > 2 % 0.96  (0.87-1.00)  0.27 (0.25-0.30) 0.31 (0.28-0.33)    9.2 (2.2-38.2) 
Statistical ACI-TIPI. 4.6 (51/1114) 0.51  (0.44-
0.58)  
> 2 % 1.00 (0.93-1.00) 0.06 (0.05-0.08)  0.10 (0.08-0.12) 5.8 (0.4 - 94.8) 
Mitchell’s model 4.6 (51/1114) 0.71 (0.65-0.78)  > 2 % 0.98 (0.90-1.00) 0.26 (0.24-0.29)  0.32 (0.29-0.35) 19.9 (2.7-145.0) 
Kabrhel et al 
(2005) 
Probability of PE in adults. Radiological 
confirmation of PE. 
Venous ultrasound, 
V/Q and CT scan, 
angiogram. Follow-up 
3 months. 
Clinical a Staff and residents in EM, 
surgery and IM. 
10.0 (61/607) - Most 
likely  
0.54 (0.41-0.67) 0.76 (0.73-0.80) 0.74 (0.70-0.78) 3.8 (2.2-6.5) 
Statistical Wells Score 10.0 (61/607) - > 4  0.59 (0.46-0.71) 0.78 (0.74-0.81)  0.76 (0.72-0.79) 5.0 (2.9-8.0) 
Quinn et al 
(2005) 
Probability of serious 
outcomes requiring 
admission (7 days). 
Composite including 
death, AMI, PE, and 
stroke.  
Follow up. Clinical a  Residents and EM staff.   11.5 (79/684) 0.89 (0.85-0.93) > 2% 0.94 (0.86-0.98)  0.52 (0.51-0.53)  0.57  (0.54-0.61)  16.4 (6.5-41.1) 
Statistical San Francisco Rule † 11.5 (79/684)  0.92 (0.89-
0.95)  
≥ 1PA 0.96 (0.92-1)  0.62 (0.58-0.66)  0.66 (0.62-0.69) 41.3 (12.9-
132.5) 
 
Stein et al 
(2005) 
Diagnosis of influenza 
infection in adults. 
Influenza 
A or B presence. 
Polymerase chain 
reaction test. 
Clinical b 35 staff in EM and IM 24.4 (53/217) - BP 0.29 (0.18-0.43)  0.92 (0.87-0.95)  0.76 (0.70-0.82) 4.6 (2.0-10.4) 
Statistical "Cough and Fever" rule 24.4 (53/217) - ≥ 1 PA 0.40 (0.27-0.54) 0.92 (0.87-0.95)  0.79 (0.73-0.84) 7.6 (3.5-16.8) 
Blattler et al 
(2004) 
Probability of DVT in 
adults. 
  





Clinical a Specialists in vascular 
medicine 
27.7 (57/206) - High 0.81 (0.69-0.89)  0.85 (0.79-0.90)  0.84 (0.78-0.89) 24.1 (10.9-53.6) 
Statistical Wells Score 27.7 (57/206) - ≥ 1 0.54 (0.42-0.67)  0.84 (0.77-0.89) 0.76 (0.69-0.81) 6.2 (3.1-12.3) 
Pruekprasert 
et al (2004) 
Diagnosis of AA in adults. 
  




Clinical b Staff and residents in surgery 80.5 (186/231) -  0.96 (0.91-0.98) 0.67 (0.50-0.80) 0.90 (0.85-0.93)  44.5 (17.4-
114.1) 
Statistical Alvarado Score 80.5 (186/231) - ≥ 7 0.79 (0.72-0.85)  0.69 (0.53-0.81) 0.77 (0.71-0.82)  8.3 (4.0-17.2) 




Probability of survival in 





Clinical a 14 experts and fellows in ICM 
and IM residents. 
17.7 (73/412) 0.84 (0.79-0.89) - - - - - 
Statistical SAPS II 17.7 (73/412) 0.75 (0.69-0.80) - - - - - 
 SAPS II (customized) † 17.7 (73/412) 0.72 (0.66-0.68) - - - - - 
Al Omar et al 
(2002) 
Diagnosis of ankle or mid-
foot fracture in children. 
Any fracture needing 
medical intervention.  
X - rays studies. Clinical b Physicians  21.3 (17/80) - BP 0.65 (0.38-0.86) 0.76 (0.63-0.86) 0.74  (0.63-0.83) 5.9 (1.9-18.6) 
Statistical Ottawa ankle rule 21.3 (17/80) - ≥ 1 PA 1.00 (0.81-1.00) 0.30 (0.19-0.43)  0.45 (0.34-0.56) 15.3 (0.9 - 
268.1) 
Cornuz et al 
(2002) 
Probability of DVT in 
adults. 
DVT (identified by 





Clinical a Residents in vascular 
medicine 
29.5 (82/278) 0.72 (NR) High 0.50 (0.39-0.61) 0.88 (0.82-0.92) 0.77 (0.71-0.81) 7.2 (3.9-13.2) 
Statistical Wells Score 29.5 (82/278) 0.72 (NR) ≥ 1 0.83 (0.73-0.90) 0.48 (0.41-0.56) 0.59 (0.53-0.64)  4.6 (2.4-8.7) 
Glas et al 
(2002) 
Probability of ankle fracture 
in patients with acute ankle 
injury. 
Any fracture diagnosed 
by the radiologist. 
Radiographic series of  
foot and ankle. 
Clinical a, b  General surgery residents 11.4 (74/647) 0.80 (0.74-0.87)  BP 0.82 (0.72-0.90) 0.68 (0.64-0.71) 0.69 (0.66-0.73) 9.8 (5.3-18.4) 
Statistical Ottawa ankle rule 11.4 (74/647) 0.69 (0.62-0.76)  ≥ 1 PA 0.89 (0.80-0.95) 0.26 (0.23-0.30) 0.33 (0.30-0.37) 2.9 (1.4-6.2) 
 Leiden † 11.4 (74/647) 0.77 (0.71-0.83)  > 7 0.80 (0.69-0.88) 0.59 (0.55-0.63) 0.61 (0.57-0.65) 5.6 (3.1-10.1) 
Attia et al  
(2001) 
  
Probability of positive 
throat culture in children 
with acute pharyngitis. 
Presence of Group A B-
Haemolytic 
Streptococcus colonies 
at 24-48h.  
Throat culture and 
serotyping. 
Clinical a Staff and residents in 
paediatric clinic and 
emergency service 
37.1 (218/587) - > 5 0.72 (0.65-0.78) 0.60 (0.55-0.65) 0.65 (0.61-0.68) 3.9 (2.7-5.6) 
Statistical Attia score † 38.5 (210/545) - ≥ 4 0.18 (0.13-0.24) 0.97 (0.94-0.98) 0.66 (0.62-0.70) 7.0 (3.4-14.3) 
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Dimer D, compression 
ultrasound and Lung 
scan. 
  
Clinical a Residents and specialists in 
vascular medicine 
17.0 (28/165) - Mod + 1.00  (0.85-1.00) 0.46 (0.38-0.55) 0.55 (0.47-0.63)  48.6 (2.9 - 
811.9) 
Statistical Wells Score applied by 
residents 
17.0 (28/165) - > 0  0.71 (0.51-0.86) 0.75 (0.67-0.82) 0.75 (0.67-0.81)  7.6 (3.1-18.8) 
 Wells Score applied by 
specialists 
17.0 (28/165) - > 0  0.77 (0.56-0.90) 0.73 (0.64-0.80) 0.73 (0.66-0.80) 8.9 (3.3-23.7) 
Bojang et al 
(2000) 
  
Diagnosis of malaria in 
febrile children. 
Fever (≥37.5 °C) and a 
parasite count of 
≥5000/ml. 
Blood Film  
(Giemsa Stain). 
Clinical b 1 experienced paediatrician 34.8 (133/382) - BP 0.82 (0.74-0.88) 0.61 (0.55-0.67)  0.68 (0.63-0.73) 7.1 (4.3-11.9) 
Statistical Olaleye  (Complete score)† 34.8 (133/382) - ≥ 7 0.89 (0.83-0.94) 0.63 (0.57-0.69) 0.72 (0.67-0.77 14.5 (7.9-26.7) 
 Olaleye (Symptoms) † 34.8 (133/382) - ≥ 5  0.73 (0.64-0.80) 0.59 (0.53-0.65)  0.64 (0.59-0.69) 3.9 (2.5-6.1) 




Probability of mortality in 
children admitted to PICU. 
Mortality during 
hospitalization. 
Follow-up. Clinical a 34 residents in paediatrics 6.7 (36/540) 0.92 (NR) - - - - - 
 9 Paediatric ICM fellows 6.0 (36/602) 0.87 (NR) - - - - - 
 5 Paediatric ICM staff 5.9 (36/612) 0.95 (NR) - - - - - 
Statistical PRMS III 5.7 (36/635) 0.92 (NR) - - - - - 
Sanson et al 
(2000) 
Probability of PE in adults. High-probability V/Q 
scan or an abnormal 
angiography. 
V/Q scan, CT, 
angiography. 
Clinical a Staff physicians 30.5 (126/413) - > 80% 0.28 (0.20-0.37)  0.85 (0.81-0.89) 0.68 (0.63-0.72) 2.2 (1.3-3.7) 
Statistical Wells score  29.5 (122/414) - ≥ 2 0.66 (0.57-0.65)  0.36 (0.31-0.42) 0.45 (0.40-0.50) 1.1 (0.7-1.8)  
 Wells score (extended) 37.6 (89/237) - Mod + 0.81 (0.71-0.88)  0.29 (0.22-0.37) 0.49 (0.42-0.55) 1.7 (0.9-3.3) 
El-Solh et al 
(1999) 
  
Diagnosis of pulmonary 
tuberculosis in adults. 




fluorescent stain and 
nuclei acid probes. 
Clinical b EM staff, infectious diseases 
fellows and medical residents. 
9.2 (11/119) 0.72 (0.65-0.79) BP 0.64 (0.31-0.89) 0.79 (0.72-0.87) 0.77 (0.69-0.84)  6.5 (1.7-24.0) 
Statistical El-Solh’s model † 9.2 (11/119) 0.92 (0.86-0.99) BP 1.00 (0.72-1.00) 0.69 (0.61-0.78) 0.72 (0.63-0.80) 51.8 (3.0 - 
905.6) 
Pons et al  
(1999) 
Probability of mortality in 
adults undergoing open-
heart surgery. 
Any death <30 days) or 
during the hospital stay. 
Follow up  (direct or 
telephone, and 
records). 
Clinical a Cardiac surgeons NR (NR/359) 0.65 (NR) - - - - - 
Statistical Pons' model † NR (NR/359) 0.70 (NR) - - - - - 
Beyth et al 
(1998) 
Probability of major 
bleeding in adults treated 
with warfarin. 




Clinical a Physicians 10.2 (20/196) - Low + 0.55 (0.32-0.76) 0.45 (0.37-0.53) 0.46 (0.39-0.53) 1.0 (0.4-2.5) 
Statistical  Outpatient Bleeding Risk 
Index 
10.2 (20/196) - High  0.25 (0.10-0.49) 0.95 (0.91-0.98) 0.88 (0.83-0.92) 7.0 (2.0-24.1) 
Hallan et al 
(1997) 
Probability of Acute 




histological findings or 
follow up. 
Clinical a 9 general surgery residents 36.5 (111/304) 0.81 (0.79-0.82) - - - - - 
Statistical Hallan's model. †  36.5 (111/304) 0.81 (0.80-0.83)  - - - - - 
Richman et al  
(1997) 
Probability of fracture in 
adults with knee injury. 
Any fracture of the knee 
or patella seen on 
standard radiography. 
Radiography and 
follow up (3 weeks). 
Clinical a Staff and residents in EM 7.4 (26/351) - ≥ 20% 0.88  (0.69-0.97) 0.64 (0.58-0.69) 0.66 (0.60-0.70)  13.6 (4.0-46.3) 
Statistical Bauer's rule 7.4 (26/351) - ≥ 1 PA  0.85 (0.64-0.95) 0.49 (0.43-0.54)  0.52 (0.46-0.57) 5.3 (1.8-15.6) 
 Stiell's rule 7.4 (26/351) - ≥ 1 PA 0.85 (0.64-0.95) 0.50 (0.44-0.55)  0.52 (0.47-0.58) 5.5 (1.8-16.2) 
Brillman et al 
(1996) 
Probability of hospital 
admission in triage patients. 
Actual rate of admission. Admission determined 
by inpatient staff. 
Clinical a Staff and  residents in EM 6.3 (242/3822) - Likely 
+ 
0.62 (0.55-0.68) 0.87 (0.86-0.88) 0.86 (0.84-0.87) 10.8 (8.2-14.3) 
Statistical AMOS triage system 5.5 (195/3550) - Likely 
+ 
0.68 (0.61-0.75) 0.74 (0.72-0.75) 0.73 (0.72-0.75) 6.0 (4.4-8.1) 
Stevens et al 
(1994) 
Probability of mortality in 
neonates admitted to NICU. 
Mortality during 
hospitalization in NICU. 
Follow up. Clinical a 18 NICU staff physicians. 4.0 (21/523) 0.85 (NR) Mod + 0.90 (0.68-0.98) 0.68 (0.64-0.72) 0.69 (0.65-0.73) 20.1 (4.6-87.4) 
Statistical SNAP-PE. 3.9 (21/524) 0.94 (NR) - - - - - 
Detrano et al 
(1992) 
Probability of coronary 
disease in adults during 
angiography. 




Clinical a Expert cardiologists 16.9 (67/397) 0.82 (NR)  - - - - - 
Statistical Detrano’s model. †   0.80 (NR)  - - - - - 
 Probability of coronary 
disease in adults during 
angiography. 




Clinical a Expert cardiologists 6.0 (24/397) 0.69 (NR) - - - - - 
Statistical Detrano’s model. † 6.0 (24/397) 0.72 (NR) - - - - - 
Meyer et al Mortality in adults admitted Death prior discharge Follow-up. Clinical b Intensive medicine staff 6.9 (40/578) - BP  0.55 (0.39-0.70)  0.98 (0.96-0.99)  0.95 (0.93-0.97) 64.5 (26.7-
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(1992) to SICU. from SICU.   156.0) 
Statistical Apache II score 6.9 (40/578) - ≥ 20  0.58 (0.41-0.73) 0.94 (0.91-0.96)  0.91 (0.88-0.93)  20.1 (9.8-41.1) 
Baxt et al 
(1991) 
Diagnosis of MI in adults 




scintiscan, and follow 
up (3 weeks). 
Clinical b EM staff and medical 
residents 
10.9 (36/331) - BP 0.78 (0.60-0.89)  0.85 (0.80-0.89)  0.84 (0.80-0.88)  19.4 (8.3-45.4) 
Statistical Baxt’s model. †  10.9 (36/331) - > 0.55 0.97 (0.84-1.00)  0.96 (0.93-0.98)  0.96 (0.94-0.98)  903.6 (113.2-
7211.8) 
Emerman et al 
(1991) 
Diagnosis of pneumonia in 
adults with respiratory 
infection symptoms. 




independently by two 
radiologists). 
Clinical b 39 staff physicians and 
residents. 
7.2 (21/290) - BP 0.86 (0.64-0.97) 0.58 (0.51-0.64)  0.60 (0.54-0.65) 8.2 (2.3-28.4) 
Statistical Gennis' rule 7.2 (21/290) - ≥ 1 PA 0.62 (0.38-0.82)  0.76 (0.71-0.81)  0.75 (0.70-0.80)  5.2 (2.1-13.1) 
 Diehr's model 7.2 (21/290) - > 0  0.67 (0.43-0.85)  0.67 (0.61-0.73)  0.67 (0.61-0.72)  4.0 (1.6-10.4) 
 Heckering's model 7.2 (21/290) - > 1 0.71 (0.48-0.89)  0.67 (0.61-0.73) 0.68 (0.62-0.73)  5.1 (1.9-13.7) 
 Singal's rule 7.2 (21/290) - > 0.26 0.76 (0.53-0.92)  0.55 (0.49-0.61)  0.57 (0.51-0.62)  3.9 (1.4-11.0) 
Leibovici et al 
(1991) 





Blood culture. Clinical b Internal medicine staff 14.2 (36/253) - BP 0.53 (0.36-0.69) 0.84 (0.79-0.89) 0.80 (0.74-0.85)  6.0 (2.8-12.7) 




Diagnosis in adults admitted 
to medical ward. 
Various conditions. Tests findings and 
subspecialist’s opinion. 
Clinical d IM staff and residents 1.0 (20/20) - BP - - 0.30 (0.13-0.54) - 
Statistical Quick Medical Reference 1.0 (20/20) - BP - - 0.60 (0.36-0.80) - 
Brannen et al 
(1989) 
Probability of mortality in  
adults admitted to ICU. 
Mortality during 
hospitalization in ICU. 
Follow up. Clinical a Fellows in PM and ICM  31.2 (34/109) 0.90 (NR) > 50% 0.79 (0.62-0.91) 0.84 (0.73-0.91) 0.83 (0.74-0.89) 20.3 (7.2-57.0) 
Statistical Knaus, model based on 
Apache II 
31.2 (34/109) 0.80  (NR)  > 40 % 0.62 (0.44-0.77) 0.80 (0.69-0.88) 0.74 (0.65-0.82) 6.5 (2.6-15.8) 
Chang et al 
(1989) 
Mortality in adults admitted 
to ICU. 
Mortality during 
hospitalization in ICU. 
Follow-up. Clinical b 2 specialists in ICM and 
surgery. 
36.1 (82/227) - BP 0.36 (0.26-0.46) 0.96 (0.91-0.98) 0.73 (0.67-0.78) 13.8 (5.5-34.6) 
Statistical Knaus, model based on 
Apache II 
36.1 (82/227) - - 0.44 (0.34-0.55) 1.00  (0.97-1.00) 0.79 (0.73-0.84) 247.1 (14.9 - 
4084.6) 
Katzman et al 
(1989) 
Probability of mortality in 
adults admitted to ICU. 
Mortality during 
hospitalization in ICU. 
Follow-up. Clinical a 6 specialists in ICM 24.5 (128/523) 0.89 (NR) > 50% 0.82 (0.74-0.88) 0.81 (0.76-0.84) 0.81 (0.77-0.84) 18.9 (11.3-31.6) 
Statistical Knaus, model based on 
Apache II 
24.5 (128/523) 0.83 (NR)  > 50% 0.55 (0.46-0.63) 0.92 (0.88-0.94) 0.83 (0.79-0.86) 13.2 (8.0-21.8) 
Sutton et al 
(1989)  
  
Diagnosis in adults with 
acute abdominal pain. 
Various conditions. Definite diagnosis 
assigned by consultant. 
Clinical d Junior doctors 100 (6379/6379) - BP - - 0.66 (0.64-0.67) - 
Statistical  CAD-A  - BP - - 0.57 (0.56-0.58) - 
 DIAG (retrospective)  - BP - - 0.60 (0.58-0.61) - 
 Diagnosis in adults with 
acute abdominal pain.1 
Various conditions. Definite diagnosis 
assigned by consultant. 
Clinical d Junior doctors 100 (583/583) - BP - - 0.66 (0.61-0.69)  - 
Statistical  DIAG (prospective)  - BP - - 0.57 (0.52-0.61) - 




Probability of mortality in  
adults admitted to ICU. 
 
Mortality during 
hospitalization in ICU. 
Follow-up. Clinical a 18 Medical interns 40 (146/366) - > 50% 0.64 (0.56-0.72) 0.90 (0.86-0.94) 0.80 (0.76-0.84) 17.1 (9.8-30.1) 
 22 Residents in PM and ICM 40 (146/366) - > 50% 0.65 (0.57-0.73) 0.89 (0.84-0.92) 0.79 (0.75-0.83) 14.5 (8.5-24.9) 
 17 Fellows in PM and ICM 40 (146/366) 0.89 (NR)  > 50% 0.65 (0.57-0.73) 0.89 (0.84-0.92) 0.79 (0.75-0.83) 14.5 (8.5-24.9) 
Statistical Knaus, model based on 
Apache II 
40 (146/366) - > 50% 0.67 (0.59-0.75) 0.86 (0.81-0.90) 0.79 (0.74-0.83) 12.9 (7.7-21.7) 
Kirkeby et al 
(1987) 
Diagnosis in adults with 
acute abdominal pain. 
Various conditions. Discharge diagnosis. Clinical d Physicians 100 (77/77) - BP - - 0.65 (0.53-0.75)  - 
Statistical Leeds' decision support 
system 
100 (77/77) - BP - - 0.53 (0.42-0.65)  - 
Poretsky et al 
(1985) 
Diagnosis of MI in adults 
with acute chest pain. 
Composite including 
symptoms and test 
findings. 
CK-MB, CK, SGOT, 
LDH, ECG, scintiscan. 
Clinical b Physicians 48.2 (81/168) - BP 0.74 (0.63-0.83) 0.85 (0.75-0.92)   0.80 (0.73-0.85) 16.3 (7.5-35.2) 
Statistical Goldman's model 48.2 (81/168) - BP 0.81 (0.71-0.89)  0.53 (0.42-0.64)  0.67 (0.59-0.74) 4.9 (2.4-10.0) 
Ikonen et al Diagnosis in adults with Various conditions. Discharge diagnosis. Clinical d Surgeons  100 (290/290) - BP - - 0.76 (0.70-0.80) - 
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(1983) acute abdominal pain. Statistical Leeds' decision support 
system 
100 (290/290) - BP - - 0.68 (0.63-0.74) - 
Evenson et al 
(1975) 
Length of hospital stay in 
adults admitted to 
psychiatric hospital. 
Short stay (< 90 days) 
and long stay (≥ 90 
days). 
Follow up (120 days). Clinical b Psychiatrists 41.1 (67/163) - ≥ 90  0.72 (0.59-0.82) 0.79 (0.69-0.87) 0.76 (0.69-0.82) 9.6 (4.7-19.8) 
Statistical Evenson's model † 41.1 (67/163) - ≥ 90  0.64 (0.51-0.75)  0.75 (0.65-0.83)  0.71 (0.63-0.77) 5.4 (2.7-10.6) 
 Unauthorized absence in 
adults admitted to 
psychiatric hospital. 
Not stated. Follow up (120 days). Clinical a Psychiatrists 11.4 (19/167) - ≥ 5% 0.68 (0.44-0.86)  0.51 (0.43-0.60)  0.53 (0.45-0.61)  2.3 (0.8-6.3) 
Statistical Evenson's model † 11.4 (19/167) - ≥ 5% 0.37 (0.17-0.61) 0.75 (0.67-0.82)  0.71 (0.63-0.77)  1.8 (0.6-4.8) 
Horrocks et al 
(1975) 





Final diagnosis (where 
relevant, 
histopathology). 
Clinical d Registrars and consultant 
surgeons 
100 (122/122) - BP - - 0.93 (0.86-0.96) - 
Statistical Leeds' decision support 
system † 
100 (122/122) - BP - - 0.88 (0.80-0.93) - 




diagnoses in adults with 
LAP. 
Various conditions. Final diagnosis (where 
relevant, 
histopathology). 
Clinical d Registrars and consultant 
surgeons 
100 (301/301) - BP - - 0.64 (0.59-0.70)  - 
Statistical Leeds' decision support 
system † 
100 (301/301) - BP - - 0.77 (0.72-0.82)  - 
 Perioperative evaluation, 
diagnoses in adults with 
LAP. 
Various conditions. Final diagnosis (where 
relevant, 
histopathology). 
Clinical d Registrars and consultant 
surgeons 
100 (301/301) - BP - - 0.83 (0.78-0.87) - 
Statistical Leeds' decision support 
system † 
100 (301/301) - BP - - 0.85 (0.80-0.88)  - 
Oddie et al  
(1974) 
 Thyroid metabolic diagnosis  
  In adults. 
Hypothyroid, Euthyroid, 
Hyperthyroid.  
Metabolic test data.  Clinical c Physicians 100 (1066/1066) - BP - - 0.97 (0.96-0.98) - 
 Statistical  Oddie's model 100 (1066/1066) - BP - - 0.97 (0.96-0.98) - 
 Thyroid etiological 
diagnosis in adults. 
Various conditions. Pathological 
examination and follow 
up. 
Clinical d   Physicians 100 (29/29) - BP - - 0.41 (0.24-0.61) - 
Statistical  Oddie's model 100 (29/29) - BP - - 0.34 (0.19-0.54)  - 
De Dombal 
(1972 & 1974) 
Diagnosis in adults with 
acute abdominal pain. 
Various conditions. Final postoperative 
diagnosis or test 
results. Follow up. 
Clinical d Surgical house officers 100 (514/514) - BP - - 0.71 (0.67-0.75) - 
 Registrars and consultant 
surgeons 
100 (552/552) - BP - - 0.80 (0.77-0.83) - 
Statistical Leeds' decision support 
system † 
100 (552/552) - BP - - 0.91 (0.89-0.94)  - 
Reale et al 
(1968) 
Diagnosis of congenital 




surgery and autopsy. 
Clinical d 1 cardiologist 100 (121/121) - BP - - 0.73 (0.64-0.80)  - 
Statistical Reale's model † 100 (121/121) - BP - - 0.62 (0.53-0.71)  - 
 
 
Abbreviations and notes: GI: Gastro Intestinal. AA: Acute Appendicitis. MI: Myocardial Infarction. ACS: Acute Coronary Syndrome. PE: Pulmonary Embolism. VTE: Venous Thromboembolic event. DVT: Deep Venous Thrombosis, ESC: European 
Society of Cardiology. ACC: American College of Cardiology. ICU: Intensive Care Unit. SICU: Surgical Intensive Care Unit. NICU: Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. PICU: Paediatric Intensive Care Unit. LAP: Lower Abdominal Pain. EM: Emergency 
Medicine. IM: Internal Medicine. ICM: Intensive Care Medicine. PM: Pulmonary Medicine. LR: Logistic Regression. ANN: Artificial Neural Networks. Cut offs: I. Cut-off implicit in prediction. U: Unclear. FD: First Diagnosis. PA: Positive answer. 
AVS (Any abnormal vital sign) Mod + (Moderate and severe). L + (Likely and yes) MH: Moderate-High). 
1 Independent sample. † Model derived for the same type of patients with sample from the same centre. a Prediction about the probability of the outcome. b Classificatory prediction for a dichotomous outcome. c Classificatory prediction for ordinal 
outcomes. d Classificatory prediction for set of nominal outcomes. 
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The central aim of this doctoral dissertation was to examine the role of clinical judgment in 
the care of individuals in the era of EBM. The EBM approach has de facto encouraged 
physicians to make clinical recommendations only when in line with the best research 
evidence, and has effectively decreased the room for clinical discretion.  
Against this emphasis on EBM, I have argued that medicine ought to recognise that 
physicians’ judgment has a pivotal role in clinical decision-making. The exercise of clinical 
judgment allows physicians to address what I have called the Problem of Extra Information 
by estimating the right probabilities for each patient. 
The PEI arises because physicians are subtly and tacitly coerced not to pay proper attention to 
part of the information they have about the individual patients. This because they are trained 
to restrict themselves to recommendations supported by probabilities obtained by means of 
the best research evidence available. 
I argued that there is a sense in which the probabilities favoured by EBM are the wrong 
probabilities for clinical recommendations: insofar as such probabilities ignore relevant 
information, they are not the probabilities with respect to which the physician ought to 
maximize expected utility for her patient. Given this problem, I proposed the Discretionary 
Approach: this was based on the ideas that (a) the objective probabilities of interest for 
clinical recommendations are the probabilities in the reference class defined by everything the 
physician knows about the patient, and (b) physicians standardly need to exercise their 
judgment to estimate these probabilities. 
As I explained, research improvements have important merits, some of which ameliorate the 
PEI by narrowing the gap between research probabilities and the right probabilities for 
individual patients. Nonetheless, it would be erroneous to conclude that movements such as 
personalised medicine or precision medicine, which present themselves as providing truly 
individualised predictions and prescriptions, normally provide physicians with the right 
probabilities for clinical recommendations. Even after these movements have done their work, 
the PEI typically remains and requires the rational physician to exercise her best judgement to 
address it. 
The empirical research presented in my final two chapters suggests that the DA would 
improve the care of individuals. Of course, the empirical evidence presented is not as direct as 
one would like, and has various limitations inherited from primary studies. Nonetheless, I 
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believe that the arguments and empirical data presented in this thesis is sufficiently robust to 
cast doubt on the assumed “optimality” of the EBM approach.  
EBM has brought about positive changes in healthcare; however, the merits of EBM do not 
turn this approach into the “best choice available”. Further changes might improve the care of 
patients even further, in particular if physicians learn better ways to integrate research with 
non-research sources of evidence. 
It is worth emphasising that my aim in this thesis has not been to try to defend the role of 
clinical judgment in a blind way. I agree that there is some evidence that clinical judgment 
can be unreliable, and I certainly concur with those who claim that it is not a suitable method 
for generating general population-level medical knowledge. So, by calling for more room for 
the exercise of clinical judgment, I am not advocating a blind trust in clinical judgment, but 
rather urging a systematic study of its performance. One of the negative by-products of the 
EBM movement has been a lack of interest in learning about and improving clinical judgment.  
What I am certainly arguing against, though, are any a priori assumptions that the EBM 
approach is always better than physicians’ predictions and prescriptions. As I have shown, 
this faith is not supported by evidence.  
Once we recognize the general presence of the PEI, and the consequent need for clinical 
judgment, it will become important to learn more about different levels of physicians’ 
performance in a variety of real settings. Of course, any such analysis will face many 
practical challenges. But it is certainly better than assuming that clinical judgment is 
unreliable altogether and it should not be given any official place in the context of clinical 
inference. We need to be serious about understanding clinical practice, by measuring its 
success and failures in practice, and helping physicians  to improve it as much as possible. 
As the Kenneth Goodman (2003) suggests  “We should neither wallow in [clinical judgment] 
nor hope to overcome it. Rather, reducing conceptual biases, disclosure, and increased and 
improved learning are what we should consider as the core faculties that are enlisted when 
we [exercise our judgment]. This has a wonderful advantage over other vague formulations 
or hopeful stipulations: It provides grounds for explaining the good outcomes on those 
occasions when we get it right…and also, and more importantly, a framework for 
improvement.” (p.132). 
The importance of exercising sound clinical judgment, the practical value of clinical 
experience, and the great significance of cultivating sensitivity to patients’ values and 
preferences have all been officially embraced at some point by prominent supporters of EBM 
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(Sackett, et al. 1996). Despite this, EBM as it is practised seems to have forgotten the ideals 
envisaged by its founders. If EBM wants to return to its roots, then it should examine the 
practical import of considered experience. Clinical judgement, just as much as research 
evidence and standardization, needs to be studied and improved by medical bodies, 
governments and funding agencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
